


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19 November 1984

# West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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19 November 1984

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## VIEWS OF KOMISSAROV, VORONKOV ON NORDIC ZONE CONTRASTED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson]

[Text] Two recent Soviet articles, Yuriy Komissarov's report on relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and researcher Lev Voronkov's thoughts on the problem of the nuclear-free zone, are discussed here by Jan-Magnus Jansson.

Two recent Soviet statements of semiofficial character have received attention in the foreign press. The first is an evaluation of the significance of the 40th anniversary of the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union, under the pseudonym of Yuriy Komissarov and published in the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' (International Life). Fortunately, neither Komissarov's original text nor a complete translation was available at the time of this writing. This is unfortunate, since the subtleties are always considered important in articles appearing under this pseudonym.

Komissarov is generally believed to represent the opinions of the Skandinavian Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Publications and articles written by Komissarov alone or jointly with others have been a channel for presenting these opinions, in an unofficial and nonbinding form, to the rest of the world, and especially to the Nordic countries. Since, in any event, they cannot be far from the official line, they have always attracted attention and been analyzed in our country.

We may recall the debate that flared up in our country over the reflections on Finish neutrality and the Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact presented in a book that appeared under the pseudonyms Komissarov and Bartenev several years ago. It may be considered typical that this discussion has not come up in the present context and, according to all indications, had no impact on the recently published survey by Komissarov.

The problems that were brought out in the discussion at the end of the Kekkonen era have hardly disappeared entirely, but they are considered to be no longer of interest and are not mentioned. Recent evaluations of relations between our two countries, even those made in the Soviet Union, have been positive

without exception. The brief statement made on television by state and party leader Konstantin Chernenko on the 40th anniversary may be the most unqualifiedly positive statement ever made publicly by a Soviet leader.

According to all indications, the Komissarov article has the same basic thrust. With regard to Koivisto, Komissarov notes that the new president is following his predecessor's foreign policy line. He does see some slight differences, however, such as a change in the style of leadership and the fact that Koivisto's policies may be closer to those of Paasikivi than those of Kekkonen. These observations do not simply reflect Komissarov's own view, but are taken from the debate here at home and, in part, from the president's own statements. Of course, it should be noted primarily that, after the Cuban missile crisis died down, Kekkonen led Finland during a time of relative international calm. Koivisto took over at a time when international relations were more tense than any time since 1962. This, in itself, leaves little room for efforts toward detente, so that greater emphasis is placed on relations with our neighboring countries, which is the basis of our entire policy.

According to a summary of the article, it also contains an indirect reference to the threat presented by the cruise missiles. If so, it may be said that Komissarov is following a tradition he has created himself, since his articles have been an important channel through which the Soviet view of the cruise missiles has been communicated to us since 1979.

A much more controversial topic is dealt with by a Soviet researcher, Lev Voronkov, in a book on plans for a nuclear-free Nordic zone. The English title of the book is *Non-Nuclear Status to Northern Europe*. The book attracted much attention in the Nordic countries last weekend when DAGENS NYHETER presented some of the highlights. Here at home, the book was reviewed in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET of 13 September. Since this is a comprehensive presentation of the Soviet view on the nuclear-free zone issue, it may be assumed that the manuscript was prepared some time ago, although events such as Olof Palme's speech in Helsinki in 1983 and the subsequent international seminar on the zone issue are included.

Lev Voronkov's book is probably the first examination of the zone question from the Soviet standpoint that can claim to be thorough and it deserves our interest, if for this reason alone. Voronkov is well known as a researcher in the field of international politics both here and in the other Nordic countries. He is a writer with a rather militant profile and his views hardly represent official policy in every detail, although it is reasonable to say that they do not contradict official policy, either.

There are many points of interest in the chapter devoted to a nuclear-free Nordic zone. The chapter begins with a total rejection of the term "Nordic balance," which is said to be cherished by those who oppose initiatives in favor of disarmament and arms control. In fact, this once-common term has been more or less eliminated from our foreign policy vocabulary, although in part for different reasons than those mentioned by Voronkov.

After analyzing various international documents and attitudes, such as the so-called Tlatelolco Treaty, which established a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, and examining the work of the group of experts appointed in 1974 by the United Nations as a result of a Finnish initiative to study the question of nuclear-free zones, Voronkov then turns to opinions and positions of more immediate interest. Of particular interest is the section describing the Soviet position on international guarantees for nations included in the zone and on commitments for limiting nuclear weapons on its own territory.

With regard to the latter, Voronkov stated categorically that the measures the Soviet Union is willing to consider in those portions of the country bordering on the Nordic countries will depend on a number of questions, such as which countries are included in the zone and the conditions under which the zone is formed. In addition, they would also depend on whether or not the West would provide guarantees for the zone or if the Soviet Union would be the sole guarantor. For these reasons, the Soviet Union is unwilling to state the specific concessions it would make at this stage.

Of particular interest is Voronkov's statement on the status of the Baltic Sea in a nuclear-free zone. As we know, certain statements on the possibility of including the Baltic Sea in some type of zone have been made previously by the Soviet side (for example, in General Tatarnikov's interview in SUOMENMAA some time ago). Voronkov put a slightly new perspective on the question. In connection with Olof Palme's speech in Helsinki, for which he had high praise otherwise, he argued against the Swedish position according to which the question of including the Baltic Sea in a nuclear-free zone would have to be dealt with during any future negotiations on a nuclear-free Nordic zone. Voronkov responded that the military problems of the Baltic Sea were not a Nordic issue, but were related to the military balance throughout Europe. This is a problem that can be solved as part of a wider picture--as part of a zone system stretching throughout Europe to the Mediterranean Sea, not simply in connection with a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

According to the arguments presented by Voronkov, the Soviet Union relates all measures outside the Nordic region per se to the general problem of arms control and nuclear-free zones in Europe. As we know, Norway and Denmark have stated that a nuclear-free Nordic zone cannot be considered in isolation, but should be seen as part of a greater European comprehensive solution. Now that, despite a lack of real progress, discussions on the zone issue are underway again--the debate may be centered around Denmark, which has been relatively passive so far--it should be remembered exactly how complicated the issue is.

9336

CSO: 3650/27

OPPOSITION SOUR ON NATO REFERENDUM, MORAN ON MC

Madrid YA in Spanish 10 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Julio Fernandez]

[Text] The Popular Group and the Catalan Minority oppose calling a referendum on NATO, even though the government wants Spain to stay in this international alliance. Yesterday, however, at the meeting of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Commission the minister of foreign affairs, Fernando Moran, repeated his view that if Spain decides to stay in the Atlantic Alliance, Spain's membership in the Military Committee will have to be reconsidered.

The AP [Popular Alliance] and PDP [People's Democratic Party] leaders have been discussing their position on the referendum the government announced during the meeting held last Wednesday [3 October], and they have agreed to oppose this call for a referendum, no matter what the official position, for they believe that it is not a state issue, but rather an internal PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] conflict harmful to the nation's policy.

Manuel Fraga reported during the meeting on the concern that Felipe Gonzalez had shown, when they dined together that day, about what the Popular Coalition's position might be if the referendum were oriented by the government toward a position favorable to remaining in NATO.

The principal opposition groups feel that the support offered to Felipe Gonzalez on foreign policy issues as a state matter does not extend to the referendum. "The government is conducting a foreign policy focussed on resolving party problems, and the NATO referendum goes outside state issues," said Miguel Herrero, spokesperson of the Popular Group.



The vice president of the PDP, Jose Luis Alvarez, feels it is "immoral" to call for a referendum to resolve internal problems, and even more so to try to win such a referendum with the votes of those whom in the past the PSOE branded as warmongers.

Nor does the spokesperson of the Catalan Minority, Miguel Roca, consider the referendum a national issue. "The people they should consult are their own grassroots people," he said, referring to the socialists, "because the rest of us in other political groups have already decided that issue some time ago."

The Basque nationalists say they favor membership in the Atlantic Alliance, and even though in the past they also supported holding a referendum, now their parliamentary spokesperson, Marcos Vizcaya, feels that conditions changed after integration in 1982, and the issue should be debated once again within the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party].

Despite the fact that the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] not only supports, but even demands a popular referendum, the protests expected upon the government's pro-western announcement will cause that party to be left absolutely alone at the time the referendum is held, and possibly to have to face a challenge from some segments of its own party.

Neither the Popular Group nor the Catalan Minority was yet ready to issue a statement on the position they will ask of their supporters if the referendum is finally held, thus making it an even more difficult problem. Nonetheless, both parties would accept as a lesser evil a reasonable campaign in favor of participation in the defense of the west, so long as such a campaign did not bring in the victories in the EEC negotiations which the government might allege in its favor--something that is constantly becoming more and more difficult.

Moran: No to the Military Committee

The minister of foreign affairs, Fernando Moran, yesterday spoke briefly to the Congressional Foreign Affairs Commission to discuss the recent visit by NATO's Military Committee to Spain. Moran, in response to a question from Santiago Carrillo, commented on his recent statements, that if Spain does stay in NATO, it would be necessary to reconsider its membership in NATO's Military Committee.



The minister praised France's position in NATO. France maintains a purely protocolar representation in the military organization. The communist deputy, Santiago Carrillo, made use of this opportunity to accuse the Atlantic Alliance of representing the interests of capitalism and imperialism and of harboring a dictatorial regime--the Turkish government--among its membership.

7679

CSO: 3548/15

## SPAIN PARTICIPATING IN NATO FRIGATE DEVELOPMENT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 10 Oct 84 p 20

[Article by Maria Jose Mendez]

[Text] Spain has a strong possibility of developing the prototype of the "NATO frigate for the 1990s," which is now in the feasibility studies phase, reported the engineer, Rear Admiral Remigio Diez Davo, director of innovation and technology at the Bazan National Enterprise, during a press conference.

Spain, as a full member of NATO, is taking part in the joint project, along with the United States, Canada, France, Holland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Great Britain.

Studies being done on the future frigate are concentrating on a ship of 4,000 to 4,500 tons which will require highly sophisticated sensors, functional radar systems, surface to surface and surface to air missiles, antisubmarine torpedoes and helicopters.

Rear Admiral Diez Davo said that the frigate, now being planned well in advance of its start of operation, will be designed to incorporate two major technological innovations during its lifespan, which will be approximately 30 years. The primordial objective of this project, in which the eight nations listed above are participating, is "to get a frigate for the next decade that between the years 1995 to 2010 will be able to replace the ones that may become unusable--about 100--and which will incorporate shared logistics and distribute basic costs."

To carry out the project of the frigate for the 1990s, a multinational company was set up, formed by industries representing the eight nations taking part in the feasibility study. The firm's capital was paid in equal shares by all the nations, with the exception of the United States, which has a special payment system. Spain is part of this company (ISS) through the

Bazan enterprise. The company is located in Hamburg, and is now operating at full efficiency. Of the 136 engineers working in the company, 18 are Spanish.

Rear Admiral Diez Davo said that it is too soon to speak of the number of frigates that might be built, "even though I wouldn't be too far off if I said a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 160, to meet the requirements of the eight countries involved."

The planning of the frigate for the 1990s will go through a number of phases during the next few years. In 1984 and 1985 the feasibility study will be completed, and in 1986 and 1987, the contract proposal will be prepared. The project development will take place from 1988 to 1992, and construction of the prototype will start at the end of this decade.

7679

CSO: 3548/15

## FLEMISH SOCIALISTS' CLAES ON RELATIONS WITH WALLOON SOCIALISTS

Brussels L'EVENEMENT in French Sep 84 pp 20-25

[Interview with Willy Claes, minister of state: "Willy Claes, the Little Red Man"; by Jean-Claude Ricquier; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] One of Churchill's well-known dictums was: 'To have done nothing is a great advantage, but one must not abuse it...'

In the case of Willy Claes, one is almost tempted to invert the adage. At the age when most are barely emerging from anonymity, he has held and distinguished himself in all the high posts of our public life: Deputy, minister, vice prime minister, party chairman, "formateur" [person designated by king to form new government], "informateur" [person designated by king to lead the opposition], and for the past several months now, minister of state; the latter represents for our political leaders what the French Academy embodies for French writers. There is indeed a Pantheon aspect in our Crown Councils: There, the white-haired old stagers far outnumber the quadragenarians.

Our man, with some 12 years of ministerial career behind him, is only 45. Willy became a minister for the first time in 1972 when, under the last government headed by Gaston Eyskens, he took over the Ministry of National Education from Pierre Vermeylen who feared, paternally, that he might be ill-served by an excess of timidity. The following year, in the Leburton tripartite government, at age 34, he took over Economic Affairs: The youngest of our ministers thus took on the most exacting of that government's tasks.

In December 1973, LA RELEVÉ published a commentary on the results of his ministerial activity and on the way he went about carrying out his governmental functions. It wrote: "Willy Claes presents us with a radically different image from that of the traditional Belgian politician, one that is all the more refreshing for his belonging to an old and weary party. In his television appearances, alone or in debate, he comes across as a direct, sincere man, who recognizes his weaknesses and the limits of his powers, a courageous, lucid and open-minded person. Willy Claes is not afraid to act on his own responsibility, and sometimes against the current of public opinion. He is open to dialogue, congenial, respectful of the opinions of others, firm but warm. In just a few months, he has attained the maturity and stature of a statesman. That all too rare fact is worthy of note. Hurting as we are in this respect, it is a consolation."

To this portrait, which is 12 years old, very little can be added. He, whom LIBRE BELGE has dubbed the "Little Red Man," has in no way been spoiled by power. His smiling simplicity has remained intact, as has that sort of easygoing cordiality that has earned for him, in Belgian public opinion, not a boisterous popularity but something like a spontaneous well of affection. Since everything about him is authentic, he naturally and effortlessly inspires esteem and trust.

This musician's style is always impeccable, which is a rare thing in our political world, where redundancy, make-believe, razzle-dazzle and excesses of language are legal tender. At the halfway point in his life, is the governmental career of this youngest of our ministers of state already behind him? It will be interesting in this respect to watch developments within the Flemish Socialist Party, which is, and by very far, the party that has most renewed itself in our country in recent years.

[Question] As of today, the Socialist family has become the principal political force in our country, which it had never been since 1936. However, relations between the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] and the SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)] appear to be very tense. Do you attribute this tension solely to "communal" problems?

[Answer] Yes. Because on socioeconomic and budgetary issues, for example, there is a wide-ranging identity of views between the two parties. It is therefore communal issues that separates us, and I would say further that they are communal problems of a secondary order of importance. For on the central issue--namely, that to find a viable solution, a new dialogue is needed between the French-speaking and the Flemish, without which no solution whatever will be possible--the SP and the PS are in agreement. Therefore, let's not beat around the bush: The Happart affair is a true bone of contention between the two parties. Far be it from me to want to add fuel to the fire in this matter. But I must say that, while I have always deplored the doings of the TAK [Language Action Committee] and the VMO [Flemish Militant Order], I feel the same way with regard to those of Jose Happart, whose attitudes do nothing other than exacerbate our communal tensions without helping in any way whatever to resolve them. For years now, Belgium has lost no opportunity to make a fool of itself on the international scene. Thus, I deeply regret that the PS has taken it upon itself to once more make us look ridiculous.

But that is its affair, not mine...

[Question] It is generally felt that you were one of the most resolute opponents of this divorce between Socialists. Do you feel that Andre Cools, who was one of its proponents, acted out of petulance or spite?

[Answer] It is true that I was an ardent opponent of this divorce. I therefore strongly opposed Andre Cools at the time, which, however, has in no way changed my feeling of great friendship for him. But he has told me several times that he feels he has lost some 20 years of his life over the simple

fact that in communal matters the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] has never ceased renegeing on its promises. He then extended his judgement of the CVP to the whole of Flanders and hence to the Flemish Socialists as well. Consistent in his stand, since he advocated the autonomy of Wallonia, he also wanted autonomy for its political forces. That, in my view, is where he errs, in that it appears to me that in all the federally constituted countries, with a far greater degree of federalism than ours, the political parties have remained unitary, or national if you prefer. The same is true, moreover, of the big labor and employer unions. This is why I continue to regret this divorce.

[Question] You are generally considered to be an advocate of the social democracy that characterizes Flemish socialism. Has this not profoundly changed since the rise of Karel Van Miert and his friends to the leadership of the SP?

[Answer] There is no question that there has been a change, but not insofar as concerns our socioeconomic doctrine. The young generation of the SP--that of the Van Mierts, De Batseliers, Tob [text missing] back, etc.--has sought to impart to the image of our party a more sharply defined, a more salient, profile in at least two domains: That of communal issues, where the SP has become radicalized, leading Philippe Moureaux to characterize us as leftist Volksunie, which is totally inexact, since we are not nationalists; and that of foreign policy, namely, the defense of human rights in third-world countries, and disarmament in Europe. But in socioeconomic matters, the SP has remained social democratic, hence very much unlike the French PS. In our country, for example, there is no great rush toward nationalizations.

[Question] What are the exact circumstances surrounding Karel Van Miert's rise to the leadership of your party?

[Answer] I must say that I am quite proud to have been at the base of the rejuvenation of my party. The generation that preceded me was a product of the War, of the resistance movements.

They were men who had known each other in London, or here in occupied Belgium. The solidarity that united them was indeed remarkable. They were friends, brothers. And since they had entered politics very young, they remained in it a very long time, forgetting to make room for younger men. This explains our successive electoral defeats since 1965: The young voters shifted away from us. Consider that when I entered the government for the first time--that was in 1971 and I was 33 then--I found myself the colleague of men like Louis Major, Hendrik Fayat, Vranckx, Edouard Anseele, all between the ages of 60 and 70. So was Achille van Acker, who was still president of the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, there was a real generation gap. I was practically the only bridge between those men and today's new breed. At the age of 45, I am presently my party's eldest former member of Parliament... That illustrates how things have changed. It was when I became co-president of the Socialist family, together with Andre Cools and in full agreement with him, that I opened wide the doors of the party to the younger generations. I went out after Karel Van Miert in the cabinet of Henri Simonet, who was

a member of the European Commission at the time. I did the same with regard to Freddy Willockx, who was teaching at the University of Ghent. We also fielded Roger de Wulf, Rik Boel, Vandenbossche, etc... Uppermost in my mind was definitely a policy of rejuvenation.

[Question] Do you think the Van Miert effect will spill over beyond only the arrondissement in which he will be running for election and extend throughout Flanders, as occurred during the European elections?

[Answer] I am convinced it will. True, we centered our entire European campaign around the person of Karel Van Miert. But our principal themes strike a profound chord in our youth: Peace, human rights, the enhancement of social solidarities, and disarmament.

We will become Flanders's most youthful party and will wield a political force that has been but a gleam in starlit eyes for the past 20 years.

[Question] One has the impression, however, that Flemish Socialist youth is not all that anxious to govern. It seems to have more of a taste for pure and radical opposition than for governing. Do you share this feeling?

[Answer] I frequently hear that said. But I believe that is a self-serving theme that is being pushed by the Flemish Social Christians, who are using it to contend that they have no choice but to continue governing together with the Liberals... That said, I recognize that among the youth of the SP there is little inclination toward political compromises, which, of course, complicates somewhat the putting together of a coalition government. But I want to make it as clear as possible that the SP is a candidate for the office of government and that in saying this I translate the desire of the vast majority of our membership sections.

[Question] Are you one of those who believes that the regionalization and evolution of our public life can lead to the formation of governments which the traditional parties would support or not support according to their linguistic bias? Can you envision a government without the PS?

[Answer] Personally, I would oppose with every ounce of energy I could muster the formation of a government based on an asymmetrical majority. If what is sought is the end of Belgium, that would be exactly the way to go about it. I speak both as a Socialist and as a Belgian citizen. First, I speak as a Socialist: Try to imagine the position of the FGVB [Federation of Labor of Belgium] and of the National Union of Mutual Aid Societies with respect to a government which, for example, the SP supported but which I opposed. It would be an untenable situation; the government would not last 3 months. And the most serious consequence would be that the major social organizations would risk disintegration, whereas they are the very foundation of the union of the Belgians. As a Belgian citizen, I add that I cannot really see what advantages the Flemings, the Walloons or the Brussels community could hope to derive from a fragmentation of the country. I do not share the pretentious viewpoints of some Flemings who affirm that the



independence of Flanders would be highly favorable to the interests of the northern part of the country. Those are irresponsible words and attitudes. Everything points to the fact that the future of our country will be determined at the international level. Continental boundaries are already a thing of the past, and what some would want in our case is to shrink our little domain still further. There is no sense whatever in that...

#### The Inside Story

[Question] Comparing yourself with Guy Spitaels, both as former minister and as leader of the opposition, what differences do you perceive?

[Answer] While Guy Spitaels and I were together in the government, our mutual working relations were perfect. I cannot remember a single instance of conflict. Not even in the case of the steel industry issue, which caused me so many difficulties in my own party. Presently, the situation is entirely different. I am no longer chairman of the SP, whereas Spitaels carries the entire responsibility as head of the PS. The major difference I perceive between him and me is that he seems to me to feel more than I do the need for a revision of the country's structures. Personally, I don't have very much faith in the effectiveness of institutional restructurings. I lean more towards the economic and financial problem areas. Spitaels and I see very much eye to eye in these areas. But on communal issues, he has been compelled to take farther-out positions than mine.

[Question] Is it principally because of its austerity policy that the present Belgian government is being so severely criticized by you?

[Answer] Absolutely not. I refuse to take a different stand in the opposition from the one I maintained while in the government. I have always argued in favor of a certain austerity. And I say clearly that the Socialists do not have a miracle cure for the crisis we are experiencing. But in my view, an austerity policy is not justified unless all efforts are mobilized to promote a voluntaristic rebound of employment. The first plan of Martens's fifth government was based on restoring the competitiveness of our enterprises. Its second plan is based solely on tidying up the budget. Personally, I doubt the success of this plan as long as we do not improve our employment situation structurally. Furthermore, the effort being asked of the population is too ungraded, and the less well-to-do are having to make truly excessive sacrifices. I invite your attention to a document that has just been published by the Emile Vandervelde Institute. It concerns a survey, the results of which are frightening. Do you know that for the fiscal year 1982-83 the CPAS's [Public Center(s) for Public Aid] in Flanders had to augment their interventions by as much as 35 percent?... And I refer to interventions solely in the "vital minimum" sector. What is involved is actually a new form of poverty. And if the additional tax burden being placed on the small independents is not yielding any more than 1 billion, rather than the 12 billion the government had envisioned, it is not owing to fraud on the part of the independents but rather to the fact that their revenues have taken a nose dive. If the government does not take heed, it seriously risks



drifting toward a radical change in the structure itself of the Belgian society. It is indispensable, therefore, as we Socialists see it, that the burden of the austerity policy be better distributed.

[Question] When the present government was formed, the Socialists were approached. What were your reasons at that time for refusing to participate in it?

[Answer] I do not agree with you. We were not approached, or at least, in any case, not from a positive point of view. I will tell you exactly what happened. Even before the elections a prior agreement existed between the Social Christians and the Liberals. The fact is that, while the Eyskens government was still in office, Wilfried Martens was approached by Willy De Clercq and Frans Grootjans. The Liberals were fully aware that the Democratic Christians had forsworn ever participating again in a government with the Socialists, and above all with the Walloon Socialists, after the events that took place in connection with the steel industry issue. Then came the elections and the out-and-out historic defeat experienced by the Social Christians on that occasion. Strangely enough, the Social Christians, principally Flemings, attributed the causes of their electoral defeat to the Socialists, and above all to the Flemish Socialists. To hear them tell it, they committed no errors whatever; we committed them all... Hence the CVP's well-justified decision never to govern with them again.

Immediately following the elections, the head of state appointed the PVV's [Party of Liberty and Progress] Van der Poorten as "informateur." The latter immediately committed an imprudence by very quickly recommending the designation of Wilfried Martens as "formateur." Summoned to Laeken, however, he was not designated. He pleaded that the defeat of his party had been so keenly felt that he needed time to try to assuage somewhat the CVP's trauma. So Willy De Clercq was designated. But the PSC opposed him. So, Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb was designated, although it was perfectly obvious that he stood no chance whatever of succeeding.

And it was not until during the course of Nothomb's mission, which I would characterize a false mission, that the Socialists were approached. With a delegation of the SP, I went to see Mr Nothomb at the Parliament. We delivered to him a document that was the synthesis of our proposals. While he was studying it, he received a telex message conveying a veto, of Liberal origin, of any eventual participation by us. We then asked him: "What, then, are we doing here again...?" He replied: "Give me some time to think about it." A few hours later he had been relieved of his mission.

Wilfried Martens having by then succeeded in calming somewhat the bitterness of the CVP, his name was put up again. The negotiations then started without the Socialists having been consulted again, or even approached again. So let no one come around saying that we wanted a stint as the opposition or that we opposed an austerity policy. It is absolutely untrue. I would add that under Martens's first, second and third governments, several proposals originated by the Socialists to tidy up the budget were rejected by the CVP,

under various pretexts. I shall conclude by saying that at Rue des Deux Eglises, there is a distressing tendency to write history in a very unilateral manner...

[Question] Over the past 10 years, you have very frequently been in government and you have held some key portfolios. To what do you attribute the frightful exacerbation of our public debt and of our budgetary deficits?

[Answer] All three of our traditional political families must bear their share of the responsibility in this regard. But that of the Social Christians is a particularly heavy one. Since 1958, with the exception of the ephemeral Leburton cabinet, they have constantly held the position of prime minister and, almost constantly, that of Finance. Their share of the responsibility is therefore greater than that of the Liberals and the Socialists. How, then, is one to explain that laxness, which, for example, an Achille Van Acker would never have permitted? I think it is explained by the profoundly heterogeneous character of the Social Christian family. As an on-going thing, the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] and the CVP must continue meeting contradictory demands in order to satisfy the interests of their diverse components. And it goes without saying that, especially during periods of crisis, this manner of satisfying everyone is nothing other than ruinous. I recognize, in this regard, that a considerable change has taken place since Martens's fifth government, a change that, in my view, is based on an entirely false reading of the political situation that has emerged from the last elections. The Social Christians are aware that: "Our Rightist constituency has left us to team up with the Liberals. We have to bring them back; and this is realizable by espousing a conservative policy, inasmuch as we have sufficiently in hand the ACW [General Christian Workers Federation] and the MOC [Christian Workers Movement]." However, the European elections have just shown that reasoning to be totally inexact. For while it is possible that certain Liberal voters may have returned to the PSC and the CVP, it is clear that a large percentage of the Christian electorate of the Left, and especially its youth, have come over to the Socialist family. And I perceive that to be true especially on the Flemish side of things. In having erred in its analysis, the CVP has lost its bet...

[Question] It cannot be denied, however, that the prime minister is popular.

[Answer] I do believe that Wilfried Martens is convinced that by taking over as head of his party, he will commit "mayhem" in the next elections. Personally, I am not at all convinced of that. I have just completed a very active European elections campaign, during which I met people of the most diverse viewpoints and talked with a great many. And what I found was that the prime minister is considered the one most responsible for the loss of buying power. While the CVP may think it clever to put him at the head of its ballot for the forthcoming legislative elections, the fact is it will be committing another major error. I see no way this party can recover terrain in Flanders. Except for Ghent, of course, because there, Wilfried Martens will benefit from the departure of Willy De Clercq for the European Commission...

## Exercise of Power Takes Its Toll

[Question] Are you concerned about the economic situation in Limburg?

[Answer] Very concerned. In Limburg the situation is as disquieting as in Liege; with many exacerbating circumstances, such as: In Liege the worst seems to be over, while in Limburg the worst is still to come; the unemployment rate among the active population there is 25 percent and, what is more, almost all of these jobless are youths, since the figures show that between now and the year 2000, Limburg will account for close to 60 percent of the growth rate of the Flemish population... This gives you an idea of the magnitude of the problems that await us.

[Question] In some circles, you are being blamed for having signed long-term gas supply contracts that are far too costly. Do you agree with these reproaches?

[Answer] There are many sides to this question. First, the contract with the Dutch. It is true in regard to it that I was compelled, after a tough battle, to accept a gas price increase that constituted a unilateral breach of contract by the leader of the Dutch. For this maneuver, they appointed a special ambassador, Mr Spierenburg, to go from capital to capital explaining that the Parliament in The Hague had voted this price rise and that in the Netherlands the Parliament is supreme... And they threatened us purely and simply with cutting off our supplies. Like the Germans and the Italians, we were compelled to give in to the Dutch demands. As for Algeria, it was not I who signed that contract, but rather Distrigaz, the majority of which is owned by the private sector. What I did, at the request of the gas sector, was approach the Algerians to double their quantities. This is how, as the result of the negotiations I conducted, we obtained an increase from 2.5 billion cubic meters to 5 billion cubic meters. I was then criticized for having agreed to a price formula, a "package," embodying both the price of refined products and that of crude products. It was highly advantageous to us. But of course, the cost of transporting the liquid gas must be paid, and this explains why Algerian gas is far less advantageous than Dutch gas. On the other hand, however, Algeria is a third-world country, and I feel that with third-world countries it is not reasonable to ask them to invest billions of dollars, to guarantee us continuous supplies, without committing ourselves to a certain long-term price policy. This is also the only way to insure ourselves against disruptions of our provisionment, a risk that the least military crisis in the Persian Gulf, for example, could render actual. That, in sum, was the thinking underlying my policy: To guarantee us against the precarious nature of the flow of our gas supplies. In conclusion, let me add that our contract with the Algerians provides that prices can be renegotiated at year-end 1985. The future is therefore open-ended.

[Question] Man of action that you are, are you unhappy in the opposition?

[Answer] Not at all... Over a period of 10 years, I have been a minister for 7 years and chairman of the party. It is a hectic life. I indeed

realized that I was living at the limit of my physical capabilities and my mental faculties as well. I am therefore very happy to be able to step back, to be able to view problems from a higher vantage point, and to recharge my intellectual batteries, a very hard thing to do in government, where the pace is a punishing one. Let me add that the exercise of power takes its toll of political leaders; it tends to change them, and not always for the better... This is what threatens Wilfried Martens, whom I know very well, whom I esteem and who is about my age: He risks seeing his personality changed by too long a total period in power. And finally, when one is a minister, one must beware, as one would of the plague, of the innumerable flatterers that swarm out of the woodwork, and of the cohorts of self-styled "friends," whose very names one does not even know...

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## KOIVISTO PRESENTING LOW PUBLIC PROFILE

Includes Foreign Affairs Role

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Oct 84 p 15

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Koivisto Returns to the Limelight"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto has been practically forgotten by the media for the last few months except for some small news items on his routine official duties. The 40th anniversary celebrations of the armistice and of the Finland-Soviet Union Society, as well as the state visits of GDR's leader Erich Honecker, are bringing the president into the limelight of wider publicity for the first time in quite a while.

In the beginning of Koivisto's term, the media carefully followed the doings of the new president, commented on his pronouncements and publicized the creation of an active relationship to the country's leader. Since last winter, however, Koivisto seems to have been allowed to withdraw in peace into the low-profile invisibility of his official duties.

The president has not said or done anything in a long time that would attract larger notice. And since the president has not made any trips abroad either, his public profile has become even lower than low.

During the summer, however, the president did allow himself to be interviewed by the Mainos-television channel, but the interview yielded very little. It was reported that the president himself was disappointed with the results.

President in Reserve

Already when he became president, it was apparent to all that Koivisto was a completely different kind of president from Urho Kekkonen. In foreign policy Koivisto hastened to swear by the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, but by his later style has shown himself more precisely to be attracted to Paasikivi rather than Kekkonen. In domestic policy, he announced he wanted to stay in reserve and let the government and parliament take care of things.

Still, the change in the style of the presidential office has been more marked than was expected even two years ago. Koivisto has not been satisfied with just being restrained in the use of his authority; he has withdrawn to be largely unreachable to public attention.

Editors and foreign diplomats who follow the news as part of their jobs know hardly more about the president's position on current issues than the general public. Information doesn't even come through the president's government offices or inner circle. Neither the new head of government offices, Jaakko Kakela, nor anyone else, has become a spokesman for the president.

According to the etiquette that has developed in media relations, the editors' only chance for questioning the president occurs in conjunction with his official visits abroad. The only trip of this kind this year was a state visit to England in mid-October.

Why then should a president act more visible? Why should editors, and through them the nation, have to know what the president thinks about various issues? Isn't the president's reserve a sign, on the contrary, that life is going on normally and that everything is fine with the country?

President Koivisto himself at least seems to think just this. Whether his notion of the president's public role agrees with the majority of the people's conception, is too early to say. The general public has perhaps not had the chance to become fully conscious of how radical the change in style has been.

#### Statesmen and Strong Men

Some political scientists have observed that it is hard to imagine a vacuum at the pinnacle of power. If the president does not act like a strong man--the head of the house--someone else easily rises to become it; in our case, the prime minister. Many think they are already seeing signs of this.

Kalevi Sorsa's role as strong man is, furthermore, difficult to restrict to domestic policy. His position as the country's most experienced foreign policy official, as the chairman of the largest party, and as spokesman for the Socialist International necessarily gives him international weight. This was very evident during Sorsa's recent Soviet Union visit.

The president's low public profile has also given plenty of opportunity for publicity to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, who, like Sorsa, has taken on an increasingly statesman-like role. Both have left domestic policy squabbling to the party secretaries Erkki Liikanen and Seppo Kaariainen.

After the requisite steps of the beginning of his presidential term, Koivisto does not seem to actively pursue foreign travel either, though there is hardly any scarcity of appropriate targets. This is demonstrated by the Foreign Minister's busy itinerary to almost all parts of the world.

The upcoming state visit to England is the only one planned ahead of time for this year. In the spring the president did visit Moscow twice, but for unforeseen reasons: in February for the funeral of Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov, and in April to make the acquaintance of the new leader Konstantin Chernenko.

#### Poll Supports 6-Year Term

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Oct 84 p 19

[Article: "The Majority Does Not Want to Limit Presidential Terms"]

[Text] The number of citizens who want to limit the terms in office of the republic's president has become lower, and now the majority feels that terms should not be restricted. This is evident in the study which the newspaper KESKISUOMALAINEN did with Taloustutkimus Oy. Those in favor of restriction make up 47 percent, and those against, 53 percent. In the corresponding study a year ago, these positions were both supported equally.

The number of term restriction supporters grew during the year only among members of the Conservative Party. 60 percent of Conservative members believe that terms should be restricted to two. A year ago, 53 percent of the party members supported this position.

Of those who registered as voting "green," fully 78 percent supported limitation. For this group, however, there is no statistic for comparison from a year ago.

Support for restriction went down especially clearly among members of the Center Party. A year ago 58 percent of those voting for the party wanted limitations, but according to the Taloustutkimus study done this September-October, only 47 percent is of that opinion now.

Among Social Democrat voters the change was also clear. A year ago 51 percent favored restriction, now only 46 percent.

Among People's Democrat voters, the number favoring limitation was the lowest, 33 percent. Last year their share was still 45 percent.

Changes in the overall distribution of opinion, however, remain quite small according to the study. In the comparable study of 1982, the division of opinion was exactly the same as this year.

The constitutional amendment being prepared by the Ministry of Justice does not involve presidential terms, which means they will not be limited.

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## CP FACTIONS' LEADERS DIFFER IN INTERPRETING CPSU STAND

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Oct 84 p 10

[Article: "Aalto: SKP Will Put House in Order; Sinisalo: Disunity Must Be Averted']

[Text] On Tuesday the leaders of different factions of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) interpreted in their own way the CPSU Politburo's stand, which was presented to the SKP's delegates on Monday.

According to SKP Chairman Arvo Aalto, who spoke in Laitila, no one should doubt that the SKP's affairs will be put in order.

Every day which has elapsed since the party's 20th Congress in May has confirmed the correctness of the conclusion that there is a need to put the SKP's affairs in order, said Aalto.

"The workers and officials in this country need a consistent and influential communist party, so that the conservative avalanche can be stopped," said Aalto.

Minority leader Taisto Sinisalo said for his part that the CPSU had made an appeal on behalf of "stopping a line of development which would lead in the end to the liquidation of the SKP as a communist party."

According to Sinisalo, the appeal urges all communists to increase efforts to strengthen SKP unity and to enhance the capacity to fight.

"The desire of the party membership for unity must now be made the really decisive factor in organizing the party's short-term activity. This applies especially to the preparations for the next meeting of the central committee," said Sinisalo in his statement.

The kind of activity pattern which aims at disunity must be averted, according to Sinisalo. The resignation of SKP Kainuu district secretary Reino Leinonen and the establishment of parallel district organizations in Uusimaa and Turku are attempts to continue this pattern.



Leinonen belongs to the so-called Third Line supporters. In June the party leadership dominated by the majority launched in the districts of Turku and Uusimaa party work that bypassed the minority leadership.

#### CPSU Concerned about Dissolution

Tuesday, on the basis of information received from various sources, the concern the CPSU feels for the consequences of a possible dissolution of the SKP appeared to be stressed in the stand presented by Grigori Romanov, CPSU Politburo members and Central Committee secretary.

The appeal to prevent dissolution of the party was also interpreted to apply to the minority.

According to the same sources, concern is expressed in the adopted standpoint that the weakening of SKP positions would strengthen those who are trying to pull the rug out from under the basic foreign-policy line led by President Mauno Koivisto.

The standpoint considers it important to organize a special and unifying Congress--a new congress can be held during the first quarter of the year at the earliest.

According to this standpoint, party leadership members who belong to the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] leadership have made statements harmful to party relations, statements from which the SKP leadership has not dissociated itself. The wording may refer at least to the SKP's former chairman, Aarne Saarinen, who is deputy chairman of the SKDL.

SKP first secretary Aarno Aitamurto said Tuesday that the SKP political committee may acknowledge the CPSU letter and discuss it on Wednesday.

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## PAASIKIVI SOCIETY EXAMINES BALTIC SECURITY ISSUES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Oct 84 p 10

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Submarine Incidents Subject of Paasikivi Society Meeting"]

[Text] What is the actual question behind the movement of submarines along the Swedish coast? This was deliberated by experts on Tuesday evening in the Paasikivi Society. As was expected, no unambiguous answer was obtained, but some important partial conclusions were drawn.

Among the most important of them was, perhaps, this: the credibility of Sweden's neutrality in a crisis situation continues to be a key question in the military policy situation of the Baltic Sea. Even the mere idea of Sweden's coast being used by enemy forces is intolerable from the point of view of the Soviet Union's military leadership.

The main speakers participating in the discussion were Chief Editor Jan-Magnus Jansson as well as Chief of Staff and Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg, whose speech was briefly reported in yesterday's issue of HELSINGIN SANOMAT. Both speeches aroused an animated debate, in which the interest of the audience was directed, above all, at the submarine incidents along the Swedish coast and the fundamental reasons behind them.

#### Occupation of Finland Was Not Necessary

Jansson pointed out how Sweden's neutrality has been the support pillar of present security policy in the Nordic area. According to Jansson, the fact that Sweden remained neutral in World War II and after it has decisive effect on the fact that the Soviet Union did not feel a need to occupy Finland.

The submarine incidents have caused serious trauma for the Swedes and has worsened Swedish and Soviet relations. The Soviet Union has not questioned Sweden's neutrality at the official level, but at the semi-official level Sweden has been criticized for its increasing inclination toward the West in weapons technology, among other things, noted Jansson.

Jansson emphasized that from the point of view of Finland Sweden's continued traditional neutrality is of primary importance as well as the continued strength of its defense capability.

Vice Admiral Klenberg showed on the map how the whole western shore of the Baltic Sea is under Swedish control. If necessary the opposite shore of the Baltic Sea and Soviet airspace can be reached from the Swedish coast and its 12-nautical mile wide strip of territorial waters by tactical aircraft, air surveillance radar as well as electronic intelligence equipment.

Even the mere possibility of the western shore of the Baltic Sea being used by forces considered inimical to the Soviet Union must cause anxiety for the Soviet military leadership, believes Klenberg. Therefore, each military threat appearing in the central or northern Baltic Sea strikes a sensitive and vital spot in the defense system of the superpower.

#### Military and Political Explanations

The military significance of the Baltic Sea to NATO as well as to the Warsaw Pact has increased, believes Klenberg. Nevertheless, he considers that there is no particular wave of military armaments inundating the Baltic Sea.

And what about the submarine incidents along the Swedish coast?

There is no reason to dispute the apparent visits of foreign submarines along the Swedish coast, but it is difficult to find an explanation for their activities from the military point of view," emphasized Klenberg.

If it is difficult to find a military explanation, then what are the political signals being sent by this submarine activity, the speakers were asked.

In Chief Editor Jansson's opinion, speculation is not pleasant since this automatically makes the Soviet Union guilty. It is, however, possible to think that the desire is to warn Sweden against leaning toward the West in its neutrality.

Jansson considered such a circuitous way of informing another government about one's feelings to be a rather senseless method since the same information can be directly transmitted from one government to another. Besides, the effect of this activity could be to the contrary.

Vice Admiral Klenberg was even more reluctant to speculate. One can, however, think that the intent of the submarine activity would be to accumulate wrongdoings in the bag of a third party, stated Klenberg. Or to create the impression that it is, indeed, a question of the other side's submarines.

The Swedish Submarine Commission did not believe in any political explanations in its own report. Its chief impression was that the submarine activity was a question of an experiment connected with the plans of military operations.

Professor Goran von Bonsdorff added fuel to the discussion by considering that Sweden's neutrality today is more and more reminiscent of Finland's neutrality in 1939. It is clear that the Soviet Union does not feel any confidence in Sweden's neutrality as long as Sweden's present officer corps considers the Soviet Union as an enemy in the event of war, charged Bonsdorff.

In Bonsdorff's opinion the Nordic area needs a peace policy instead of the Swedish armament policy praised by Jansson and Klenberg. Bonsdorff's speech did not find a response in the hall. On the contrary, he was criticized for making an incorrect statement about Sweden's officer corps.

Would it not be important from the point of view of Finland's outward image that public reports be made of foreign submarines observed in our territorial waters also, Klenberg was asked. Klenberg gave the assurance that this will be the case when it is a question of "significant violations". Compared to Sweden, the situation is, however, peaceful and Finland's territorial waters extend only 4 nautical miles.

"Unfortunately, our credibility is less than that of the Swedes," stated Klenberg. "If I say that not one foreign submarine was observed last year, many will not believe me. If I say that our coastline bristles with submarines, everyone will apparently believe me."

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## NEWSPAPER VIEWS COUNTRY'S CONCERN WITH USSR, SWEDEN TIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Nordic Area's Most Urgent Problem"]

[Text] The Finns are the closest bystanders in the mysterious chain of events along the western shore of the Baltic Sea belonging to Sweden. The search for underwater violators has become a sensational experience for the general public, Karlskrona has become a popular tourist attraction.

Bombs have even been dropped, but damage -- not to mention the taking of lives -- has been carefully avoided. Sharp words have been exchanged on both sides, but relations have not been broken off. A decision has been made to strengthen Sweden's coastal defense, but attempts to improve relations between Sweden and the USSR have for the time being ricocheted off Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's turned back.

Whoever the intruders are, Swedish and Soviet relations are in any event in need of immediate improvement. The situation was recently comprehensively elucidated at a meeting of the Paasikivi Society. The security policy aspect of this situation is vital to Finland. If the Soviet Union's confidence in Sweden's neutrality and defense capability wavers, as is generally suspected, then Finland's position will change from a bystander to a participant. Jan-Magnus Jansson, the chairman of the society, even stated with good reason that the significance of Sweden's neutrality in the make-up of whole Nordic area's security policy continues to be just as decisive as it was for Finland at the conclusion of the war.

It should come as no surprise to the Finns that the security policy problem of Finland and the USSR as far as Leningrad is concerned is now being repeated as a Swedish and Soviet problem in the northern Baltic Sea. But not all the effects of peacetime are being explained in a sufficiently far-reaching manner. Since the emphasis of international tension is in the southern Baltic Sea, the situation further north is too easily left in the background.

But in the northern Baltic Sea the USSR and Sweden remain "face to face". The mention made by Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg, the chief of the General Staff, of the vulnerability of the Soviet defense system is for this very reason arousing thoughts and memories. Besides this, it is especially timely as a consequence of the large construction projects on the Estonian coast. Since the

large city of Stockholm is on the Swedish side, there is reason to consider this problem to be significantly greater than what Leningrad's security problem was a full 40 years ago -- even though there is no war in sight.

In 1939 Finland's security policy problem was in the East. Now it has been transferred in other directions. But Professor Goran von Bonsdorff's argument that Sweden's present neutrality is reminiscent of Finland's neutrality at the beginning of World War II cannot be endorsed. What is essential in this is not what is thought in Finland or in Sweden, but what the Soviet Union's perception of Sweden's neutrality is. One must not, on the other hand, forget that Sweden has behind it a long and more consistent neutral policy than Finland has ever had. In spite of this, the USSR may feel averse toward Sweden because of the more than expected completely Western attitude of the Swedes.

It has not been possible and perhaps there is no desire to give any political explanations for the incidents and territorial violations, but their possibility must, nevertheless, be kept in mind. Indeed, we have had experiences of such practice in this respect. A comparison of the situation to the year 1939 in many respects does not apply. But things can now progress at a much more dizzying speed than before. Therefore, the restoration of confidential relations between Sweden and the USSR as quickly as possible is the Nordic area's most urgent local problem.

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## LATEST 'KOMISSAROV' TREATMENT OF FINLAND IN USSR PRESS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Oct 84 p 8

[Article by Mikko Eronen: "Komissarov Gives Favorable Picture of Finnish Policy"]

[Text] Moscow--The well-known Soviet commentator writing under the pen name of Yuriy Komissarov gave a positive overall picture of Finland's foreign policy line since World War II in a recently published Finland article.

It intent does not seem at all to be one of fault finding in Finland's foreign policy, but rather a reminder of the obligations contained in it.

Under the title "Finland: A Direction of Peace and Good Neighborly Relations" Komissarov wrote a rather long "article of celebration" in a foreign policy journal entitled MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' [International Life], which generally adheres to the views of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Indeed, Komissarov is a member of Foreign Ministry's guards.

While even directly quoting earlier reports, Komissarov described the birth and development of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line from the armistice concluded 40 years ago until the present day. Komissarov also evaluated President Mauno Koivisto's role for the first time in Finland's foreign policy leadership.

Thus it is in part a question of a traditional commemorative article, but Komissarov's text did not contain all the usual ceremonious phrases which appeared earlier in, among other things, the official commemorative articles published in the fall. Komissarov's text is more direct, more sterile.

If one attempts to find new interpretations of Finland's recent history and Finnish-Soviet relations from Komissarov's article this time, they will be difficult to find. It contains no trial balloons.

It seemed that Komissarov was urging Finland to remain constantly vigilant so that events and development's in world politics that might possibly affect Finnish and Soviet relations would be observed in time.

## Activism on Behalf of Peace

Since last spring the Soviet press has printed a considerable number of articles about the revenge-seeking attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany or the aspiration to regain former German territories and about the threat that American medium-range missiles may possibly represent to Northern Europe.

Even though Komissarov seems to approve of President Koivisto's low-profile policy without any reservations, he still would clearly like to see Finland become more active on behalf of peace in its foreign policy. With the support of Finnish commentators Komissarov seems to have come to the conclusion that under President Koivisto the forms of foreign policy have changed, but not its content.

Komissarov seemed in a way to compare Koivisto with Paasikivi, under whom the principle of noninvolvement in disputes between the superpowers was central to Finland's position on international affairs.

As such it is not possible to find one single negative issue on Finland's foreign policy from the Soviet point of view, Komissarov failed to mention them. Instead, he mentioned, among other things, the fact that Finland did not jump on the band wagon of the supporters of a cold war in their condemnation of the Hungarian events or the occupation of Afghanistan at the UN any more than the state of martial law in Poland. He also mentioned President Koivisto's UN speech last year, in which Koivisto supported the Soviet Union's proposal for a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons.

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## CGT LEADER VIANNET ON NEW CNPF UNEMPLOYMENT PROPOSALS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Sep 84 p 7

[Interview with Louis Viannet by Mariano Ortiz: "Management Wants to Destabilize the Right to Work"]

[Text] The meeting which the unions and management are to hold this afternoon within the framework of negotiations on "adaptation to new conditions of employment" will no doubt be livelier than usual. This time, length of work is on the agenda.

But beyond the stands which will be reaffirmed on this occasion and the turns in vocabulary to which the statements of both sides will give rise, management intends to grant real importance only to the last two meetings scheduled for the month of November. The CNPF's desire really is to push the unions to negotiate to the finish an outline agreement in which the main points of its demands concerning the "flexibility" of employment would be recorded.

In the interview that he granted us, Louis Viannet, who leads the CGT delegation, sees in the CNPF's attitude a desire to "destabilize over the long term the notion of full-time employment" and on a broader scale to "get out of" the "constraints" linked to the right to work. For Louis Viannet, by way of negotiations: "We are in the presence of a machination against what remains of the social protection of the right to work."

[Question] The discussions that the unions started with management have now reached the mid-point. Up to this point they have not led to much. This is not likely to sensitize public opinion which, for now, does not understand very well the real objective and the importance of these discussions.

[Louis Viannet] That is true and it is dangerous, because the stakes are high. That is why it seems to me essential to be clear about what the CNPF wants. Its objective is to clear another hurdle on the way toward liquidating wage-earners' guarantees.

It started discussions for that reason, with the hope of obtaining acceptance of some union organizations. Its efforts are not new, but it considers that the situation today may allow it to go far. What it wants, over the long run,

is to destabilize the notion of full-time, stable, guaranteed employment, paid within the framework of collective agreements, and to increase considerably the number of precarious, temporary, part-time jobs, separate from any "constraint" linked to the right to work.

These immediate targets are, obviously, the young, women, and wage-earners more than 55 years old, but everyone understands the formidable pressure which the presence of several million jobs of this type could bring to bear on the conditions of employment, guarantees and remuneration of all others in the private sector or in the public sector.

[Question] Yes, but there is also the question of fighting unemployment. Does that mean that you really do not believe the CNPF when it states that it can quickly create more than 400,000 jobs if given just a little more elbow room?

[Louis Viannet] That is simultaneously a bluff and a threat. It is a scandalous bluff if one is talking about additional jobs, but a real threat for jobs yet to come. What does management say? "If I can create jobs with complete freedom of dismissal, of reduced social security contributions and the possibility of not respecting obligations in matters of personnel representatives, workers' council, health and security committees; if I can multiply part-time employment, I can create more than 400,000 jobs. Let's try it for three years!" And, in the meanwhile, it puts a freeze on hiring.

The current rate of movement (departures/hirings) is about 600,000 to 700,000 departures by retirement or pre-retirement and 400,000 hirings each year. To give in to the CNPF's blackmail is to allow it to transform in three years about 1,500,000 jobs--today full-time and guaranteed--into an equal number of devalued and underpaid mini-jobs. Now, we already currently count about 2,000,000 part-time jobs and, no doubt, more than a million precarious jobs, which would bring the total of jobs not covered by the right to work to a level equal to, indeed above, one-third of the private sector's salaried jobs. It is, in a way, a forced march toward a society a la Reagan. We firmly say: Hold it right there!

[Question] In these discussions, you cannot do without the positions expressed by what is called the "outside partner," that is, the government, and those positions taken by the other union organizations.

[Louis Viannet] That is really why we are sounding the alarm. The government has let it be clearly known that it was ready to examine the CNPF's demands favorably. All the more reason if the CNPF can take advantage of significant union support. And there are risks. The CFDT's recent statements, adopting the essential points of management's demands as its own, are only a confirmation of it. We do not intend to prejudge how the situation may develop, but anything that constitutes, from near or afar, an encouragement to the CNPF's venture is dangerous.

[Question] Please comment on the measures that the government must take to give a so-called collective interest job to young people who are out of work.

[Louis Viannet] This piece of information is included in the reservations that we expressed with regard to measures which the government foresees for young people under 21 years of age. Because here, it is more a question of employing the young than offering them real work. Aren't these collective interest jobs, when all is said and done, locking young people into temporary activities with low pay and no future? This is already preparing them to consider it "normal" to find themselves in part-time, underpaid, unstable jobs. What young people want now is a real job. But, what's more, what a wonderful opportunity for management to call for the generality of these possibilities. If we were to remain silent, that would run a great risk of going in the same direction, against unemployment.

For if tomorrow employers have the possibility of making wage-earners work in poorly-paid, unprotected jobs at the mercy of their employers, why would they create real jobs? As for management, there is no doubt, but I am not forgetting public "employers," and we should remember that hiring free-lancers in the PTT is not so far away. All of that would likewise go against modernization. The full success of modernizing our industry necessitates, among other steps, a training effort and a constantly improving level of qualification which demand stable jobs, and what is being proposed to us is to turn our back on this necessity.

This is why it is necessary to speak out clearly. The CNPF's current step is more a matter of a bid for power than negotiation.

This must be made known, it must all be brought out into the open. We are going to work on it because one single thing can weigh on the development of the situation: the wage-earners' energetic retort. The development of fights for jobs, for safeguarding purchasing power and for the extension of guarantees is the most efficient argument to make management back down from its claims.

9895

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## LACONTRE EXAMINES OGARKOV REMOVAL, GROMYKO MOVES

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 22 Sep 84 pp 80-83

[Article by Robert Lacontre]

[Text] Was Marshal Ogarkov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces, plotting a military coup to get rid of his rivals in the Politburo? In a move unprecedented since the days of Zhukov, he was transferred away from Moscow to a lesser post. Gromyko now seems to be pulling the strings of Soviet policy. He is meeting with Reagan just before the election; thus, the USSR has decided to vote against Mondale.

If Ivan read this in PRAVDA or RED STAR, he would have been surprised. The "brain" of the Red Army has just been decapitated. But that isn't Ivan's problem. The 10 days of leave he is spending in his native village on the banks of the Volga are very dull. The food there is just as bad as in his regiment in Kabul: old potatoes, cabbage, and tasteless gruel. The plump, blond girls in the village don't show any interest in his faded uniform. You can't find vodka and "samogon" (black market alcohol) costs a fortune.

"Why are you messing around with those crazy people?" his father asked when he came home. As if he had any choice about where he was stationed! Ivan is very sad as he takes off his straw-filled boots in the last rays of the summer sunshine: not sad because he doesn't even have a pair of socks, but because his best friend, Igor, died somewhere in the Afghan steppes. Some troublemakers told him that Igor was finished off by napalm from special forces helicopters. After an ambush, the Soviets don't leave their wounded in the enemy's hands. "What a bitch of a war!"

"Soviet Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov has been relieved from his position as chief of staff of the armed forces and as first vice minister of defense because of his assignment to other

duties." Not a word of explanation. Not a line thanking him for his brilliant service record during the 7 years he spent as supreme commander of the armed forces."

At the same time, in the Kremlin courtyard an old man weighed down by 2 kilos of decorations is literally being extracted from a large black limousine, a carbon copy of the 1950s-style American limos. This is Marshal Ustinov, 76, minister of defense, a civilian disguised as a military man, whom the real generals scorn. A Finnish elevator carries him up to the second floor of the building where the Politburo meets once a week in the secretary general's office. Chernenko, 73, arrives next, supported by two bodyguards. He has difficulty talking. Gromyko, 75, is already there, all bent over, but apparently in better shape. The destiny of Soviet Russia is being played out around these three men.

Upon the death of Marshal Malinovsky in 1967, Ustinov, an engineer and the head of the Soviet military-industrial complex, was a candidate for the ministry of defense. But the army didn't want him. The bargaining went on for 23 days, while the body of Zhukov's successor was kept secretly in cold storage. Finally, Ustinov was evicted by a real soldier, Marshal Grechko. Ustinov had to wait a few years for the marshal to die before he could finally get in. Chernenko has just made a reappearance after a 53-day absence. He has been seen on television--looking terrible--congratulating the cosmonauts, the people who hold the record for the longest time spent in space. So it seems that everything will have to start all over again. A new red czar will have to be named, most likely a new minister of defense, and a new chairman of the council of ministers, as Tikhonov is 79.

Among the 12 men in the Holy of Holies of the Soviet leadership --who have nothing in common with the 12 Apostles--there is the clan of the elders: in addition to the four people mentioned above, there are: Grishin, 71; Shcherbitsky, 67; Kunayev, a Kazakh and friend of Brezhnev, 73; and Solomentsev, 72. Then there is the group of young men: Romanov, 62; Aliev from Azerbaydzhan, a KGB specialist, 62; Vorotnikov, the newcomer, 59; and the real baby, the heir apparent appointed by Andropov (which hurts him now), Gorbachev, 54.

In addition to questions of age and alliances, the battle of the succession is being fought essentially between the party, the army, and the KGB. Each of these three groups is intensely

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\* He is to be director of some military academy.

involved, and each keeps a close watch on the two others. There is no doubt that only a military coup d'etat could now transform the regime. The civilians are perfectly well aware of this, and they won't let any military in among their midst: Ustinov, remember, is a civilian. Bonapartism has always been the obsession of foolish old men. Before Ogarkov, there was a well known precedent in the person of Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin, who was removed when he began to nurse political ambitions. History does tend to repeat itself.

Nikolay Vasil'yevich Ogarkov didn't build his career on the battlefields, but in the military academies in Kuybyshev and in Moscow. As a captain in the engineering corps during World War II, the great patriotic war, as it is known in the USSR, he was responsible for building fortifications in Karelia. It was there he met Andropov, a leader of the Komsomol (Communist Youth) and of a group of partisans in that region. His days of glory really began when he was appointed military adviser in the SALT talks with the United States. In actuality, it was his job to keep an eye on the civilians, particularly Semyonov, who didn't know all the secrets of these terrible weapons. The Russians were really taken aback when the Americans brought out into broad daylight their figures on their own arsenal of the Apocalypse and still more so, when the U.S. negotiators released their statistics on the Soviet arsenal.

Little by little, the future marshal and leader of the armed forces began to show his true self. He did everything he could to get his rival, Marshal Kulikov, sent into exile, to have him assigned far away from Moscow, in Poland, as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. When Brezhnev died, he intervened directly against Chernenko, to get Andropov appointed. Today Brezhnev's former private secretary may be getting his revenge. He was directly involved in the affair of the South Korean Boeing shot down by a Soviet fighter with 269 passengers on board. He was the one who held the famous and highly unusual press conference to give his views on what happened. His performance was hardly convincing for the west, but it went much too far in the eyes of his peers, as it contradicted somewhat the Central Committee's official statement, and drew attention to the silence maintained by his boss, Marshal Ustinov.

Again, Ogarkov was the one who, along with Gorbachev, supported Honecker. Honecker really wants to go to the Federal Republic of Germany. The historic meeting between the leaders of East and West Germany has not been cancelled, but merely postponed. It depends on the secret bargaining now going on between the two Germanies, and on what happens in the Kremlin in the days



to come. Honecker needs West German capital because his people are grumbling. East Germany is on the verge of exploding. The pacifist operation of Gromyko and Ustinov not only misfired: it reawakened the west, and also had a boomerang effect on the other side of the Iron Curtain's 1,400-kilometer line. The East Germans don't want the SS 20, 21, 22, and 23 that the Soviets are basing in East Germany. And East Germany's athletes are furious that they were forbidden to take part in the Olympics because, they claim, they were going to win more medals than their Soviet masters.

Ogarkov recently wrote some astounding articles and a brochure: "Always Ready to Defend our Homeland," in which he dwells heavily on the need to prepare the country for war. In the stilted language of the Soviet communists, this means that their preparations are lagging behind now, especially in the areas of electronics and telecommunications. So this is actually a criticism of the work done by the civilians. He pays close attention to these specialties, and reading between the lines we can find the concealed question: "Why does it take 475,000 soldiers to handle missiles in the USSR but only 71,000 in the United States? There is also mention of the big military parade on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October revolution. They had to create a totally new division composed exclusively of officers, as the general staff feared that ordinary soldiers wouldn't be good enough. Then quite recently, the marshal almost got directly involved in international politics, claiming that the Soviets had to negotiate with their capitalist adversary because a nuclear war would destroy both sides, and the Soviet economy can not withstand the frenzied effort of this overheated arms race any longer. And he certainly must have helped Andropov to stir up the diamond scandal in which Brezhnev's daughter, Galina, was implicated.

The Politburo meeting begins. Gromyko is ready for hard times ahead. The unchanging leader of Soviet diplomacy has to move quickly to erase his failure with Ustinov on the anti-Pershing operation. Embittered, he is more and more opposed to letting these "young" men get any real power, bringing in new ideas with them that would only cause disruptions. Suddenly Gromyko, despite his advanced age, gets ideas of grandeur. Why couldn't he be the interim czar, while training a man of his own to ensure the regime's continuity? And then, who else is there?

Gromyko then drops his bombshell. He will meet with Reagan. By doing that, he will pick up some votes for the U.S. president



in the election\*. Why was that decision made? Because the old oligarchs would still rather talk with their hardline adversaries. They preferred Adenauer to Brandt or Schmidt. They wanted Chaban-Delmas rather than Giscard d'Estaing, and then Giscard rather than Mitterrand. Because in their opinion, the worst of the "reactionaries" are people who know what they want. When they sign treaties, they respect them. But the softer-line people, the ones more in tune with the left, are often more unpredictable and more inconsistent.

So Gromyko turns the heat up on everyone. In the United States, Mondale can't accuse Reagan of bellicosity for refusing to talk with the Russians any more. In the USSR, Gromyko is now pulling the strings of Russian policy. The young wolves can do nothing but accept what he has done. But will he have enough support to carry it through? He has just won one round, but he hasn't yet won the game.

Ivan doesn't know any of this. And chances are that he will most likely never know it. What he wants is to live a little better, to have a little more freedom, and more than anything else, he wants an end to this horrible war in Afghanistan, where he now has proof that there was never a single American soldier involved. Ivan has no idea of what geopolitics is. Anyway, why should they fight the Americans, who are so rich, so strong, and so free? At heart, Ivan the soldier is really a pacifist.

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\* It took several days to work out the arrangements. Gromyko is also to meet with Mondale, just to cover up what he is really doing.

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## FATAH COMMANDO GROUP FRENCHWOMAN KILLED IN ANTI-ISRAELI RAID

Paris LE FIGARO in French 25 Sep 84 p 3

[Text] Beirut, AFP. A Frenchwoman from Nice in southeastern France, Francoise Castiman, 34, was killed at dawn Sunday by the Israeli army north of Saida (45 km south of Beirut), while she and four other FATAH members were preparing to conduct an operation in Israel.

This was the first action conducted by a Palestinian organization in which a Frenchwoman took part. In July 1983, a young Frenchman, Henri Eichholtzer, was arrested in Israel and sentenced to 4 years in prison on 12 March 1984. He was charged with "participating in a hostile organization" and of "preparing for attacks on Tel Aviv."

In Beirut, both diplomatic and police sources claim to know nothing about this young woman, not even the date she arrived in Lebanon. To carry out this operation, the group must have embarked either from the coast near Beirut or in the region of Tripoli in northern Lebanon.

It seems that such an operation would have been extremely difficult, for ever since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, the Israeli Navy has constantly been patrolling, fearing an attack from the sea.

According to Israeli sources, and the communique released by FATAH, led by Yasser Arafat, the commando group was preparing to go to Israel when they were intercepted by an Israeli ship. They then decided to head back to the coast north of Saida, when there was an exchange of fire with the Israeli army, leading to the death of the Frenchwoman and of two of her companions; two others were wounded and were taken prisoner.

Israeli sources state that the commando group had an antitank rocket launcher, a machine gun, grenades, five Kalachnikov assault rifles, and ammunition.

According to the Lebanese press, the rubber boat the commandos were using was flying a Lebanese flag and the occupants were dressed in orange clothing.

Shortly after the operation, a communique reached the AFP office in Beirut, with photos of the participants. It stated that a "unit was going by sea to the occupied territories in order to conduct an operation in response to the daily massacres perpetrated by the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories and in southern Lebanon."

The last operation conducted by sea by a Palestinian organization took place on 16 June 1980, when three Palestinians were killed by the Israeli army near Arziv, north of Saint-Jean-d'Acre.

7679

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## REPORTS FROM MEDITERRANEAN PROGRESSIVE PARTIES CONFERENCE

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Sep 84 pp 66-79

[Report on Conference of Mediterranean Progressive Parties and Movements, with introduction by Louis Fath]

[Text] The Fifth Conference of Mediterranean Progressive Parties and Movements was held in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) from 7 to 10 July 1984 with the theme of "Peace, Security and Social Progress."

The conference agenda dealt with two questions:

First of all, the evolution of the situation in the region, the role and contribution of progressive parties and movements in the fight to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace, security and cooperation.

Second, the contribution of progressive parties and movements to the promotion of economic cooperation and other aspects of cooperation between Mediterranean countries.

The presence of 31 organizations<sup>1</sup> from 15 countries permitted a very broad exchange of views on all common problems, existing conflicts and prospects for cooperation.

The conference expressed both the deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean due to imperialist policies, particularly in the Middle East, and the existence of positive trends, as in Lebanon, with the success of the fight of patriotic forces, or in Europe, with the broad scope of the peace movement.

A communique addressed to the public at large was approved.

By virtue of its very existence and the diversity and number of its participants, such a conference now represents something unique in the movement of peoples and the convergence of their struggles for their liberation and social progress. The Belgrade conference, like that in Algiers<sup>2</sup> in 1982, was a success for a better understanding between peoples and in helping promote the cause of peace.

With the final communique, we are publishing lengthy excerpts from the preliminary speech by Marjan Rozic, president of the Federal Conference of the

Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, and that of Maxime Gremetz, member of the Political Bureau, on behalf of the PCF.

Speech by Marjan Rozic (excerpts)

We have accepted this proposal (of hosting the conference) for the following reasons: first of all, because we approve of the idea of turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace, freedom, security and cooperation and second, because we believe that progressive parties and movements in the Mediterranean can be important achievers of this idea and because, in so doing, they express the will of peoples living in this part of the world.

#### Important Force

At the present time, we can say that the important historical changes in the area of the Mediterranean have never come about without the participation of progressive parties and movements. The latter have always been the promoters of the process of liberation, the general emancipation of peoples in the fight for their independence and their free democratic development. They comprise an important force in the struggle for peace, independence and relations of equality, and they are also the promoters of political, economic and social transformations in their countries.

In developing closer mutual contacts, progressive parties and movements have contributed to the establishment of lasting communication between peoples and states in the region. It is to them that we always address messages of peace, friendship and cooperation and in so doing, provide unreserved support for all progressive parties and movements in achieving the objectives and interests of peoples in the Mediterranean.

We drafted the foundations for the meeting together and in a democratic manner. Common interests were set forth with complete respect for equality. In practice, we have confirmed that cooperation is possible between forces oriented differently ideologically and politically, if one starts from what binds and unites them.

Our peoples are linked by a common aspiration to live in peace, security and friendship and to develop freely and cooperate for the benefit of all.

The broad scope of the political and ideological base of our rally is unique. By common objectives, it unifies political parties and movements, the promoters of different progressive political and ideological programs and concepts. This fact is an important reason for our future cooperation on the settlement of matters of common interest.

The principles of equality, opening and benevolence, autonomy and noninterference, respect for differences and specificities, constitute the guarantee of successful cooperation. That is why we attribute special importance to the Conference of Progressive Parties and Movements, in the certainty that it will constitute an important event in the future consolidation of relations between our parties and movements.

## Serious and Unfavorable Situation

The importance of the conference is all the greater because it is being held at a time when the international situation is serious and unfavorable. A considerable deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean has occurred, particularly in the two years since the conference held in Algeria. This further increases the importance of progressive political forces in our region. The responsibility and need for engaging in activities become increasingly marked, for the Mediterranean is the cradle of ancient civilizations and its future is linked to all movements in the world, particularly to peace and security in Europe.

That is why at the present time we must more decisively oppose any future worsening of the situation in the Mediterranean. We have constantly shown by all our efforts the dangers and threats stemming from the rivalries of blocs and superpowers, the buildup of their military forces and destructive, mainly nuclear, arms, and pressures and interference in the internal affairs of Mediterranean countries. We are deeply convinced that existing problems in the fight for peace, disarmament, detente, and a new international political and economic order are of vital importance to every man, irregardless of the part of the world and the sociopolitical system in which he lives. That is why it is a platform for the strengthening and broadening of our cooperation.

We are aware of the fact that the hotbeds of crisis have not been eliminated but strengthened, particularly in the Near East, where one constantly feels the increasingly aggressive policies of Israel, in Cyprus and the immediate vicinity of the Mediterranean, in the Gulf, the Western Sahara and other regions as well.

We cannot resign ourselves to the acceptance of greater pressures placed on Mediterranean countries, the use of force, meddling in internal affairs, the application of pressure on and attempts at destabilization of certain countries. We must assert in an even more decisive manner the demand of progressive forces and broad public opinion in our countries that peoples in the Mediterranean must decide the fate of this region, and we must work even more actively toward the elimination of all obstacles.

## Common Interest

Our conference must act in behalf of the peaceful settlement of existing crises and problems created, in a spirit of complete cooperation of peoples and nations in all the spheres that bring us together and bind us. Stronger general cooperation on the part of Mediterranean countries, the reinforcement of peace and security, and the settlement of development problems constitute a common interest that will lead to stabilization and positive changes in the region, without regard for differences in the level of economic development, social systems and their position on foreign policy.

Mediterranean peoples are oriented toward one another, toward the broadest possible cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and technical fields, as well as in tourism, ocean shipping, all in the interest of the development and benefit of each and every Mediterranean country.

Socialist, nonaligned Yugoslavia has a vital interest in the establishment of peace, security and general cooperation in the Mediterranean and, just as it has done to date, will make every effort to build new relations so that Mediterranean peoples may develop freely, in peace and security, on the basis of equal rights and mutual respect.

Peace is one for all peoples in the Mediterranean, Europe and the world. For all of us, it constitutes the essential condition of interior development, without obstruction, for the future economic and social progress of all peoples in the Mediterranean.

I am convinced that the Conference of Progressive Parties and Movements will take place in the spirit of our common attachment to the ideals of peace, freedom, independence and the equal rights of peoples, development amidst security and social progress.

Speech by Maxime Gremetz (member of PCF Political Bureau, secretary of Central Committee) (Excerpts)

After expressing his pleasure "over the fact that this conference is taking place in Belgrade, the capital of socialist, nonaligned Yugoslavia, whose international following and role are legitimately recognized," Maxime Gremetz revealed the PCF's opinion of the international situation.

#### International Situation

"In many ways, this situation has deteriorated. Each of us recalls the Israeli aggression in Lebanon in June 1982. It was a very harsh blow and two years later, with the occupation and repression in southern Lebanon and West Bekaa, its effects still weigh heavily on the situation in our region. The chance for peace is still fleeting and fragile.

"Other events have occurred, the importance of which must also attract the attention of our conference."

Gremetz noted the installation of Euromissiles at Comiso, in Sicily, within the framework of a resumption of the international arms race, the revival of the strategic accord between Israel and the United States, the worsening of the problem in Cyprus and the intensification of Morocco's aggressiveness against the Saharan people and the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

"All these events have considerably worsened tension in the Mediterranean zone."

This disturbing situation nevertheless shows positive trends.

These include the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon and the abrogation of the 17 May agreement aimed at sanctioning that country's dependency on Israel. After the victory of the Lebanese patriotic forces, a government of national union was set up, despite the considerable obstacles obstructing the path of national reconciliation. It is an important step that may



contribute to the restoration of peace. Finally, the people's resistance to the military occupation, through its action, contributes to the country's independence and therefore to peace.

The failure of American policy in Lebanon is accompanied by a failure of the strategy of liquidating the Palestinian cause. Despite all the maneuvers and despite the blows dealt to the resistance and the PLO, they have not found and will not find the false solution that would sacrifice the essential national rights of the Palestinian people.

The Saharan people also courageously resists the Moroccan offensive thanks to the determined action of the POLISARIO Front alongside its people, in order to safeguard the independence of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

Finally, the dictatorship of Turkey and its aggressive, annexationist policy on Cyprus are internationally condemned.

#### Fight for Peace and Development

In the European countries, the crisis and contradictions it engenders on the economic and political levels do not prevent the development of struggles for social progress and against the arms race.

One must therefore rejoice over the conclusion of the Assembly on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Madrid in September 1983. The final document of that meeting reaffirms the link between world security and security in the Mediterranean. It expresses the determination of participants to take constructive measures for the region in order to reduce tension and strengthen peace. This is a substantial achievement.

Furthermore, the nations participating in the Madrid conference were asked to hold a seminar on Mediterranean cooperation in October 1984 in Venice. We are therefore hoping for real success of this seminar and of all the follow-up and measures planned by the Madrid assembly, all of whose participants reaffirmed a common desire to achieve balanced progress in all areas of the final Helsinki agreement, particularly security, cooperation, individual freedoms and the fundamental rights of citizens. This can only be a positive contribution to the objectives of our conference, particularly detente and peace.

This demand for peace is common to all peoples in the Mediterranean.

Powerful demonstrations then took place in the FDR, Italy, Spain and France, which express that great hope of seeing war banished and life respected.

Naturally, in the fight for peace and development, there are formidable stakes. The forces of the past are doing everything to slow down or impede change, preserve or regain positions. This is particularly true in the Mediterranean, in that area which figures among the most conflict-ridden in the world and where the confrontation of military blocs renders the situation dangerous.

Nevertheless, the fight of the people is a source of confidence in the future.

Gremetz then proposed certain objectives:

The first of our objectives must be the fight for peace and disarmament, at a time when \$700 billion are devoted every year to military spending in the world.

We must step up our action to halt the escalation and for that purpose, freeze the deployment of new missiles in the East and the West, while creating the conditions for new international negotiations in order to reach a balanced reduction of weapons at the lowest level.

In that spirit, the Mediterranean can and must become a zone of peace, free of bases and foreign troops and liberated from the division of blocs, whose simultaneous dissolution we propose.

We therefore propose, as intermediate objectives, the extension of the measures of trust adopted in Helsinki to all border nations. From that standpoint, we hope that the conference meeting in Stockholm at the proposal of France will lead to tangible progress.

We also propose: a ban in the Mediterranean on ships carrying nuclear weapons and on the introduction of new weapons of massive destruction; a universal ban on the neutron bomb; signing of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, as well as all international treaties concerning disarmament, by all nations on the Mediterranean; a ban on the introduction of new weapons and a limitation of foreign forces; and a ban on installing new foreign bases and the drafting of measures to dismantle existing bases.

However, detente and peace do not have only military aspects. They also depend on the independence and freedom of peoples.

There can consequently be no peace in our region as long as the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people are not realized. Consequently, it is naturally up to our conference to solemnly reaffirm its total solidarity with the Palestinian people and its determination to have principles defined long ago applied, particularly by international organizations and the United Nations, for a just and lasting peace. We believe that an international conference would constitute a good means to achieve peace.

In addition, with respect to Lebanon, our solidarity will naturally extend to the national resistance and the patriotic forces fighting for the withdrawal of troops from Israel and the independence of the country in the affirmation of the Arab identity of Lebanon.

The conflict in the Sahara affects the entire Maghreb. There can be no solution without recognition of the right to self-determination of the Saharan people, respect for the decisions of the OAU, the admission of the Saharan Republic to that body and Morocco's acceptance of direct negotiations with the POLISARIO Front.

Finally, the people of Cyprus must be able to decide their own fate. Our conference can only condemn the fait accompli of the creation of a Turkish

Cypriot state. A solution must be found within the framework of the United Nations for the independence and nonalignment of Cyprus.

We therefore support the Turkish people, who are now experiencing a bloody dictatorship that tortures and murders trade unionists and democrats of every stripe. I propose that our conference express its support for the Turkish people and all democratic organizations of Turkey in the harsh test they are undergoing and in their fight against the dictatorship. We could -- but it is up to the conference to discuss and decide -- take the initiative of a great solidarity rally with the participation of delegations from all our countries and Turkish democratic organizations. The victims of repression could bear witness to the way in which human rights are now systematically thwarted by the military regime in Ankara. We are ready to welcome such a solidarity move in France, but we are naturally open to discussion of any other proper proposal.

#### Mutually Advantageous Cooperation

Today, economic relations between Mediterranean countries are profoundly marked by inequalities, exploitation and neocolonialism.

The international division of labor is now aimed at ensuring the multinational companies the conditions for maximum profit. The United States plays a pre-dominant role. The rise in the dollar and the increase in interest rates help transfer to other countries, particularly developing countries, the burden of the crisis, especially the charges of reimbursing their debt. The industrial redeployment of the capitalist countries has not ensured true industrialization, even if those countries must take the demands of developing countries into account. It is the path of a new international economic order that we must now take.

Of course, substantial progress in the implementation of this new order cannot be made without an effort to resume serious and overall negotiations on the international level.

This new order must be founded on the right of every people to sovereignty over its natural resources, its right to use them for development and economic and social progress. It must also institute cooperation founded on equality, mutual interest and respect for the independence of each.

On these questions, I would like to underline the following facts:

For the relations of domination that now exist and the trade currently marked by the exclusive search for profit, we must substitute the implementation of cooperation that creates jobs by increasing production, cooperation that will be a factor of growth in each country, thus permitting an increase in mutual markets.

The agreements signed by France with Algeria or India show the possibilities of such an approach.

Such cooperation must respond to the real needs of the countries concerned, as they define them themselves. Finally, they require solutions adapted to the problem of financing, particularly through reduced interest rates, an extension of credit terms and the terms for their repayment.

It is because we want cooperation in the Mediterranean to be exemplary that we are against the expansion of the Common Market. Such an expansion would create strong contradictions and give rise to legitimate concerns in many Mediterranean countries, particularly in the Maghreb. The expansion would drain the cooperation agreements which the EEC has signed with those countries of their substance. We believe that quite the opposite, we must seek out the conditions for true complementary efforts through cooperation that respects the interests of each country.

We believe that it is possible and necessary to promote cooperation in our region on subjects of common interest such as the environment, research, culture or social questions.

Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution has been the subject of studies and proposals of other international bodies. We should examine these proposals more closely and join together in defining conditions for the preservation of that common natural heritage.

In the field of research, many things can be done, such as bringing countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean into the space programs of European countries for research concerning the subsoil.

Such a partnership, if those countries so wish, could help to know better and much more rapidly the potential of their soils in energy, raw materials and water, for example.

In the field of culture, better mutual understanding must be sought. Young people are particularly interested in sports and tourist exchanges and exchanges in the field of education. The Mediterranean Youth Festival must receive our complete support.

It is also toward a new order of information and communication that we must orient our reflection. We have therein a vast field for research and action for free access to information and rapprochement between Mediterranean peoples.

In the social field, I believe it is necessary to find the bases for and proposals of cooperation in the most essential aspects of that field.

The matter of professional training is of far-reaching importance. Every contract for industrial cooperation should include an aspect of professional instruction and training.

In the field of health, mutual advantageous cooperation can be set up with public or private research centers and the pharmaceutical industry.

Finally, speaking more generally, social progress must be the driving force behind a new type of cooperation, which means that this question must be taken into account as an essential dimension of cooperation accords.

Gremetz concluded his speech by recalling that the PCF has filed an important document of analysis and proposals in Algiers on the problem of immigration, which remains of crucial importance for the future of cooperation in the Mediterranean.

#### Final Communique

In an atmosphere of mutual respect, the representatives of Mediterranean progressive parties and movements proceeded, at the conference held on 7, 8 and 9 July 1984 in Belgrade, to engage in a wide-ranging and sincere exchange of views on the evolution of the situation in the region and the contribution of progressive forces enamored of peace and on efforts aimed at making the Mediterranean a zone of peace, security, cooperation and social progress.

This time, as on the occasion of preceding meetings, emphasis was placed on the particular importance of the grouping and cooperation of progressive parties and movements in the region. In addition, their resolute option in favor of the promotion of peace and security and the establishment of new relations in the region, based on independence, equal rights, the free development of all countries, mutual trust and good-neighbor relations, was reaffirmed.

The conference expressed the opinion of all that only the development of such relations in the region is likely to ensure the conditions necessary for stability and the pursuit of the process of general emancipation of all peoples and countries and the evolution of progressive social and economic transformations, in keeping with the right of every people to choose its own development path and to enjoy sovereign control of national resources.

The conference regretfully pointed out that, countering efforts made by progressive parties and movements and the peoples of those countries, negative tendencies have for some time become increasingly obvious. Confirming the hope that we are able to nourish thanks to the fight of the peoples and the efforts of progressive parties and movements in the region, the conference expressed its concern over the general deterioration in the world situation, particularly the dangerous worsening witnessed recently in the Mediterranean region.

Special concern is roused by the fact that not only have conflicts and hotbeds of crisis not been appeased, but alongside the old ones, there are new hot points, particularly in the Near East, where Israel, with the support of the United States, continues to wage an expansionist and aggressive policy, by increasing the number of military forces and mainly nuclear weapons of destruction, by other forms of tension between the great powers, by increased pressures brought to bear by the forces of imperialism and neocolonialism, along with other forms of domination and hegemony, interference in internal affairs and attempts at creating instability in certain countries.

The imperialist policy of aggression has become particularly manifest in attempts made to break the integrity of the republic of Lebanon and the republic of Cyprus in the pressures on and threats to the sovereignty of Libya, the

massacre of Palestinians in Lebanon and the attempt to liquidate the PLO in the aggression against the Western Sahara, the installation of nuclear rockets in Sicily within the framework of the nuclear race in Europe.

Aware of their responsibility to their own peoples and international public opinion as a whole, Mediterranean progressive parties and movements are firmly resolved to oppose the worsening of the situation and make every effort to cause reason, peace and cooperation to reign in the region, in the place of current worries and fears.

Particularly concerned over the absence of dialogue, the lack of real negotiations in the course of which one would seek a way out of the very grave international situation, the progressive parties and movements in the Mediterranean address themselves to all countries, especially the great powers, asking them to do their utmost to respond to their obligations to international peace and security, to undertake without delay all practical measures to bar nuclear war and disarm, to turn toward the building of detente extending to all areas of international relations and all regions of the world.

They also ask the nuclear powers to halt testing, production and the installation of nuclear weapons and the launching system, as a first step toward a more tangible decrease in their nuclear arsenal, aimed at general and total disarmament. They appreciate and also support efforts made to institute a zone of peace and cooperation free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans.

The conference reiterated the loyalty of progressive parties and movements to the idea of transforming the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace, security and cooperation and manifested their desire to cooperate mutually in achieving that objective. In order to achieve these objectives, eliminate current tensions and ward off the risk of a wider conflict, it emphasized the need to reaffirm the following principles and conditions:

Respect for the principles of the UN Charter and active peaceful coexistence, to wit: independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, equal rights, mutual respect and noninterference in the domestic affairs of nations; the abandonment of force or threats of force, intervention and any form of meddling, the consistent application of the principle of settling conflicts or pending matters by peaceful means;

A halt in the arms race, a ban on the buildup and transfer of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military bases and installations, the withdrawal of fleets not belonging to Mediterranean countries;

Affirmation of the role of Mediterranean countries as the main decision-making factors with respect to mutual relations and the situation of the region, through the strengthening of their cooperation and the promotion of their common interests.

Progressive parties and movements in the Mediterranean emphasize the great importance of the policy of nonalignment and the Movement of Nonaligned Countries as independent, extra-bloc and active factors in international relations



and for the solution of problems encountered by Mediterranean countries. They express satisfaction over the move aimed at the holding of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Mediterranean countries belonging to the Movement of Nonaligned Countries in Malta, and other measures aimed at promoting far-ranging, multifaceted cooperation between countries in the region.

Based on the fact that peace and security in Europe are inseparable from peace and security in the Mediterranean, they emphasize the interest in continuation of the process of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and strengthening of the Mediterranean element of security and cooperation in Europe. They are working to see that a more active part in the CSCE process will be reserved for non-European Mediterranean countries. They are also working toward the definition, within the framework of the Stockholm conference on strengthening measures of trust, security and disarmament, of the maritime aspect of security in Europe and therefore, in the Mediterranean.

Given the existing situation in the Mediterranean region, the progressive parties and movements deem that priority must be given to efforts to eliminate hotbeds of crisis and put an end to conflicts and war through peaceful means, based on the inalienable right of every people to self-determination and independence, the right of peoples to decide their own destiny with complete freedom. Accordingly, it was emphasized that:

A just and lasting solution to the crisis in the Near East can only be obtained through the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories.

Respect for the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people under the leadership of the PLO, its sole, legitimate representative in the achievement of legitimate, inalienable national rights, a return to its country and the installation of an independent state on Palestinian soil, must be ensured.

Rejection of all imperialist plans aiming at eliminating the Palestinian problem and the rights of the Palestinian people. Within this context, the conference asked the international community to call an international conference on peace in the Near East, under the auspices of the United Nations, as a means contributing to the achievement of legitimate and universally recognized Palestinian and Arab national rights.

The conference also condemned terrorist actions of the Israeli occupying authorities in occupied Palestinian territories, the seizure of land and the construction of settlements, and it issued an appeal that they be immediately eliminated.

It gave its support to the Lebanese national resistance in its liberation fight in Southern Lebanon and West Bekaa, occupied by the Israeli Army, in order to force the latter to withdraw immediately and without preconditions from all occupied territory, in keeping with UN resolutions Nos 425, 508 and 509.



It is therefore fitting to support the fight of the patriotic, progressive forces of Lebanon in order to protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the country, confirm its Arab identity and thus establish a democratic regime founded on the elimination of political sectarianism, respect for equality and justice.

The conference expressed:

Support for the struggle of the Arab people of Syria against the imperialist and Zionist plans in the Arab country and the condemnation of American and Israeli threats to it;

Condemnation of the policy of aggression and provocation followed by the United States against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya because of its progressive positions of support for the fight of peoples for their freedom and independence;

Support for the efforts made to solve the problem of Cyprus on the basis of protection of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and nonalignment of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to achieve it, it was emphasized that it is necessary to implement the UN resolution on the elimination of attempts to divide the island and on the withdrawal of Turkish troops of occupation.

Full support for Security Council Resolutions Nos 541 and 550 by which one condemns the proclamation of "the autonomous Turkish state of Cyprus" and the exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the illegal "state," and emphasis is given to the demand for the withdrawal of all action and secessionist mandates, the demand that the secretary general undertake all measures necessary for the application of these resolutions and the implementation of an overall solution on the basis of UN principles and resolutions.

Support was given to efforts made to eliminate any foreign presence and ban any new bases, as well as to the proposal of the government of Cyprus on total demilitarization.

Support was also expressed for the measure calling an international conference within the framework of the United Nations to settle the problem of Cyprus.

Support for efforts made for the peaceful settlement of the problem of the Western Sahara, on the basis of the UN resolution and the peace plan of the 19th Summit Conference of the OAU to fulfill the right of the Saharan people to independence under the leadership of the POLISARIO Front and ensure peace in the region. For that purpose, the POLISARIO Front and the Moroccan Government must be urged to immediately undertake negotiations in order to achieve the peaceful settlement worked out by international organizations.

The conference spoke out in favor of efforts aimed at putting an end to the Iraqi-Iranian war as soon as possible and expressed its support for efforts made to ensure a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Support was expressed for Turkish democratic forces fighting the dictatorship, for democracy, human rights and social progress.

The conference devoted special attention to the problems of economic development and cooperation in the light of the economic crisis in the world and its negative effects on countries in the region. It pointed up the inadmissibility of attempts to transfer the effects of the crisis to developing countries and working people.

The conference appreciated the important positive role of progressive parties and movements in view of the growing awareness as to the interdependency of development and the need to reduce the gap between developed countries and developing nations. This imposes a long-range effort in the fight for the new international economic order and energetic support for the pursuit of overall negotiations within the framework of the United Nations.

The need to undertake urgent measures to solve the crucial problems in international economic relations was emphasized, problems that seriously worsen the position of developing countries such as matters of food and raw materials, trade and finance, the transfer of technologies, and so on.

Progressive parties and movements consider that based on advantages resulting from the complementary nature of their development and the convergency of their interests, new thrust should be given to the extension and strengthening of cooperation between Mediterranean countries. Consequently, they broadly support adequate bilateral and multilateral moves.

The conference emphasized the special importance of cultures and the cultural identity of nations on the Mediterranean, whose protection and enrichment constitute an essential precondition of their development. The need to stimulate the general circulation of information, ideas and cultural values was stressed as being essential to the enrichment of these cultures and to promote the exchange of cultures, while ensuring greater mutual respect among the cultures of the peoples of southern Europe and the Arab world, thus helping the fight against racism and xenophobia.

At the conference, the Mediterranean progressive parties and movements reaffirmed their resolute intention of continuing to strengthen their relations and cooperation. They confirmed the authentic and independent nature of the rally in the region and cooperation based on the principles of equal rights, freedom of action, free exchanges of views, respect for differences, freedom of support and freedom of consensus.

Convinced of the need to work to promote mutual solidarity and make a concrete contribution, they believe that over the course of the period ahead, their efforts should be combined and mainly oriented toward:

Activities aimed at affirming the idea concerning the Mediterranean region as a zone of peace, security and cooperation;

Actions of solidarity with liberation movements and the fight of peoples to protect their freedom and independence, for democracy and social progress;

Actions in behalf of disarmament and against the installation of missiles and nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean region (as at Comiso) and to free the Mediterranean of any foreign military presence (fleets, bases, and so on) and in favor of the denuclearization of the Balkans;

Initiatives aimed at the development of wide-ranging and multifaceted cooperation, mainly economic in nature and capable of promoting better mutual understanding through intensified cooperation in the fields of culture, information, sports, and so on;

Support for the promotion of varied forms of cooperation of progressive and democratic organizations of young people and for the organization of Mediterranean youth festivals;

Support for action promoting cooperation between different trade union and women's organizations and between professional and humanitarian organizations;

Support for efforts ensuring respect for the social and cultural rights of migrant workers, their dignity, and against racism and xenophobia, as well as for their right to professional training;

Support for projects to protect the environment and the sea;

Support for initiatives aimed at fighting drug trafficking in the Mediterranean.

Driven by the determination to continue dialogue and promote mutual cooperation, the progressive parties and movements agreed to hold their next conference in Tunis in 1986.

Aware of the gravity of the current situation, progressive parties and movements appeal to all democratic forces enamored of peace, to all peoples, parliaments and governments of the Mediterranean countries, and to international public opinion, asking them to make their contribution to the relaxation of tension and the pacification of the situation, to support efforts made to turn the Mediterranean region into a region of peace, security, cooperation, social progress and the development of all peoples and all countries on the shores of the Mediterranean.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The delegation of the PCF was made up of Maxime Gremetz (member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee) and Jacques Fath (member of the foreign policy section bureau of the Central Committee). Among the organizations present were: the PCF, the PS, the PSU, the PC's of Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon, the Party of Progress and Socialism (Morocco), the Yugoslav Communist League, the FNL (Algeria), the PLO, the POLISARIO Front, the Progressive Rally Party (Egypt), the Progressive Socialist Party, Amal (Lebanon), the General People's Congress (Libya), the PS's of Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Ba'th Party (Syria), the Destourian Socialist Party (Tunisia).

2. See OMHOURS DE COMMUNISME, June 1982.

## CHAD: SOVIET ROLE, POTENTIAL LIBYAN RETURN ANALYZED

Paris MAGAZINE HEBDO in French 21 Sep 84 pp 20-22

[Article by Francois Librette: "Qadhdhafi Backs Off But Does Not Disarm"]

[Text] Has France scored a diplomatic victory in Chad? True, Libyan weaknesses have allowed Francois Mitterrand to score a point, but Qadhdhafi is not one to give up his ambitions in Africa, especially since he is keeping the all-important Aouzou strip, where he has concentrated considerable strength. The end of one war could well bring on another one.

The big question is not when the Libyans will have completed their withdrawal from Chad but when they will return. The new agreement between Paris and Tripoli has a familiar ring to it. In November 1981 Qadhdhafi's Libyans evacuated Chad. It was a more spectacular retreat than the present one; at that time they had controlled virtually the entire country including the capital, Ndjamená.

But the Libyan troops did not withdraw very far, only as far as the Aouzou strip, a vast zone of mountainous desert running from Niger to the Sudan and occupied by Qadhdhafi since 1973. Since then this desert has become unusually populated. The Aouzou oasis has become a large military base with an airstrip for fighters and bombers, fuel and ammunition dumps, and a permanent garrison that is said to have as many as a thousand men.

The Libyans jumped off from Aouzou in June 1983 to take Faya-Largeau, the capital of northern Chad. At the time, Hissene Habre's Chadian army was able to push them back, but not for long; on 10 August, Libyan MiG's and, perhaps, Mirages, too, bombed the oasis from the Aouzou base.

Whoever holds Faya controls the BET, an abbreviation dating from colonial times that designates the three provinces of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti. Faya is only 500 kilometers as the crow flies from the Aouzou strip, but it is nearly 1,000 kilometers from Ndjamená. According to the French-Libyan agreement, there is no question of Qadhdhafi's evacuating the strip. Charles Hernu at least showed the virtue of frankness in declaring at Ndjamená, "Everything in its time. The United Nations will take care of the problem. After all, it is an old story."

In other words, France is de facto recognizing Libya's claims, a fitting present for Qadhdhafi but one that in return inadequately ensures the Libyan leader's good will toward Paris. The beginning of the mutual withdrawal was set for and published on 25 September. The date of the end of the withdrawal has also been set but not revealed. "It's a military secret," solemnly whispered the great strategist Claude Cheysson.

As it is obviously no secret to the Libyans, the discretion is intended only for public consumption, as though Paris were afraid of divulging a date that might not be respected. Even if it were kept, the problem would be far from solved. The fear expressed on 17 September by the Chadian minister of Foreign Affairs sums up the real aspects of the problem.

Even if the Libyan troops pretend to leave, they will only retire to the North of Chad, set up camp at Aouzou and come back when the French soldiers have gone.

What hope could have deluded Paris that things would work out otherwise? Francois Mitterrand probably banked on the internal difficulties that the Libyan government is presently experiencing. Unrest is widespread, from the Nefoussa mountains, where the Berbers are in almost open revolt, to the Akhdar mountains in the east, where partisans of the Senoussi fundamentalist brotherhood take a dim view of the revolutionary leader's theological innovations. The army is also balking, as are middle-class tradespeople and the people generally, for they have not been able to swallow the suppression of traditional small businesses and their replacement by "people's supermarkets" with outlandish hours and merchandise. Colonel Qadhdhafi's decision, announced last 1 September, to permit the consumption of alcoholic beverages to celebrate the 15th anniversary of his revolution will not sit well with either the devout or the liberals.

Something else that Paris seems to be counting on is last month's sudden breakup of the Chadian National Union Government (GUNT), which was led by Goukouni Weddei and supported by Tripoli. On 12 August most of the GUNT politicians seceded and formed a "Rally of Patriotic Forces." On 24 August there was a new schism, this time in the most active movement in the field, the Democratic Council of the Revolution. This new cleavage was originated by Mahamat Senoussi, whose name is indicative of the cause: he belongs to the fundamentalist brotherhood that has swarmed out of Libya and over the Sahel; it is now openly opposed to Qadhdhafi. What is Mahamat Senoussi saying today? That Libya's flagrant occupation of a part of Chad is inadmissible.

This is another one who will not like Paris's de facto recognition of Libyan sovereignty over the Aouzou.

It is certain that Qadhdhafi and his allies are having trouble. It is less certain that they will behave themselves. The French disengagement in Chad looks curiously like another: the one in Lebanon. There too, Paris realized it had stumbled into a hornets' nest and felt it could get out by alleging internal difficulties in the other camp. In Damascus, Hafez el-Assad was ill, and the war of succession was tearing the Baath party apart.

The president's brother, Rifaat el-Assad, was playing his own hand. The fundamentalist opposition of the Moslem Brotherhood was rearing its head. Within Lebanon, the scattering of militias hostile to the Beirut government seemed to guarantee the government's authority. But now the results are in: Damascus directly controls the Lebanese government, and peace seems to be farther away than ever.

Will the same scenario be played out in Ndjamena? There is one unknown that nobody controls: Moscow's tactics. Qadhdhafi can do nothing without the consent and direct aid of the Soviets. The Soviets made it possible for Libyan troops to make their irresistible sweep to Ndjamena between June and September 1980. Theoretically, this expeditionary force included Chadian elements supported by the "Islamic Legion" created by Qadhdhafi with soldiers recruited from near and far: Moroccans, Egyptians, Sudanese, Nigerians, dissidents from almost all the Arab countries, and many Pakistanis. But the Islamic Legion could not have succeeded without an extraordinary East German officer corps that did a superb job of logistics: transporting armor on trucks across the desert, setting up fuel dumps along the roads, and building rudimentary airfields.

Similarly, it is stretching things a bit to say that the Libyans reconquered Faya-Largeau in August 1983. The oasis was first attacked by MiG's, which were indeed Libyan, but they were piloted by North Korean "volunteers." Did French troops never attempt to retake the capital of the BET because they wished to avoid making contact with these unexpected "Islamic Legionnaires"?

Chad's future will therefore be decided not in Paris, Tripoli or Ifrane but in Moscow. If the Soviets wish, the Libyans and their ally Goukouni Weddei can again be in control in Ndjamena in a few months. True, nobody in Paris would shed a tear over another defeat of Hissene Habre, the one who kidnapped Francoise Claustre and who tortured and murdered Major Gallopin, who came to negotiate the liberation of the hostage. But the credibility of French policy in Africa is at stake.

Even the Socialist government knows that Qadhdhafi cannot be trusted. Nobody thinks he is about to give up on his great enterprise of subversion south of the Sahara. However, he may first seek to destabilize other governments, such as in Niger, Cameroon or the Central African Republic. It is an interesting sign that not all of the French expeditionary force is returning to France; some elements will go to reinforce troops at Bangui.

Francois Mitterrand can obviously do Qadhdhafi the favor of receiving him at the Elysee palace, which is an old dream of the Libyan dictator. But polite formalities will make no basic changes. In 6 months or a year it seems inescapable that the "Islamic Legion" will set out again from its Aouzou bases for the BET and Faya-Largeau. It might happen, for example, in the weeks before the 1986 legislative elections. What would the French government do under those circumstances? Would there be another airlift from France with it once again being virtually certain that the enemy would have stolen a march on Faya-Largeau?

It seems to keep coming back to that. The French army intervened in Chad in 1968, 1978 and 1983. There seems to be no reason to hope that this last withdrawal will be the final one.



DETENTE, EAST-WEST TRADE, HELSINKI ACCORDS SEEN TO AID USSR

Paris LE FIGARO in French 19 Sep 84 p 2

/Article by Vladimir Bukovsky, president of Resistance International:  
"The Defeat of the West"/

/Text/ We live in an era of ideological war, a war which no more  
than any other can be won by resorting to defense alone.

One is obliged to note that since it has been in existence the USSR has never ceased to expand its sphere of influence without hesitating over the means and the price to pay, and that not one country, developed or developing, has shown itself to be immune to this ideological penetration, this expansion bearing the heavy cost of slavery.

One must also grant that during the past few decades, the West has always lacked a policy, even an inconsistent one, of opposing this challenge. From the time of the "Cold War," just as from the time of "detente," or "containment," or "the great alliance," the successes of the Soviets abroad have varied as little as their designs.

The permanent defeat of the West is due to two major causes: the grave misunderstanding by Western leaders of the nature of the Soviet system and the generally defensive, peaceful policy which they pursue with regard to the USSR in the name of maintaining the status quo.

But no amount of arms, nuclear or conventional, no "cordon sanitaire," no dialogue of friendship, no gesture of good will is able to stop the ideological expansion of a system conceived exactly for that purpose. Only a similar weapon can be effective. Furthermore, the defensive tendency of the free world leads it to accept automatically the status quos which occur one after the other with each advance of Soviet expansionism. abandoning to their fate the nations which have just fallen into slavery. The danger of any defensive strategy is in reality leaving the initiative to the aggressor, who thereby acquires the freedom to create all the "realities" he pleases, with the certainty that his adversary on the defensive (especially if the latter is motivated by peaceful intentions and sincerely believes in the virtues of "realpolitik") can do nothing but accept them.



Applied to the Third World, this defensive policy conditions the support rendered by the West to dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, but whose "stability," in fact the "lesser evil" in their eyes, prepares the ground for new Soviet penetrations by that very fact. The failure of detente illustrates perfectly the failure of this defensive policy.

The promotion of cultural and scientific cooperation, exchange of people and ideas, broadening trade and other relations, would possess some logic if it implied the democratization of the closed societies. This program, launched at the beginning of the 1970's, nevertheless led to the opposite result. For obvious reasons. While the West saw in detente a real liberalization, for the Soviets it was "one more degree in the ideological battle" or "the class struggle" (see the statements on this subject by Brezhnev, Suslov and others). As a result, instead of the hoped for East-West dialogue we have the right only to a Soviet monologue which admits of no criticism; instead of free movement of people and information, we have the right only to a one-way street, to the point that international scientific conferences are prohibited from inviting the Soviet (and East European) specialists of their choice: they must accept the names designated (sometimes even intelligence officers), when those persons have the endorsement of the Soviet authorities.

In a general way, since these exchange programs concern only the limited group of a strictly selected elite, they have been unable to reach the broad masses of the Soviet population. Foreigners who have traveled to the East have been able to visit only a few areas where everything has been set up to prevent any real contact with the people. Moreover, fearing the effects of possible Western contamination, the Communist authorities have increased repression since the mid-1970's as a preventive measure.

The West nevertheless seems to accept this Soviet interpretation of detente. The best example is the record of the Helsinki accords. Legitimizing Soviet conquests before and after the war, confirming Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, these accords nevertheless contain something new and positive: recognition of the direct link between security, cooperation, and respect for the rights of man. Theoretically this concept would provide a powerful lever of pressure to the West, if it were determined to use it. The violations of the rights of man would then be perceived by the West as a threat against its security and would automatically bring economic sanctions (or the breaking off of other forms of cooperation). Unhappily, the West has never used it, except after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets, when detente was already defunct anyway.

The second positive point of the Helsinki accords--the establishment of periodic conferences--degenerated in practice into a total betrayal at Belgrade under the pretext that one "must not demand too much from

the Soviets," a principle imposed by France and the FRG, and into a flood of complaints and protests at Madrid, totally ignored by the Soviet Bloc. It could not have been otherwise, the pressure of sanctions having never been applied.

But something else also happened at Madrid: the de facto cancellation of the Helsinki accords, the signatory countries having decided to treat the problems of disarmament and the rights of man in separate conferences.

#### The Helsinki Accords

There is no longer any sense in carrying the Helsinki process further. It is too late to revive it, and the desire of the West to adhere to it in spite of everything can be perceived by the Soviets only as a proof of weakness. Those who tried to exercise surveillance over the application in the USSR--the members of the Helsinki groups--are practically all behind bars.

The Helsinki accords should be denounced, so as to deprive the Soviets of what they have gained by ratifying them, namely the legitimization of their territorial and political gains in Europe. A legitimization which they presented to the Soviet population as the sole reason for the existence of the agreements, which thus became a substitute for a European peace treaty. There are those who object to the idea of such a denunciation, arguing that the Helsinki accords contain important dispositions, "yielded against their wish" by the Soviets, in the realm of the rights of man. Let us remind them that these accords contain much less in this regard than the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man or the civil pacts of the UN.

We would like to remind those who fear that a threat of the disintegration of the Soviet empire would force the USSR to seek a way out in a major confrontation with the free world that the present masters are as cynical as their subjects. Solely concerned with their security and their privileges, they have only to apply Communist doctrine. A serious threat would simply force them to reform and rearrange their system.

The denunciation of the Helsinki accords could be the first step of a Western political offensive, which is alone capable of stopping the cancer of Soviet expansion. This is why the Resistance International, which includes the majority of the resistance movements of the countries sacrificed in the name of detente at any price makes it its standard.

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CSO: 3519/16

## BRIEFS

SOVIET ANTI-SEMITISM AT STRASBOURG FAIR--The leading attraction at the European Fair in Strasbourg, which closes today, was certainly the USSR's exhibit. Not so much because of the products displayed there, but because of the demonstrations of hostility that took place there for over 2 weeks. After the Pentecostals and Jewish students in Strasbourg, France's leading rabbi, Rene-Samuel Sirat, yesterday went to the USSR pavillion "to speak with representatives of Soviet churches and officials of the ministry of religious affairs." But instead of a dialogue, the door was slammed shut, and the Soviets present in the pavillion turned up the background music just when the rabbi was making a statement to the press. According to Samuel Sirat, "such an attitude provides an answer to the alleged religious freedom touted by the displays at the Soviet exhibit." The leading rabbi of France used this opportunity to say that he was still ready to go to the USSR (in 1981, he was invited by his counterpart in Moscow, but 3 years later he has still not been issued a visa) to meet with Soviet authorities and Soviet Jews. There are 250,000 Soviet Jews in Moscow. They have only two synagogues (before the October 1917 revolution there were 200), and the synagogues are used only by the elderly. There is a simple reason for this, according to Rabbi Sirat: "In addition to the anti-Semitic propaganda published in the Soviet Union, the young people are unable to receive any religious instruction, which is the only way spiritual values can be transmitted." [by Etienne Aubarbier] [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Sep 84 p 4] 7679

NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA MEETING IN FRANCE--On Saturday the French government confirmed that meetings between Nicaragua and Costa Rica have taken place in Paris, "in the presence of a French diplomat," but stated that France "is not making any proposals and did not offer its services." With the technical aid of the French government, the Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans are meeting in Paris in an attempt to find a lasting solution for the border problems that have caused the exchange of 64 protest notes between the two countries since June 1982. Relations between the two nations are regularly poisoned by border incidents, related to the presence in this area of anti-Sandinista guerrillas of Eden Pastora's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, and quite recently, of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Sep 84 p 4] 7679

## SOARES PRESIDENCY SEEN AS PRESERVING STATUS QUO

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 2

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "Soares and the 'Republican Tradition'"]

[Excerpts] No one can still have any doubts after the last few days: Mario Soares is going to be a presidential candidate in 1985.

Although it might appear paradoxical to some less attentive observers, I can and wish only to rejoice in the candidacy of Soares and the strategy which he has pursued. Where I part company is that I cannot accept at face value (it would certainly be much ~~too~~ naive) the foundations on which the Soares strategy is built. The democratic regime is not in crisis; there is no spectre of a coup d'etat; the Armed Forces are law-abiding and have already demonstrated their acceptance of the Law of National Defense. The democratic regime is not in any danger, but we must make a distinction between it and the political system, to use the terminology in fashion in Portugal. The system is the political regime in actual practice, and many, including myself, feel that the practice tends to destroy the cement and the foundations of the existing political regime.

For this reason, Soares is the candidate for all those who feel that the present system (with improvements and corrections, naturally) is best suited to the defense of the democratic regime. Also, in my opinion, there must be another candidate to polarize those who believe (in terms which I will set forth at another time and place) that the survival of the democratic regime requires a break with the present system. If this were the case, Portuguese would have clear options; they would have specific candidates with specific programs. They would have to base their vote on the clearest issue on which a presidential election can be decided: the election of a man whose function is not to govern but is certainly to determine the path and the direction of our political-institutional development in the coming years.

I applaud the candidacy of Soares because I believe that, for better or worse, he represents the present system better than anyone else. His political style, his personal characteristics, the politicians around him, the party which he leads: all this leads me to declare that Mario Soares is the individual who can best represent those who believe that the "status quo" must be maintained and that while people may know where things begin, they do not know where things end up. Those who think this way should vote for Soares. Those who think otherwise must have the chance to vote for a candidate who is clearly committed to cleaning up ~~the~~ corruption in which we are mired, which means that his victory would result in a change in the actual practice of the regime, [a candidate] who would be the bearer of a program for radical change.

I hold, and I have been saying for several years, that the PSD [Social Democratic Party] should constitute the nucleus of this change, for reasons which it is irrelevant to repeat again here. I have argued that a man like Alberto Joao Jardim has suitable characteristics to carry out the process of change. For this reason, I have always opposed the idea of the PSD presenting a candidate who would be a kind of lesser Soares--a candidate to defend the system--because in that case the best candidate is undoubtedly Mario Soares, and no one can invent another one.

I cannot deny a certain feeling of happiness that everything seems to be moving in this direction. Nothing is definite, and solutions such as having Soares step down in favor of an "equidistant" personality (there has been talk of Ferrer Correia, for heaven's sake!) could still come forth, as could the idea of an agreement between the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD regarding the second round, which would be incompatible with the strategy which I have been defending. What is necessary is that the Portuguese know that they can vote their choice between a man of the system and another man in opposition to him. If this is the case, the Portuguese can make a clear decision about their future and we will all be responsible for what comes to pass.

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CSO: 3542/16

## GOVERNMENT SAID TO LACK A NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 4

[Commentary by Manuel Maria Murias: "Foreign Non-policy"]

[Text] Reports published in the Spanish press inform us that, within the so-called Atlantic Alliance, the Americans plan to turn the Iberian peninsula into a great logistical base, with oil pipelines from Sines and Galiza, a naval air base in Lisbon, better integrated use of communications between Portugal and Spain--and other such marvels. Our Defense Ministry responded to these reports with a chilly admission of ignorance; the Madrid government initially refused to make any comment and then issued an almost jocular denial. The Madrid newspaper, however, declared that it had access to documentation substantiating the existence of the project.

These things were not invented. It is possible that there may have been some speculation on the part of DIARIO 16, which was responsible for the report--DIARIO 16 is a leftist newspaper which is completely unclassified, but it could not have invented the story from start to finish. The use of the Port of Lisbon as a U.S. military base has been mentioned frequently by responsible people, both here and in Washington, on the pretext of the need to protect LISNAVE [Lisbon Shipyards]. In the same way, Sines is a lovely beach much coveted by the Atlantic strategists. It is natural that the idea of using these two strategic points on the Portuguese coast for military purposes should have surfaced again, and it cannot be denied that, whether we are aware of it or not, the Pentagon has a plan--in the event of war--to turn Iberia into an immense bridgehead, destined to support and fortify Europe against a possible Soviet invasion which, according to predictions, would reach the Pyrenees in less than 2 weeks, literally steamrolling over Germany--and France, which, as has been its inveterate custom since the time of Napoleon, would lay down its arms.

If it is no wonder that the Madrid government denies the report, it is nonetheless strange that the Lisbon government would be unaware of the plan. The program as described in the Spanish daily has appeared several times in Anglo-Saxon military and diplomatic journals--as a working hypothesis. Madrid's denial and Lisbon's ignorance lead us to believe that, at this moment, the phase of specific negotiations between the Spanish general staff and the U.S. general staff has passed right over our heads. Evidently at Washington's request, Madrid denied the report so as not to wound Portuguese feelings. Things will continue to be developed on the quiet--until Portugal needs some more dough and meekly cedes Sines, Lisbon, Porto and Alhos Vedros. We are rushing headlong toward



Paraguayization. Day by day, we are losing larger chunks of what remains of our sovereignty, because we have shown ourselves to be incapable of solving our financial and economic problems; our foreign policy depends on the partisan intrigues and bargains and on the obvious lust for power that has overtaken our wretched prime minister.

It is the intangible [sic] norm that any fairly well organized government makes its domestic policy dependent on its foreign policy, in the certainty that the latter consists in the defense of national independence in all its aspects. In this country, foreign policy depends on the hazards of party rule, personal vanities and inefficiency in the administration; national interests are not protected--only oligarchical and individual interests.

There is a simple explanation for this phenomenon: all the parties receive foreign money, from Libyan to Albanian, including German and American money. Living from hand to mouth, the Portuguese partocrats depend as much on international banking concerns as on their own country. We have lost our independence on all fronts: we have lost it in Necessidades, we have lost it in the Terreiro do Paco; we have frayed it in Sao Bento and we have ripped it in Belem [all palaces of government]. In diplomatic terms, the chiefs of our sovereign organs are reduced to holding out their hands to international charity. The parties' vestibules are filled with mite boxes for the cult of sainted democracy.

National Defense as understood just at the military level--this is one case; the admission to the EEC as understood only in economic terms is another. Mario Soares groveled at the feet of Francois Mitterrand, begging him for a commitment from the EEC to guarantee Portugal's admission at some date. Mitterrand, in exchange for who knows what (a halt to our African policy?) said yes. The Council of Ministers of the Community said no, leaving us standing once again with our finger on the door bell and (thank God) as second-class Europeans, put off to wait for better days. We do not have a foreign policy; we have public relations conducted by half a dozen flying clowns.

Well, a state without a foreign policy, that is, without a coherent and effective policy for national defense, is not a state; it is not anything. The only legitimate justification for the existence of political power organized as a state is to defend the vital interests of the nation it serves. This one, which oppresses us and occupies our territory, is nothing but a formless and almost inorganic group of public departments which suck up the people's money to maintain themselves and to enable the prime minister to go and tan his navel at Copacabana and rub Lena d'Agua on his chest. Because we are worth nothing politically and some of us are paper tigers, the Americans and Spanish are negotiating away our lands and all the Europeans are giving us the royal runaround.

The remains of a people, governed by the most ordinary rabble ever to issue from the pregnant belly of the land, we have come to this: eight centuries of history, trapped in the dung heap of the parties.



## KNOWLEDGE OF BOTH UNITA, MPLA SEEN VITAL TO SOUND POLICY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 4 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Lands at the End of the World"]

[Text] The film about UNITA was aired by the RTP [Portuguese Radio Television System], an RTP filled with excuses, taking shelter under the umbrella of the air time of the Higher Council of Public Communications, as if the RTP were ashamed of its own work.... And the world did not come to an end.

But for the frustrated attempt to censor it, the report would have gone--perhaps undeservedly--unnoticed. We say undeservedly, ~~not~~ because we considered the piece by Barata Feyo and the French cameramen to be completely free of a certain sympathy for UNITA, despite the occasional clumsy dig at the constant propaganda barrage aimed at painting a rosy picture of the guerrillas for the benefit of the newsmen.

Undeservedly, because, despite everything, we were witnessing an important contribution to giving the Portuguese people a little better understanding of what is going on in southern Africa and of the people involved in this game, in which the trumps are weapons and the loser pays in blood.

And this is saying a lot for a piece of investigative journalism. It is clear that the RTP could and should have gone a good deal further, but it is doubtful that, in the inhospitable terrain of the Lands at the End of the World, so well known to generations of Portuguese soldiers, the reporters could have done very much better, inasmuch as they were dependent (and not just logistically) on the very object of their proposed investigation.

Even so, by the vivid reality of its images, the report confirmed some facts that have been only timidly touched on in the Portuguese press: UNITA's primary goal is to neutralize the "Russo-Cuban" presence; it is supported by the apartheid regime and by Morocco; the Chinese influence is sensed here and there; its organization, specifically its military organization, retains much of the Portuguese colonial style of the 1950's and 1960's. But UNITA exists. The "puppets" are real flesh and blood. The movement has come a long way since its birth in the lap of the Portuguese intelligence services.

Is the movement a political contradiction, based on a "black" phraseology that reveals some colonialist nostalgia? Is it a Western response to the control of Luanda by the Soviet bloc, seeking, not the "total independence of Angola," but the reappropriation of that control through the political, military and economic "strings" which the Portuguese had let loose? Is this, when all is said and done, simply another chapter in a war that has gone on for more than two decades and in which we were participants until April 1974? The questions are legitimate--but to pose them we must have the facts, and the diplomatic pressures to prevent this information from reaching the eyes and ears of the Portuguese public are unacceptable.

The Luanda government presides over a system which, faced with the UNITA rebellion, prefers to launch a struggle for its elimination while it pretends to the world that UNITA does not exist.

The Portuguese will not stand for this; it cannot be demanded of us that, to be true friends of Angola, we must accept the premise that the problems will be solved faster if we do not talk about them.

UNITA has broad support in Portugal and has been much fussed over by the Portuguese Right, which sees in the movement of Jonas Savimbi a balm for its nostalgic pain and an "argument" against what it calls the "abandonment" of the "overseas territories" to "Soviet Socialist imperialism" after 1974. This has made a certain sector of our public opinion almost afraid of the UNITA issue, although, deep down, it knows that the official line of Luanda is obscurantist and does not even correspond to the thinking and practice of some of the key leaders of the MPLA, specifically of those who are in hiding abroad, on the other side now, seeking a political solution.

On the contrary, it is important that all the Portuguese people have access to all the various levels of this complex edifice of interests and dramas, so that we can move forward in the search for a truly national foreign policy position. At the moment, we are still caught up in the internal contradictions and also in the "historical" proximity to Angola which we still feel. This proximity affects both the Portuguese and the Angolans, who like to make the former colonizer the scapegoat for all their ills.

On this side, only full information can break the impasse--and this week's report on the RTP is valuable as a starting point--because there is so much that remains to be known about UNITA....

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## GARCIA DE ENTERRIA STUDY OPTIMISTIC ON AUTONOMY

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Oct 84 pp 3-4

[Article by Eduardo Garcia de Enterría, professor of administrative law: "The Future of the Autonomous Territories"]

[Text] One of the most brilliant analyses published recently concerning the status of the autonomous territories is the contribution Prof Garcia de Enterría wrote for the work entitled "Spain, a Present for the Future," which the Institute of Economic Studies has just published. We are publishing here the most substantive of his theses, which are brimming with optimism, since they predict the strengthening of the system and a safe path toward federalization.

I believe what has been achieved to date in the realm of autonomy to be positive overall, and I believe that the final picture provided us by the situation we now have, characterized by the two themes of generalization of the autonomous system and the framing of it within an almost federal technical-juridical context finally completed by the Constitutional Court, justifies optimism about its future.

The fact is that our old state has resisted the centrifugal acceleration which began with no happy prospects perfectly, and it appears that one can now clearly glimpse its capacity to frame this trend finally within the context of a technical mechanism which is objective and functional. Perhaps few would have thought, at the time the constitution drafted the system, full of uncertainties, that these words could be written in a little more than 4 years, but I write them with the objectivity of which I am capable and with faith in what I say. Our country has shown that it can rise to the formidable challenge of organizing a generalized system of autonomy, and this constitutes one of the most important achievements in our surprising historical phase of political transition.

But it is not a matter only of a negative virtue--resisting, containing--but of the fact that, as many of us believe, the generalization of the autonomous system and its final institutionalization can awaken in our country political and social energies which have been dormant thus far, thanks to the deceiving mantle of the centralized bureaucratic political system. Hereto a reading of Ortega and his historic harangue ("Ah, the provinces arisen!") may still prove encouraging to many skeptics. The autonomous system, like all political systems which want to survive, must legitimize itself by its actual

social results--a higher level of management of services, greater attention to real specific needs, better integration of the people taking responsibility for their self-government. Autonomy is organized for precisely these ends.

The time has come for the organizers, who are capable of foreseeing and shaping all of the political and management potential the autonomy formula embodies. With the political demand stage ended, the time has come to populate the new political space won. This requirement now places the burden of the operation, in my opinion, on the executive branches of the autonomous administrations. They must win the wager placed on their greater administrative capacity, on the concern for and effective integration of their peoples which the autonomous territories are capable of ensuring. If the political class rises to this challenge, the operation will be justified and will gradually be consolidated. Otherwise, this will be difficult, we should frankly warn.

This process has been shared in every experience of establishing a new political order. There is always an initial phase of a certain confusion, resulting from the disruption of the previous channels and their safeguards, as well as the excessive initial weight of any new freedom. However, one immediately enters into, although sometimes not without difficulty, the field opened up by this freedom, which yields in the end positive fruits, if minimal responsibility is evidenced. Those of us who believe in freedom, in its pedagogical virtue and its ultimate profitability, must believe in the new freedom of the self-government for which autonomy provides.

Naturally, we must still expect, and certainly over a period which will not be short, naivete, stupidity, difficulties and malfunctions, sometimes sizeable. There will also be disparities in rate and yield among the various autonomous communities, due precisely to the differences in their respective social structures, their political habits, their traditions, and their profound ethnic textures themselves (since it is obvious that the success of a system does not depend solely, nor, perhaps, primarily, on the technical perfection of the laws organizing it--if this were not true, political construction would be very easy). But it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that it is precisely in this process of application that the fate of the system is determined, and not in the great political dogmas, which have fortunately subsided considerably now after the difficult initial consensus on establishing the system. It is precisely this timely ideological silence which should be utilized for the construction of the autonomous administrations without delay, and on a footing of efficiency. Needless to say, a most important portion of responsibility also falls to the central state, not only to avoid any obstruction, but also to support this operation resolutely, allowing absolutely sincere and unreserved play to the constitutional option concerning autonomous territories.

The foreseeable development is then, I believe, toward a definitive strengthening of the system. This will lead to the time for its standardization, above and beyond the statutory particularities and the plurality of systems allowed by the governing principle in the constitution, except for what has

been said above about the expectation of some specific special aspects for the territories with active national groups.

This standardization seems certain to lead in the end to a formal federalization of the system, which might eventually justify a constitutional amendment to Title VIII. It is obvious that such a revision should be delayed until the system which has just been established thanks to so much effort and so little risk has been both confirmed and consolidated. If any need should prevail, in fact, it is the need to put a resolute end to this kind of vague constituent process seen in the establishment of the autonomous system. Prior to its final establishment, which will come about both through a complete trial run of the system over a considerable period of time and the perfecting of the jurisprudence on the subject in the Constitutional Court, it would be an obvious and dangerous threat to the stability of the balance achieved with such difficulty to attempt any constitutional change.

But this change will in the end be inevitable, in the sense described. Federalization will immediately require the establishment of a real senate for territorial representation, as a necessary forum where the two political spheres can meet, debate and reach agreement, as well as the definitive formalization, in the constitution itself, of techniques the detail of which must be sought today in jurisprudence or in doctrine. And finally, federalization may involve the final constitutionalization of the system of articulation and the limits for the two political centers, which must be sought today in the complex network of statutory, constitutional waivers, and even in simple political practices.

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CSO: 3548/15

## INTERNAL RIFT BETWEEN 'LENDAKARI,' PNV LEADERSHIP

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by Ulpiano Garcia]

[Text] Vitoria--Lendakari Carlos Garaicoechea made some statements yesterday about the polemic within the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] which has caused widespread unease among the highest nationalist leaders.

While giving assurance that he had no intention of resigning, Garaicoechea spoke of his "personal sacrifice" in order to prevent schisms in the membership of the PNV.

Garaicoechea's statements were made precisely at the time when two Basque daily newspapers were carrying an interview with the president of the party, Roman Sodupe, in which he stated that the lendakari continued to have the full support of the Euskadi Buru Batzar (EBB).

The Basque prime minister gave assurance yesterday that he will not be the one to allow or encourage division within the Basque Nationalist Party.

"It will not be Carlos Garaicoechea," the lendakari said, "who will allow, much less encourage, division. If necessary," he added, "I would rather abandon the defense of my own personal convictions within the party context, to avoid the occurrence of such a schism."

"And I say this very emphatically because I am reading, and this upsets me profoundly, that all of this may be the prelude to a division within the PNV," the lendakari went on to say, referring to the Historical Territories Law conflict.

"And I want to make it very clear," he added, "that this lendakari and this nationalist will never, never contribute by any of his actions or attitudes to the spread of division in the PNV."

"Quite the contrary. If anything governs his actions, it will be the desire and determination to prevent at any price any kind of division, beginning first and foremost with his own personal sacrifice," Garaicoechea stated.

After indicating that his attitude will be "that which will urge the party to avoid division under any pretext," the lendakari stated that rather than see

this happen, "I would prefer to be abandoned by all of the components of the PNV and to retire to my private life."

Concerning his possible resignation, Garaicoechea gave assurance that "I have no bias at present which would make me think of resignation. For me, like any prime minister, there are possible future circumstances which could lead to resignation."

After reiterating that currently he is characterized by the greatest willingness and calm imaginable, although objective circumstances may work against him, the lendakari said that "this does not mean in any way that I have the slightest intention of leaving my post, rather quite the contrary."

These statements resulted in an immediate comment to the press by the executive board of the PNV, which said: "The executive board of the PNV is surprised by certain statements in which the possible internal division of the PNV is again mentioned, and new references made to the picture of discord, precisely on the day when the president of the EBB, Roman Sodupe, himself, has stated in an interview that Garaicoechea continues to have the full support of the EBB."

"In this way an atmosphere of unease and confusion which encourages constant instability within the party is being created."

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## HALEFOGLU IMPRESSIONS OF U.S. TRIP, CYPRUS, NATO

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 Oct 84 pp 8,12

[Account of press conference by Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglul 8 Oct 84 in Ankara]

[Text] Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglul talked about impressions of his ten-day trip to the U.S., his views concerning the U.S. Congress, foreign aid, Cyprus and Greece, and the latest international developments, in a press conference yesterday.

Apart from putting forth Turkey's views at the U.N. General Assembly, Halefoglul held talks with the foreign ministers of 34 countries, and two private talks with the U.S. Secretary of State. Agreement was reached to "hold meetings at regular intervals at the foreign minister level so as to conduct Turkish-U.S. relations in a sound manner." On U.S. aid, Halefoglul said the following:

"I want to say a few words about the state of the aid at the Congress. The cool and determined attitude of our government, and the efforts of the (U.S.) Administration based on a proper evaluation of the issue has meant that the aid has been secured, though not to the extent of our full requirements, but at least at the maximum level possible under present circumstances. There are no unacceptable conditions. Grants exceed last year's amount. Half of the FMS credits carry interest rates below the going market rate, which was not the case last year. The economic aid is above last year's figure. We view these as positive developments. Yet we observe with some sadness that the mentality which views aid as an instrument of political pressure still exists among some members of the Congress. However, the great efforts shown by the Administration have prevented this objectionable attitude from affecting the result in a decisive way. I would like to mention our appreciation of this."

Noting his satisfaction with the first round of talks on Cyprus initiated by the UN Secretary-General on 10 Sep 84, Halefoglul stated that TRNC has "assumed" a conciliatory attitude during these talks, demonstrating a positive approach with regard to both "the procedural and essential" aspects of the Secretary-General's 'working proposals'. "If the Greek Cypriots adopt a

similar attitude then the possibility of progress in the second round of talks could emerge," Halefoglou said.

As the voice and guarantor of stability and peace in the region, Turkey is in a good position to act as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, contributing to the establishment of understanding. Said the Foreign Minister:

"Turkey's realistic and nonpartisan efforts to end the tensions and conflicts in the region are being appreciated. In our meetings there were persistent demands from both our friends and the representatives of non-aligned countries that Turkey should continue its efforts in that direction."

In the first meeting with the Secretary of State Shultz, Halefoglou had explained the "backlash created in Turkey by the known incidents in the Congress". He had also explained the disadvantages of relations between the two allies suffering because of certain actions in the Congress, even if they are contained in the end. Halefoglou pointed out that like the previous military exercises in the Aegean, Greece did not participate in the recent 'Show of Determination - 84' exercises, citing peculiar and illegitimate justifications. The reason for such behavior, according to Halefoglou, could be found in the kind of thinking "which goes so far as to say that NATO exercises should be directed against Turkey."

#### Turkey - Greece

The Foreign Minister said that the recent exercises are of the kind that provide extremely valuable experience for the alliance. Greece tried to prevent these exercises, and not being able to do so, to make the point loud and clear that NATO exercises which do not accord with their designs will always prove problematic. A lot of Greek effort went into influencing the allies in this way. Said Halefoglou:

"Greece's efforts to force NATO into accepting its illegal behavior and actions regarding the Aegean international airspace, its objection to military exercises in these areas, its organizing military activities deliberately designed to coincide with NATO exercises in the Aegean are concrete instances of this."

Continuing, he said:

"A point that needs to be stressed in this context is the Greek authorities' refusal to accept our NOTAM which was made in full accordance with the Chicago agreement and its addenda regulating the flight of Turkish military planes in the Aegean international airspace. Their refusal to relay our NOTAM constitutes a denial of their responsibilities concerning air traffic. It is obvious that the non-transmission of our NOTAM is an act which might create serious consequences with regard to civilian air traffic in the area. To prevent such contingencies the necessary NOTAM has been relayed by ourselves. Not satisfied with all this, the Greek authorities have not failed to issue threats that there might be ominous developments in the area during the exercises, and that they would be taking certain measures. Since there could be

no question of any serious problem arising out of NATO exercises conducted in accordance with regular procedures, it is clear that any situation that might arise would be the responsibility of Greece which persistently avoids fulfilling its obligations under FIR.

Turkey believes that conducting joint exercises in all areas covered by the alliance (including the Aegean) is a beneficial activity which brings the soldiers of member countries together, gives added experience to the troops, and reinforces the solidarity of the alliance. Thus it is with apprehension that we view Greek efforts to use NATO exercises as a means to score advantages in bilateral Turco-Greek problems, and through a policy of blackmail, force NATO into supporting their views. As Turkey, it is our belief that it would be a much sounder approach for Greece (to which we have extended the hand of friendship) to recognize that its security lies in the strengthening of the alliance rather than its weakening. And we hope that in the near future Greece will be attending these exercises within the framework of understanding that belonging to an alliance calls for."

#### Questions - Answers

(Question) Greece persists in not attending the exercises under the military wing of NATO. This being the case, can you still maintain that Greece is presently part of the military wing of NATO?

(Answer) On paper it is. It does not attend exercises in areas close to Turkey, but participates in others. You better ask this question to NATO officials.

(Question) The Armenians have intensified their anti-Turkish efforts throughout the world in cooperation with other terrorist activities. Does Turkey have a new policy to deal with this?

(Answer) With regard to Armenian activities our reaction will remain the same in whatever country they happen to take place. We try to educate them first by means of historical realities, to bring them back to the right path. And we have been pretty successful in that regard. We will continue our efforts in the same fashion. The same policy will be followed with strict determination.

(Question) In announcing that no result has been achieved at the meetings under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Cuellar, the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou depicted the Turks as non-conciliatory. How do you interpret this?

(Answer) I suppose that the Turkish side's adoption of a conciliatory attitude has upset the Greek side. This view has been expressed by many people we have met. If any proof is required it is the declaration by the former foreign minister of the Greek administration Rolandis where he announces that Kyprianou does not want conciliation. He has said everything that needs to be said.

(Question) Minister of Defence Yavuzturk has stated that the U.S. aid is not sufficient? What do you think?

(Answer) I am saying the same thing. I said that the U.S. aid is the maximum amount to be secured under present circumstances even if it does not meet our needs completely. As you know \$485 million of the U.S. aid is in the form of credit, and \$215 million in grants. Half the credit carries very low interest rate. Last year the grants portion of the U.S. aid was \$130 million. Moreover, \$175 million has been given in economic aid. Last year this figure was \$138 million. When all these are taken into consideration, and let's not forget that this is an election year, the result should be viewed as a good one even though our needs have not been met. No conditions have been attached of any concern to Turkey. The Greeks wanted to bring in the issue of Marash. This has not been accepted. They have placed their president (U.S.) under certain conditions. But that must be viewed as the continuation of the existing practice.

(Question) There are reports to the effect that due to NATO exercises Greece will shut off the civilian airspace over the Aegean. How do you view this? What will Turkey do?

(Answer) We are in touch with the Greek authorities. We are doing all that is necessary, closely monitoring all developments.

(Question) When you were in the U.S. you also met the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Did you deal with the issue of the Black Sea economic zone?

(Answer) Yes, I discussed that issue too. Black Sea does not add up to 400 miles. Thus starting with the economic zone concept it is not possible for the Soviet Union to have a 200 mile economic zone. It is expected that the boundary of the old continental shelf formed by the median line will also constitute the boundary of the economic zone. The only problem is the condition of our fishermen who have been previously fishing haddock in the Soviet continental shelf. They have been fishing between 3-5 tons of haddock. As we understand it the Soviets are not too interested in such minimal amounts. Discussions are carried on in Moscow over this matter. I told the Soviet foreign minister about this subject. I think he did not know much about it. He did not say anything positive or negative. The situation will be clarified after our discussions with the Soviets.

Greece: 'Halefoglu's Statements Without Basis'

Greek Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, argued that Halefoglu's statements were without basis. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis argued that Turkish authorities had demanded the extension of boundaries in the Sams area. This being rejected by the NATO commander in charge of the exercises, the Greek civil aviation authorities did not issue an additional 'notam' for NATO exercises. Yet Turkey issued a 'notam' which was an arbitrary move.

Kapsis also claimed that at 11 o'clock local time yesterday, a Turkish fighter plane climbed up to 22,000 feet thus exceeding the altitude envisioned by the 'notam' thus endangering the security of civil aviation. The deputy minister said that, "in order to avert probable accidents, the Greek authorities have necessarily decided to close off the G-10 air corridor during the exercises." Furthermore, the Greek Ministry of Defence also claimed that during the NATO 'Show of Determination - 84' exercises, seven pairs of Turkish fighter planes have violated Greek airspace.

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CSU: 3864/10

## KAPIKULE CUSTOMS SCANDAL DEBARKS UNPAID

## Opposition Move for Interpellation

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Oct 84 pp 1,8

[Text] Ankara (Cumhuriyet Bureau) - After the call for a parliamentary investigation of the Kapikule customs scandal created turmoil in the Motherland Party (MP) and the government and the clash between ministers spilled over into the Grand National Assembly (GNA), the opposition has also gone into action: the Populist Party (PP) Group Executive Committee has decided to introduce a motion of interpellation concerning Interior Minister Ali Tanriyar. Going one step further, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDF) has taken a group decision for a motion of interpellation regarding Tanriyar.

Prime Minister Ozal, answering journalists' questions last night following a session of the Council of Ministers that lasted nearly four hours, said that "it's possible we may not even put an interpellation motion on the agenda." Should such a motion be placed on the agenda, he said that "automatically a vote of confidence would be sought."

Minister of State Mesut Yilmaz said that "Prime Minister Ozal will make a statement in the GNA on the topic of placing an interpellation motion on the agenda."

Murhan Bayazit and Seref Bozkurt, deputy chairmen of the PP group, have reported that they have studied the minutes of Finance Minister Vural Arıkan's address to the Assembly of the previous day and that it has been determined that certain top-level officials of the Interior Ministry "engaged in activities which were contrary to the basic principles of the Constitution." They also charged that these activities, "far exceeding the bounds of a civil servant's individual judgment and initiative, were of such a nature as to require that the political responsibility of the Interior Minister be placed on the agenda." The HF group's deputy chairmen stated that they had decided to bring a motion of interpellation concerning Ali Tanriyar based on Article 99 of the Constitution and on Article 107 of the rules of the GNA, and that they would present this to the PP group for a final decision.







According to information obtained by a CUMHURİYET reporter, Üzal stated that Finance and Customs Minister Vural Arıkan's address in the previous day's Assembly session in which he accused some state officials and especially Interior Minister Ali Tanrıyar was regrettable. Üzal also stated that he did not "consider it proper to make any changes in the government until the budget for fiscal year 1985 is through the GNA."

In a discussion with Mehmet Kececiler, Üzal asked that developments within the party be followed closely and "reported immediately" to him. Noting that it would be wrong at this juncture to allow any conflict within the party or the government, Üzal stressed the necessity of the group leadership's being alert on this topic.

Following the General Session of the GNA, Finance and Customs Minister Vural Arıkan spoke with his sister Turkan Arıkan, parliamentarian from Samsun, and Ankara parliamentarian Gökseül Kalaycıoğlu.

Fifteen MP parliamentarians who signed a letter prepared to be conveyed to Prime Minister Turgut Özal characterized the address of Finance and Customs Minister Arıkan in the General Session as "a sound and necessary address." According to information acquired, the pro-Arıkan parliamentarians, who followed the developments until late last evening, united "in the view that Finance Minister Arıkan should not resign under any circumstances in the face of probable pressure."

It has been learned that, after Finance Minister Vural Arıkan rose to the podium of the GNA amidst applause from the opposition and made his speech, the pro-Arıkan parliamentarians agreed to abstain on the motion for a general debate on the Kapıkule customs scandal. When his speech resumed, something on the part of the government and its parliamentarians, however, Arıkan asked that his friends act in concert with the proposal. Thereupon, the pro-Arıkan parliamentarians and the liberal group within the 12 votes against the motion for a general debate.

Moreover, it attracted attention that certain parliamentarians, especially the so-called "liberal group" and extremely numberless in, abstained on the pro-Arıkan parliamentarians, especially Arıkan himself, and turned the Finance Minister's speech a sound and consistent act.

Speaking with Turkan Arıkan and Gökseül Kalaycıoğlu, Vural Arıkan said that "I was obliged to say from the podium of the Assembly everything that needed to be said. I told my friends who know me that they should know that I would not under any circumstances whatsoever resign from my ministerial post."

Only two members stated that the speech was premature, and that it should have been said within the group.

Adana parliamentarian Vedat İncir, stating that he intervened because of the speech, spoke as follows:

"Our respected Finance Minister has now stated in the GNA some things he had earlier said elsewhere. He stated them all at once. It's only natural for an honorable person to speak out on those things he knows to be true. There's nothing more for us to say. I don't believe that there will be any crisis within the government and party on account of these statements by the Minister. He has merely made some necessary statements on a number of topics. We offer him our appreciation and affection."

Afyon representative Abdullah Altuntas, noting also that the Minister had set everything forth openly, said "There was absolutely nothing wrong in the speech yesterday; he said what he knew."

As for Nigde parliamentarian Haydar Ozalp, he said the speech was premature and stated that "One must make statements of this sort at the right time. I found it premature." Stating that he found the Finance Minister's address to be "quite positive," Antalya representative Abdullah Cengiz Dagyar said that "I don't think it will cause any crisis. The Minister openly furnished the Assembly with information in his possession. Since we're not an old-type party, I don't think such speeches will cause any problems." Dagyar added that "Actually this type of speech is very beneficial in helping our party find itself. In my view, such speeches are very necessary. Since we're a new party, I think that we will resolve a number of our problems with just this type of speech. One mustn't think that the party is damaged by such speeches. The statements were very good. I respectfully welcome them."

problems of inability to speak out

Balikesir parliamentarian Ismail Dayi, as well, welcomed the Minister's speech, saying "I find it most positive." Stating that the Minister had said everything that should have been said from this platform, Dayi spoke as follows: "The esteemed Minister was suffering from the inability to speak out. Giving the speech, he has now brought the matter out into the open. He gave us serious information. The speech yesterday was actually extremely important from the standpoint of showing us what sort of situation we are in."

Adnan Ouzhan Artukoglu noted that he did not approve of the Minister's making such a speech. He said "Naturally I also have ideas on this subject. But I'm not in favor of making this type of statement in a public forum."

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11: 10/7/70

## EREL URGES OPPOSITION'S ON-SITE REVIEW OF EASTERN DILEMMA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 9 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by Teoman Erel]

[Text] Erdal (Inonu) Bey and company are carrying on a dialogue with themselves: "It seems as if it would be better to change our schedule and go East. We should be making this trip without further delay."

Yes, it would indeed be better.

Particularly now that the Hon. Prime Minister has gone ... It is common knowledge that at the outset of the incidents in the East, Turgut Ozal viewed himself as being above the fray. He kept stressing that the problem was not serious. He kept posing for photographs at the beach. In saying that a good part of the electrical energy generated by the Keban dam is used for the electrification of villages in the western part of the country, he seemed to provide propaganda material for the claim that "the East is being deliberately neglected."

Well, Ozal has made the trip to the East at long last. And he did a good thing, too.

Now our sights are set on the SODEP leader, his probable visit and views on the subject. And our advice to him would be that he should avoid keeping his views to himself just to create an impression of national unity in every instance. The opposition should be forthright in specifying those government policies that they support, and those which they do not.

Yes sir, there are benefits to be derived from such an attitude, yes indeed.

As we were told by an official who has recently returned from those parts, such an exchange of views would carry benefits of vital importance.

\* \* \*

There is a widespread view that conflicts among parties, and party divisions among the people have been responsible for sinking the country into a quagmire

Yet a veteran sub-governor who recently returned from a tour of duty in South-eastern Anatolia has told us the following: "Despite the commonly-held assumption, during the critical years in the Southeast - those unfortunate years when the power of the state had vanished - the conflicts and differing viewpoints among parties had beneficial effects overall. The fact that the people were divided in terms of their party allegiances (JP, RPP, NSP and so on), prevented them from being divided along more ominous types of cleavages. What do we mean by more ominous types of cleavages? There might have been the divisions between separatists and anti-separatists which could probably have bolstered the ranks of the separatists. Whereas even during the period when the state reached its low point in its capacity to exert authority - when the Apocu's had the entire field to themselves - the proportion of those inclining towards separatism remained at minimal levels."

Pay attention to this observation. We regard it as particularly significant that democracy is alive and well even in those critical regions which are clearly objects of attention as far as some external power centres are concerned. The NDP Leader Turgut Sunalp has certainly performed an important duty in this regard when he recently toured the East, recording (on cassette tape) the bitter complaints he received there. The transmission of these tapes to the public, has placated the people of that region to some extent, however small that may be.

The government and the state cannot be everywhere catering to every individual. The bureaucracy and the security forces do make mistakes. Even then it is much preferable that the leader (or a parliamentarian) of an opposition party assumes responsibility for the problem of the citizen living in this critical region than simply ignoring it. If the opposition does not claim active responsibility for these problems then others will, including the separatists, as problems keep accumulating. They have done so in the past.

\* \* \*

We advise the leaders of the opposition parties to investigate the so-called problem of 'distributing arms to the people' at its locale, and only then pronounce judgement over the matter.

We should be careful to remind ourselves: In the IV program dealing with the incidents in the Southeast, the citizen awaiting the protection of the state was talking about "the security of his property and life". That is, he was referring to the security of his property even before that of his life. In a sense he was articulating the reality of that region. In faraway border villages without any jobs, not being able to protect one's animals or produce from bandits means a certain death from starvation. I have been told by a retired staff officer: "We were passing through the fertile lands south of Hakkari during army exercises. The poor peasant of the region had neither sown wheat nor was he rearing animals. When asked why, his answer was: 'I will rear and the bandit will take them. So why should I bother?'..."

This is the essence of the problem. The inhabitants of that region need security (in the simple business of living) to a much larger extent. When their arms were being collected some time ago there were widespread complaints: "You will leave us powerless in event of the bandit." Such complaints were not

heeded at the time. Now we see that both the President, and the Prime Minister are attentive to the citizens' fundamental need, and are trying to meet that need. If the opposition is against the distribution of arms to the people, they should go there, investigate the situation, and pronounce judgement with two feet firmly planted on the ground.

The ball is in your court Erdal Bey, Hon. Necdet Calp, Yildirim (Avci) Bey, Ahmet Tekdal Bey. There are very important problems concerning the property and the lives of citizens over there. Perform your duty.

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CSO: 3555/10

## POPULIST PARTY SUFFERS SEVERE INTERNAL RIFT

## Calp Denies Intraparty Problems

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 9 Oct 84 p 21

[Press conference by PP Chairman Necdet Calp 8 Oct 84 in Ankara]

[Text] Issuing a call for unity in a press conference yesterday PP Chairman Necdet Calp said that there was "no difference of opinion within the PP". Calp demanded that all manner of self-seeking be abandoned, and behavior that is detrimental to party unity should be avoided. There is no question of cancelling the conventions at provincial and sub-provincial levels, said Calp. He also denied meeting Finance Minister Vural Arikan and former politicians.

In his press conference Calp stated that the meeting of the Founders' Council was legal, that there was a quorum at the meeting, that resolutions and motions of no confidence are passed by a vote of majority. He announced that a written answer will be given to charges of impropriety made by former secretary-general Aydin Guven Gurkan and Deputy Chairman Dogan Sonmez.

Noting that people have been dismissed by the Founders' Council just as they had been appointed by the same body six months ago, Calp said:

"None can take us away from our six principles and the social democratic view of the PP. Therefore we should free ourselves from all manner of egoistic attitudes."

## Questions, Answers

PP Chairman Calp answered journalists' questions at the end of the press conference. It went like this:

(Question) Will provincial and sub-provincial party leaders be removed from their positions?

(Answer) No.



(Question) You have issued a call for unity to the very same people with whom you said you could not serve on the Steering Committee. How will you get along?

(Answer) Some friends have misunderstood that. An opposition group on the outside had been formed against the Steering Committee. The press has been wrong. It should be said that the opposition won, not lost. The opposition has come out of the party council, by opposing the transformed Steering Committee. I am talking as the counterpart of the opposition. They had been in power, but now they have fallen down.

(Question) The former secretary-general depicts the meeting of the Founders' Council as a "mini-coup". If a motion of non-confidence were tabled for this administration too, what would happen next?

(Answer) This administration will last until the convention. It is legal. Conforming to legality is fundamental.

(Question) You have previously maintained that your authority was limited. Will it be expanded now?

(Answer) The party regulations deny authority to the chairman on several issues. The regulations ought to be changed. We have decided to leave this matter to the convention, or another expanded Founders' Council meeting. We are awaiting the most suitable opportunity. The party chairman should be given the necessary authority.

(Question) Will the dossier of the four parliamentarians who went to Israel without permission be forwarded to the newly-formed disciplinary council? Or whether the matter is going to be discussed at the Steering Committee?

(Answer) No. The decision has been made. The dossier will be forwarded directly to the newly-formed disciplinary council.

(Question) The former secretary-general Guven Gurkan maintains that conventions should be conducted in a democratic manner. What do you say?

(Answer) The untrusted man talks about trust; the cowards talk about courage; and the blind man talks about light.

Hasturk, Secretary-General

At the meeting of the PP Steering Committee yesterday, the MP from Istanbul Yilmaz Ihsan Hasturk (who was the sole candidate) became the new secretary-general of PP having received 21 votes.

Later at the same meeting elections were held for the four deputy chairmanships. In the first round of voting the following were elected as deputy chairmen: MP from Muguia Iiris Gurpinar (28 votes), MP from Istanbul Resit Ulker (24 votes), MP from Istanbul Gurseli Ozkaya (19 votes).

## Assistants

At the meeting the following were elected to the positions of assistant secretary-general: Selahattin Tafliloglu, Rusen Isin, Edip Ozgenc, Cemal Ozdemir. Arif Toprak was brought in as treasurer.

The spots on the Founders' Council vacated by the resignations of Yilmaz Onen and Erol Agagil (who were elected to the Steering Committee) were filled by the first alternate Rusen Isin, and former secretary-general Aydin Guven Gurkan.

Gurkan, on the other hand, maintained that he and his elected friends will be travelling along different paths until the convention, adding that: "I want to leave them alone in their path of divisiveness and fragmenting the party. I cannot bear to be with them, cannot even take one step together."

## Former Secretary on Strife

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 9 Oct 84 p 21

[Interview with Aydin Guven Gurkan, former secretary-general of PP, by Ismet Solak at Gurkan's home in Ankara; date not specified]

[Text] Former PP Secretary-General Aydin Guven Gurkan, who has become something of an "opposition leader" within the PP, explained the whys and wherefores of their falling out with Necdet Calp, saying that "even the simplest man-on-the-street knows that there is a leadership problem within the PP. Even if I weren't around, there would still be a leadership problem." Said Gurkan: "Hon. Calp wants to see politics as the undersecretariat of democracy of the Turkish Republic, or the directorate-general of opposition affairs, or some such thing. In any case as a routine administration of an official department." Gurkan added that they would be prepared when the convention comes, with their "grassroots support and alternative program."

Gurkan who was lying in bed with high fever at his home in the Emek district maintained that his "illness was due not to a change in the administrations but to a change of seasons." He declared that he will give 'specific answers' to all our questions. His answers to HURRIYET's questions are as follows:

(Question) Due to a leadership struggle you have left the party administration. They have, amongst other things, accused you of trying to 'patch' PP into another party. When did leadership become an issue?

(Answer) Even the average citizen knows and sees this. I cannot be creating a problem which already exists. Even if there were no Aydin Gurkan there would still be a leadership problem. That I left the job of secretary-general does not mean the end of the problem. There is clearly a problem of leadership and executive council at the PP. The problem has arisen without any initiative on my part. How does it relate to me? In a social democrat party when a problem like this arises the competing faction acquires the post of secretary-

general. And that happened to coincide with my tenure. In a social democracy one does not actively seek to become a candidate. If a vacancy exists others nominate one as a candidate. Such a problem cannot be swept under the rug just by my removal from a position of influence. This will be seen to be the case at the convention.

(Question) It is said that the PP is a party of collusion. Your own style does not accord well with a party which has a reputation like that. Do you really claim that you have brought in the style of a genuine social democratic party?

(Answer) I do not accept the premise that PP would be engaged in collusion. Had I suspected that to be the case I would never have joined the party. However, there may be such rumors pertaining to party cadres which have come into existence under extraordinary conditions. Since I had been secretary-general under different set of conditions I may have expressed myself more openly. I have no commitment to anybody either.

(Question) Is it true that the Calp team and the Feyzioglu team will join in the same party? Will PP adopt the Reliance Party line?

(Answer) I have also heard about these goings on. I cannot see myself to be compatible with the political course followed by Feyzioglu and his friends in the past. We are engaged in a serious social democratic movement of considerable substance.

#### Meeting with Ecevit

(Question) Has the movement against you been started after your meeting with Ecevit?

(Answer) I don't think so. Our talk with Hon. Ecevit has been subjected to overspeculation. Believe me, we talked about the convention of social democrats. But the coincidence of our meeting with SODEP's call for unity led to a variety of interpretations. Hon. Ecevit does not presently possess the right to engage in politics. In our private talks we were both careful to remain within the legal framework. But it is clear that we do have things in common even if we had not come together. Social democracy as conceived and articulated by Ecevit and my conception of it is similar, and in fact the same. This is nothing new. What he was saying previously is reflective of what I think. But we did not talk about domestic politics.

(Question) It is said that you are close to the Democratic Left Party. Is it true?

(Answer) It is not closeness to DLP, I have said over and again. SODEP and PP have gone through two elections with formidable struggles between them. There was no such thing vis-a-vis the DLP movement. It is the party rank and file who are inclined towards that side. But it is presented as if I have injected this into the party. That is not so. I simply did not oppose the tendency. I did not push it the other way either. I did not influence it

did not try to divert it. I have not even met the prospective founders of DLP.

#### SODEP and Unification of the Left

(Question) How do you view SODEP?

(Answer) There are many valuable people in SODEP whose existence gives me happiness ... However, SODEP's relations with the ruling powers seem to be slightly in excess of what is expected of a social democrat party. If the PP movement achieves the status of a serious party, it would become the real social democrat party. I mean to say, look at PP, and then take a look at SODEP. In PP you will see the simple people, whereas in SODEP you will see the professionals.

(Question) Will the unification of the left take place at grassroots level, with votes unifying the left?

(Answer) Unification could take place at the upper reaches as much as at grassroots level. In my view a genuine social democrat party encompassing all its functions has not been established as yet. We would gather around whoever establishes such a party. An important stage in this is the convention. If PP manages to hold a convention which is not diverted from its purpose by means of constraints, which is fully open to participation and democratic, and if the grassroots can be fully reflected at the convention, then the crisis of the left would come to an end. SODEP could have done this but missed the opportunity because it conducted a constrained, prescribed convention. It is my impression that the previous two elections have left their scars on our party organization as far as SODEP is concerned.

(Question) How will you prepare for your convention?

(Answer) We will go to the convention not only with the provincial and sub-provincial conventions supporting us, but with our grassroots support and a specific alternative program. Those who have removed us from duty have, in a sense, made a good turn to us and to the party. We will go to the convention with a program which will put to rest all the silly talk about lack of an alternative.

#### Differences with Calp

(Question) What specific differences are there between Calp and yourself?

(Answer) We have an important difference in the way we look at politics. He sees the issue as the undersecretariat of internal democracy, or directorate-general of opposition affairs. That is, regular caucus meetings on Tuesday mornings, and doing opposition three afternoons a week within the limits of whatever the government brings to the question period. He sees it as routinized opposition. As for me, I see it as necessary to have control over the agenda. I want to pressurize the government, to face the issues head-on, to unite with the people, to mobilize them, to create new targets, open new vistas. It is here that we diverge. Thus a vacuum is created in the opposition.

(Question) If the convention eliminates you once again would there be a break-up?

(Answer) If the convention does not give us the chance to serve, I can only honor such a decision. The only condition is that the convention be democratic.

(Question) Is there a possibility of becoming government with those who have broken up from ANAP? Does Calp think along those lines?

(Answer) I have never been able to be Calp's close confidante. We worked together but I could never become close. I heard a rumor like that but he did not tell me anything. I am against the idea that we should enter a coalition at all costs. But if the national interest and the conditions of the time require such a thing then one could join a coalition.

(Question) Is the situation which has arisen in the Founders' Council legal?

(Answer) I believe it is not legal. However, I prefer political discussion to arguing over legalities. They could not entice us into the trap of legalistic disputes. The important thing, however, is not the friction between the party chairman and the secretary-general, but the reasoning behind the memorandum directed against us. They wanted to divide the party but we did not fall for it. We did not allow the party to be divided.

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CSO: 3554/11

## BRIEFS

CDS ADVOCATES INTEGRATED COMMAND--The CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] recommends the creation of an integrated command for the armed forces, the complete restructuring of the military service and also the revision of the missions of the armed forces as the basic groundwork of the strategic concept of national defense. The conclusions, which were made public yesterday, are the result of the meeting of the "Ofir [expansion unknown] Group" held last week end to continue work on the development of the "Program for a New Decade." The CDS maintains that "the potential for autonomous national defense must be understood as a vehicle of first priority for Portuguese military participation in the collective defense operations of NATO and must guarantee survival and a minimum of dissuasion from dealing with threats to the integrity of the nation." "The utilization of Portugal as a zone of logistic support within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and the contingent granting of facilities in the national territory must contribute to the enhancement of the country's strategic position and safeguard the reinforcement of its sovereignty," the document adds. The unhomogeneous nature of the country's territory, the broad expanse of its air and sea space in comparison with its land area, the enhancement of its strategic position, the setting up of strategic reserves in vital areas and an effective alert and detection system throughout the national territory are, according to the CDS, "basic matters which the department of National Defense must take into account." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Oct 84 p 3] 8089

NO NATO BASE, PIPELINE--The Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Defense stated yesterday that "as far as Portugal is concerned, nothing is known about NATO's plans described in news reports in some Portuguese media." After stressing that these reports were based on the Spanish newspaper DIARIO 16, Mota Pinto emphasized that the information being circulated is incorrect. According to DIARIO 16, NATO "plans to install a military base in the Tejo estuary and an oil pipeline linking Sines to Madrid, within the framework of a plan to transform the Iberian peninsula into a logistic platform." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Oct 84 p 3] 8089

JARDIM: 'NO NATO FLUNKY'--According to Alberto Jardim, NATO installations on the Island of Porto Santo justify a request from Portugal for compensation from the Alliance, within which the country "cannot play the role of an errand boy." The Madeira leader made this statement during the ceremony inaugurating the new parking area for aircraft using the Funchal airport. In this connection, Jardim said that, in his opinion, the project to build the intercontinental airport on Madeira cannot be postponed, after he had stated that "per capita, Madeira is the region of the country that generates the greatest amount of foreign exchange for the Banco de Portugal." As far as Jardim is concerned, the port problem has been solved and he is now engaged "in the airport battle." The international airport project anticipates the lengthening of the runway with a choice between two possible figures for the extension, one of 2,336 meters and another of 2,781, in addition to the enlargement of the airport, the parking area and the highway network. The project for carrying out the operation, which is known as "Funchal II," is at present being evaluated from the standpoint of its technical and financing aspects and either of the two possibilities indicated above would permit use of the airport by various types of aircraft, including the Boeing-747. The second of the aforementioned possibilities would have the advantage of eliminating any kind of penalization. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Oct 84 p 7] 8089

'ORION 84' MILITARY MANEUVERS--Units from several military regions yesterday began at Sul do Tejo the "Orion 84" exercise, the purpose of which is to test the command, control and communications structure of the army. The exercise will involve the transfer of command nuclei and their installation in Vendas Novas, Evora, Estremoz and Elvas and a zone to the east of Estremoz, between the Caia dam and the village of Rosario. Participating in "Orion 84" will be the Ground Forces Operational Command (COFT), command nuclei consisting of elements of the Logistics Department of the Army General Staff, the military regions, the First Independent Mixed Brigade (the NATO Brigade), the Special Forces Brigade and respective units. The exercise also anticipates the involvement of unit commands of the GNR [Republican National Guard] "in specific tasks in collaboration with the armed forces, for the military defense of the national territory against foreign aggression." [Text] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 11] 8089

LEMONS FERREIRA'S DIPLOMACY--"The supposed antagonism between civilian and military society is a false problem," affirmed Lemos Ferreira before an audience of military and civilian doctors at the opening session of a symposium on assistance for members of the armed forces suffering from tuberculosis. "We are all part of one and the same society and although the military are a group distinguished by their own characteristics, they are a reflection of the society to which they belong. When that society is inferior, we too will be inferior," the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces said. These are the calm and sensible words



of a military man who has conducted his actions by such parameters.  
But in times like these, they are, more than anything else, an example  
of diplomacy... [Excerpt] [Lisbon A TRADE in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 20]  
8089

CSO: 3542/18

## PLAN PROPOSED TO IMPROVE CIVIL DEFENSE ANTI-GAS PREPAREDNESS

Stockholm KEMISK TIDSKRIFT in Swedish No 8, Aug 8+ pp 12-14

[Article by Ulf Ivarsson]

[Text] The threat of chemical weapons is growing, but there is still an insufficient number of protective masks and shelter spaces.

A new home guard organization with thousands of volunteers appears to become Sweden's method of protecting its civilian population against the various aspects of chemical warfare.

Whereas the peace movement in the West focuses on nuclear arms and is primarily opposed to the deployment of nuclear arms by NATO, our Swedish experts and defense politicians have reassessed the risks of nuclear warfare.

The threat on which the defense analysts base their study is conventional warfare where the attacker may use ABC [atomic, biological and chemical] weapons to supplement primarily chemical weapons which are less costly to produce and which, if the defender lacks protection, may cause equally much damage in the battlefield as tactical nuclear charges.

The nuclear threshold is regarded as higher than assumed in the fifties and sixties.

In the case of chemical weapons, the same political-moral restraining forces do not apply as in the case of nuclear weapons. The reaction of world opinion to Iraq's desperate mustard gas and tabun [nerve gas] attacks on Iranian forces last winter was surprisingly weak.

#### Reassessment

The new situation has brought about a reassessment on the part of the Swedish civil defense of its previous tactics, which, of course, have been characterized by large-scale evacuations for the very purpose of minimizing the effects of nuclear terror bombings.

The civil defense, however, has not entirely abandoned the idea of evacuation. As long as sufficient notice is given, the civilian population may be evacuated if chemical attacks on population centers are imminent.

Previous defense decisions reduced the protection against ABC weapons. The measures would merely cause "moderate additional costs." A turning point came with the defense decision of 1982. It was assumed at the time that a first-time use of nuclear weapons in Europe would hardly take place against Sweden, but that it is important that we have the capability to resist a limited use of nuclear weapons.

The risk that we may become subject to the use of chemical weapons is deemed to have increased sharply. They may occur already in the introductory phase of a war where the attacker tries in advance to gain control of important military targets to disturb our mobilization.

In this connection, the civilian population may be hit by floating gas clouds or may be forced to evacuate through an environment where chemical weapons are being used.

#### Combat in Built-up Areas

Civilians may also end up in risk areas where the fighting is carried on in built-up areas, a possibility which the Swedish Army leadership considers inevitable in the case of a future war.

Since Sweden has rejected offensive chemical weapons for its own part, only one barrier remains in addition to international disarmament initiatives, viz. a strong defense on the part of Sweden itself. The defense committee made a note of this, and the conclusion, therefore, was that "our protection against chemical weapons (must) be such that an attacker cannot gain any essential advantages from using chemical weapons in support of his military operations."

Unfortunately, it probably has to be admitted that we merely find ourselves at the initial stage of the development of a protection which, at best, will keep the attacker, if any, from using his chemical weapons.

"On the military side, Sweden's good reputation in this area probably should be reviewed somewhat," says Anita Meyerhoffer, chief of the Research Institute of the National Swedish Defense, in Stockholm.

#### Basic View of Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces

Her department watches closely international developments as far as chemical weapons are concerned. On the basis of chiefly open sources, facts are gathered for the Swedish Military Council which, subsequently, frames a list of demands in the form of "the Basic View of the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces on ABC Warfare," which appeared in its present version in 1982.

From the West there are no difficulties obtaining information on protection against chemical warfare. There is even an exchange of research scientists, and they have no major secrets from one another.

In the East, they have not made any official statements on the offensive capacity they themselves possess since 1938, and they are extremely secretive

about everything which concerns their own protective equipment.

Anita Meyerhoffer and her research team inform the leadership of the Swedish Armed Forces of everything which with a fair amount of certainty may be said about the kind of chemical weapons which may be deployed against Sweden, what the weapons are, and what weapons carriers exist.

In the fall, the Research Institute of the National Swedish Defense will release a detailed study on the Basic View of the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces on ABC Warfare, which will answer the question whether our planned protection will put a halt to the kinds of attack on which the defense leadership bases its position in its so-called prospects plan.

### Objections

The new picture of threats has not been received without objections. Wilhelm Agrell, peace researcher, has warned against abandoning nuclear warfare as the controlling factor in the planning. The civil defense ought to be based on the worst of all attacks in a war, he says.

Everybody is agreed, however, that the civil defense, in order to be realistic, ought to base itself on simpler solutions and the citizens' own initiative.

After 9 years of study and thousands of pages of reports, the civil defense, therefore, begins to change its appearance and will, according to the plans, in 1987 be given the following structure:

The municipalities will take over the leadership of the civil defense in war.

Each municipality will set up a civil defense area, prepare shelter plans and will be divided into home protection areas comprising 200-2,000 persons.

Concurrently with a reduced but more effective regular civil defense force, so-called home protection representatives will be recruited on a voluntary basis.

### Idea of Popular Movement

In case of war, the new civil defense under municipal leadership will comprise 100,000 men, the majority of whom will be voluntary home protection representatives. Daniel Bildt, organizational secretary of the Civil Defense League, says that the home protection organization is a way of reviving the old popular movement idea in defense of our vulnerable society. At the request of the Civil Defense Board, he has studied the home protection organization and finds that it will have to be developed as soon as possible to improve the defense preparedness.

"The very moment that peace is lost it will be too late. We are living in an insecure time, and much of that which is happening reminds one of the escalation in the thirties."

Daniel Bildt believes that the home protection organization may play an important role when it comes to reducing the effects of a war disaster. Simple protective measures of the type of the "Vietnam shelter" and the protective mask--quickly adopted--are the ones which work safely and which we can afford.

Swedes, of course, are used to getting all kinds of conceivable help and services once an accident has taken place. In case of war, there are rescue forces, i.e. the reinforced fire-fighting organization, outside the densely populated areas in special civil defense bases. They are prepared to step in only after the actions of war have been called off.

#### Take Responsibility Oneself

Everybody, therefore, must take the responsibility for the protection of themselves and their families. The task of the home protection organization is to provide information on how to arrange heating, water, and emergency food supplies once the ordinary supply system has collapsed, to distribute protective masks and to provide information on how to set up a protected area in one's own basement, etc.

Most people do not even know where to go in case of an air attack. According to the regulations, they will have to reach a shelter within 2-3 minutes of the sound of the alarm.

A popularly based protection on a grassroots level is probably attractive to countries with strained economies, and it has, moreover, been found that it does not even help to invest enormous amounts of money--a total level of protection can never be accomplished.

In 1974, the UN attempted to calculate the costs of a detection and warning system, transports and hospital care for the protection of the inhabitants of an industrialized society against chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Translated into Swedish conditions and converted into current prices, the costs would be of the magnitude of 10 billion kronor, i.e. half the defense budget. Nobody familiar with the situation any longer believes in such a large-scale civil defense system.

#### Slow Rate

The peace-time budget of the civil defense is modest in this context--today, it is of the order of approximately 415 million kronor, the estimated cost of shelters not included. This sum includes the costs of the annual new acquisitions of protective masks. A total of 4.5 million protective masks of the 1971 model for the civilian population are kept in centrally located storehouses. Each year, an additional number of 380,000 masks will be purchased.

The big problem is respiratory protection for children between the ages of 3 and 6. The protective jacket of the No 36 model, 50,000 jackets of which have already been manufactured, has proved to be psychologically inconvenient, and the production will probably be halted. The child is frightened by the noise from the electrically operated fan.

Protective gear for the smallest children--up to 3 years of age--is expected to start being produced in 1985.

Daniel Bildt takes a critical view of the slow rate:

"It would have been a simple matter arranging protective masks if the Civil Defense Board had not put the estimate at the top of its list of claims and used it as a kind of means of pressure against cuts."

"As long as we do not have masks for all, inhabitants in specially sensitive regions of the country, such as Skåne, Gotland and Norrbotten, will be given priority," says Bengt Stridsberg, a chemist within the Civil Defense Board. In these counties, all adults have access to respiratory protective equipment.

#### Lack of Shelters

"Unfortunately, there are not shelters for everybody either, even if the state authorities have made great efforts to eliminate the shortcoming."

The present situation is that we have 55,000 shelters of varying quality with a total of 5.8 million spaces.

The reason why there is still a lack of approximately 3 million spaces is that during a 15-year-period up to 1975, practically no shelters at all were built in the central parts of the major cities and in the single-family homes areas. The idea at the time was to evacuate the population in the case of a danger of war, a philosophy which has thus been partly discarded.

In older built-up areas, the cost of the construction of shelters is 4,000 kroner, while the cost in conjunction with new construction is approximately half that amount.

An amount of 400 million kronor has been earmarked for the budget year 1984/85 to reduce the shortage of shelters, but experts now wonder whether one space per inhabitant will actually cover the needs.

"Actually, at least two spaces are needed, since it is hardly enough to have access to shelter merely close to one's home or place of work," Daniel Bildt says.

#### Devastating Effects

An attack with chemical weapons will have devastating effects on an unprotected civilian population. Four tons of sarin, a highly volatile nerve gas, dropped over a large city are expected to kill tens of thousands of people in an area of 2 square kilometers. If the charge contains VX, which is an almost more effective nerve gas, the amount is sufficient to kill 50,000-180,000 people in an area of 6 square kilometers.

The medical personnel in the town cannot do much to limit the damage unless they have been trained in the use of antidotes and the population has learned to give itself injections at the right moment.

Remaining means of chemical warfare constitute a serious risk to rescue personnel trying to enter the area. If hospitals become contaminated, they may become unusable for a long time.

Reactions of panic may readily arise among survivors. They may be expressed in the form of fear of those who have become injured or tendencies to cease considering other people as belonging to the human race.

"The threat forces us to do something," Bengt Stridsberg says in a comment.

In the long run, there will be an improved protective mask for the people. The filter of the present mask cannot be exchanged since it has been glued on instead of screwed on.

Greater emphasis will be placed on the ABC training of the personnel of the civil defense. Only a few hours per training week are devoted to the subject.

In the war organization, more protective suits against chemical warfare will be needed if the civil defense is to live up to the demand for rescue even in environments which are covered with chemical weapons.

The possibility of procuring automatic detection equipment within the framework of total defense is being discussed. A prototype which is capable of identifying nerve gases has been developed at the research station at Umeå of the Research Institute of the National Swedish Defense.

Half of the existing shelter spaces are ventilated via sand filters which do not provide satisfactory protection against means of chemical warfare. There are rough plans to supplement them with modern filters which will absorb particles of dust, aerosols and gases.

Nor does the sand filter absorb ammonia, chlorine, sulphur dioxide or hydrocarbons. Clouds of such substances may spread as a result of attacks on chemical works.

The protective mask for the civilian population, however, provides some amount of protection against these "civilian" gases to the extent that one manages to escape from the risk area or is able to wait in the shelter until the clouds of such gases have disappeared.

#### Difficult Balancing

An unfortunate circumstance is the fact that the so-called normal shelters provide scant possibility of admitting persons who have been exposed to liquid chemical weapons.



Merely 1 gram of sarin evaporating from the clothing of a person seeking shelter is sufficient to kill everybody within a shelter of 100 square meters in the course of 20 minutes.

The civil defense is thus performing a difficult balancing act in informing the public that it is, after all, possible to protect oneself against the various aspects of war, without, at the same time, shocking people with far too detailed descriptions of the threat which we latently are exposed to.

"Our biggest resource is the will among many people to stand up for the democratic society which they find is worth defending," says Daniel Bildt. A few protective measures mean more than we think, despite the fact that we live in the space age where only technically complicated systems are said to have a decisive effect in warfare.

They are equally optimistic within the Civil Defense Board. There, they rely on people acting in a rational manner in a situation of crisis and on the authorities managing to provide the necessary information. However, they also recognize that the organization still far from comes up to the organizational, economic and tactical objectives.

7262

CSO: 3650/32

## BITING CRITICISM OF FRG ENTREPRENEURS HEARD IN SINGAPORE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Oct 84 p 14

[Article by Jens Friedemann: "The Germans Have Lost A Great Deal of Prestige in Singapore--The City State is Interested in Newest Technology--Offers of Japanese and Koreans Often Cheaper"]

[Excerpts] Singapore, 14 October--At the Singapore Development Board in the World Trade Center on the small island dotted with skyscrapers on the southern tip of the Malaysian Peninsula, the conversation is taking a surprising turn. The spokesman of this industrial planning center of the island republic, who has just explained to the German guests the industrial development strategy of the government authority, gets excited when asked about German participation, saying that the Germans are no longer a shining example for Singapore as far as industriousness and discipline are concerned. German businessmen, he says, have lost their positive qualities and now only think about social plans. Singapore, he continues, is an ideal location for making case studies concerning the quality of investment behavior. Whereas Americans, with very high capital outlay, are sending the latest technology for production to Singapore and are testing market opportunities without being afraid of taking risks, the Germans wonder where they can export their worn machines whenever they cannot manage to get rid of their old products at home.

Criticism of the Germans has become popular in Singapore since Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew some weeks ago officially reprimanded the Germans in an address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the independence of the city state. Strikes and a 35-hour week do not fit into the environment of Southeast Asia, marked rather by a passion for work. Particularly in the eyes of the Chinese, who are very good businessmen, the sheen of German industry has faded along with that of the Deutsche mark. The Singapore dollar and also the currency of neighboring Malaysia have gained in value vis-a-vis the Deutsche mark for Swiss franc. A couple of years ago 70 or 75 pfennings were enough to buy a Singapore dollar; today one must pay almost double that amount. The old-established German trade firms, such as the Hamburg company of Behn Meyer & Co Ltd, in Singapore since 1840 (annual turnover: DM 400 million), benefit of course from the weakness of the European currencies. The company, a representative of BASF and AEG as well as numerous German medium-sized businesses, also sees "enormous opportunities for the export of the Airbus and for German cars, constructional engineering and chemical goods," but at the same time it is being pointed out that the Japanese and Koreans are on

the heels of the Germans with far cheaper products. While there is basically no doubt in the high quality of the German products, their prices are often considered far too high.

Criticism of the Germans can be heard even in their own ranks. Friedrich Wilhelm Aldag, head of Nixdorf Computer Ltd and former head of the Rollei Works in Singapore expresses exactly the feelings of the local Chinese businessmen when he says that between 15 June and 15 September and then again over Christmas one cannot talk with any German firm. "They just close shop during vacation time," says Aldag disapprovingly; at least one cannot get any important decisions from them during that time,

Whenever German businesses wonder whether to invest in Southeast Asia, "they first send a reconnaissance patrol," and then there is radio silence for a year or two. If a decision is made thereafter, it generally comes too late. By that time Americans or Japanese have filled the gap and whoever is there first has the opportunity to close the market for the latecomers.

Rollei-Singapore, says its former chief Aldag, had made great profits; "the junk was produced in Braunschweig." The collapse of the German-Singapore camera firm to this day constitutes a heavy burden on economic relations between Singapore and its neighbors. "The tale about outstanding German entrepreneurs was destroyed as a result," says Aldag. Now everyone thinks he can criticize the Germans. Even the taxi driver, who speaks fluent English, says to German passengers with a wink: "Tired of working in Germany? Me too." But he sits behind the wheel 12 to 14 hours a day.

8790

CSO: 3620/66

## RECORD EXPORTS TRIGGER CHEMICAL INDUSTRY OPTIMISM

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 15 Oct 84 p 11

[Text] For the German chemical industry, 1984 promises to be an excellent year. For 1985 as well, the basic attitude in this key sector is one of optimism although, in view of the high 1984 level, the strong growth rates of the past can probably no longer be maintained.

Summarizing his expectations before the press in Essen, Prof Heinz-Gerhard Franck, president of the chemical industry association VCI, Frankfurt, said, "If business will stabilize at this high level, we are satisfied." Franck made his remarks at the occasion of his organization's membership meeting held in Essen on October 11 and 12. He described the current business situation as extremely encouraging. He said that, during the first 9 months of 1984, sales in the chemical industry increased by about 12 percent to DM 105 billion. He estimates sales for the entire year to come to approximately DM 140 billion. That would be a 5 percent real growth rate.

This strong increase was primarily due to exports. While the domestic growth rate was about 7 percent, the growth rate for exports was about 18 percent. The decline in construction and the weakening of private consumption were responsible for the relatively small increase at home. In addition, labor conflicts in the metal and printing industry have left their marks. On the other hand, the strikes also served to prevent the usual seasonal lull and a catchup boom developed instead from which the chemical industry benefitted as a supplier. During the period under review, chemical production grew by some 7 percent. Had it not been for the labor conflicts, Franck believes, it would have been one percentage point higher.

The industry's exports profited from the continuing worldwide economic recovery and the strengthening of the dollar. Exports to the United States, the Far East, including Japan, as well as several European countries increased sharply. For the first time, exports this year surpassed the 50 percent mark. But Franck didn't forget to emphasize the risks of exporting. In this connection, he mentioned in particular the current-account deficits and high indebtedness of the developing countries and the declining oil receipts of the OPEC nations. In addition, the high exchange rate of the dollar have made raw materials more expensive. In view of that, the 3.5 percent price rise in the chemical

industry was by no means spectacular, considering general cost trends. At any rate, prices could only be raised on exports, while domestic prices remained largely stable. Another factor with regard to the difference between the development of sales and volume is the continuing trend towards products with a higher value-added.

Imports also increased by about 18 percent during the first 9 months. While imports from North America grew at an above-average rate, those from the OPEC nations and the USSR declined. Meanwhile, at 36 percent, the share of imports to supply the domestic market constituted a new high.

#### Encouraging Growth Rates in Synthetic Fibers

The chemical industry was able to achieve a better utilization of its capacity in almost all areas, and in the primary sector by more than 85 percent. This higher utilization is one important reason for the continuing improvement of earnings despite higher expenditures for personnel, raw materials and energy.

As for individual areas, Franck made the following comments: The production of inorganic and organic industrial chemicals as well as synthetic materials developed at an above-average rate. The growth rate in the production of synthetic fibers was also encouraging. Production for private consumption, on the other hand, was below average. The general detergent production fell. Earnings in the fertilizer sector remained entirely unsatisfactory.

The fact that the chemical industry in the FRG was one of the few industries showing visible real growth was largely the result of the extraordinary efforts the sector itself had made, Franck stressed. Many firms, he said, spent large sums of money in past years to adapt their production structure to changing market conditions. He mentioned in this context the reduction of surplus capacity in standard synthetics and changes in the range of available synthetic fiber products. However, at the same time, he pointed out that such dramatic structural changes could no longer be expected in future years. As evidence of the high innovative capability of the German chemical industry, Franck referred to the balance sheet for royalties which, he said, closed with a positive balance of DM 300 million in 1983. Among the FRG industries, the chemical sector is the one that grants the largest number of patents and licenses. In the coming two decades, he said, the sector is going to produce a wave of innovations. Many innovations and developments, currently being tested in laboratories, will be produced commercially in the next few years. In the area of genetic engineering, he ranked the FRG third worldwide after the United States and Japan. He felt good progress had been made in catching up with these two countries. Prof Sammet of Hoechst Inc and Hermann-Josef Strenger, board chairman of Bayer Inc, supported him on this. The chemical industry is planning to invest a total of DM 7 billion this year, i.e., the same amount it will spend on research. Investments for expansion have clearly gained ground compared with rationalization and replacement procurement. Their share of total investment is 41 (last year 34) percent. For rationalization investments, it is 20 (31) percent and for replacements 39 (35) percent.

The VCI president underscored as a particularly welcome development the fact that the chemical industry had hired more than 3,000 new employees. Equally positive in his view was the growing number of new firms in the chemical industry: 180 new chemical firms were set up in 1983, i.e., 50 percent more than in the preceding year.

7821

CSO: 3620/83

## MERCHANT MARINE MINISTER DENIES RUSSIAN FLEET COMPETITION

Athens TA NEA in Greek 11 Oct 84 p 9

/Article by G. Komis/

/Excerpt/ Members of the joint Greek-Soviet maritime committee, headed by Mr Beleski, permanent deputy minister of maritime affairs, will arrive in Athens Friday. The visit has been planned for some time now and comes within the framework of regular contacts between members of the joint committee both here and in Moscow.

As announced yesterday by Minister of Merchant Marine G. Katsafaras, the meetings that are scheduled to begin Monday will deal with an exchange of views on problems facing the international merchant marine on the one hand and relations between Greece and the Soviet Union on the other hand.

Answering journalists' questions, the minister admitted that issues on competition will also be discussed but he made clear that there is no such issue as Russian fleet illegal competition to the detriment of the Greek fleet. In answer to persistent questioning by the journalists who mentioned that such an issue does indeed exist as far as European fleets are concerned, the minister said the following:

" I have never spoken about the Russian fleet. I have never spoken about 'dumping' on their part. Also, I have not seen any decision by the EEC with regard to illegal competition on the part of Soviet vessels. If certain isolated northern European countries are facing such a problem it is their own problem. Coming down to the basic issue, our friends, our partners, never did come to support us when we had our own problems."

In answer to a question as to how much damage is being done to Greek tourism by Russian cruise ships with their cheap cruises, the minister said the following:

"Russian cruise ships do not bother me. What does bother me are the vessels of multinational companies. And I will not permit Greek waters to be exploited by others but only by Greek shipowners. I will not permit vessels of multinational companies to pick up passengers in Greek ports."

5671

CSO: 3521/45



## EXPORTS PICTURE SHOWS IMPROVEMENT; RISE IN ARMS SALES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Oct 84 p 7

/Text/ According to the KEEM /Exports Research and Studies Center/, the increase in the value of our exports in the first 7 months of 1984 was great compared to the corresponding period of last year, with the main characteristic being that industrial exports developed more favorably than agricultural exports. There was also a great increase in the value of our exports during July 1984 compared to those of July 1983, a month that has usually been "the worst month" for our exports.

KEEM also made the following points:

In July 1984, exports amounted to 380 million dollars, i.e. they showed a 30.9 percent increase compared to July 1983. Nevertheless, the increase was smaller (+24.4 percent) if petroleum products are subtracted. It should be noted that exports of petroleum products in July 1983 were negligible.

During the 7-month period January-July 1984, exports amounted to 2,862 million dollars, thus showing a great increase by 24 percent compared to the corresponding period of last year which remained almost the same (+22.6 percent), even when petroleum products are not included. If this rise in exports continues in the same way for the remaining months of the year then the amount of exports for 1984 is estimated to reach the level of approximately 5 billion dollars.

The rise in exports during the 7 month-period January-July 1984 comes from all categories of products (of the TTDE /Standard International Trade Classification/) with the exception of "transport equipment and materiel" (category 7) the export of which remained at the same levels of those of the corresponding period of 1983. Especially strong were the exports of "raw materials" (category 2: +47 percent), "solid fuels, fertilizer, etc." (category 3: +34 percent) and "miscellaneous industrial goods" (category 8: 32 percent). Also spectacular was the increase in the nevertheless very small exports "of goods and transactions not classified into categories" (category 9: 38.8 percent) that primarily relate to exports of arms and ammunition to Portugal in May 1984 and to Burundi and the Philippines in July 1984. Overall, the export of industrial products increased by 25 percent while the export of agricultural products rose by 13 percent.

In relation to the overall picture of exports during the 7-month period January-July 1984, it is interesting to observe an increase in exports in all categories of products (of the TTDE) for the month of July 1984 compared to the same month of last year. The only exception was the export of "olives" (category 4) which showed a significantly big drop. Specifically, the increase of exports of "solid fuels, fertilizers, etc." (category 3) was spectacular, as was the nevertheless very small exports of "goods and transactions not classified into categories" (category 9). Also strong was the increase in exports of "raw materials" (category 2) and "miscellaneous industrial goods" (category 8).

Exports during the first 7 months of 1984 to all the basic geographical areas of the world were significantly great compared to the corresponding period of 1983. Nevertheless, an exception to the rule was the export of goods to the "remaining developing countries" that showed a small drop by 3 percent. There was also a small drop in exports to the Middle East and North Africa (-1 percent). On the other hand, there was a spectacular increase of exports to North America (+102 percent), especially to the United States (+103 percent). There was also a big increase of exports to the countries of the EEC (+26 percent). Also to be pointed out is the more than doubling (+115 percent) of the nevertheless limited exports to the "remaining OECD countries" and especially to Turkey (+404 percent) and Japan (+188 percent). Moreover, especially great were the nevertheless limited exports to the EFTA countries (+61 percent), especially to Portugal (12 times bigger) and to Sweden (+102 percent). Overall, exports to OECD countries show significantly large increases (+37 percent). Also bigger were the exports to socialist countries (+13 percent) due in great part to a big increase of exports to the CEMA countries.

In comparison with statistics of the first 6 months of 1984, a significant improvement in exports in July 1984 is observed compared with the corresponding month of last year. This refers to exports to all basic geographical areas of the world and especially to North America, the EEC and the "remaining OECD countries."

5671

CSO: 3<sup>r</sup> 1/45

## BRIEFS

EEC MEMBERSHIP APPEARS REMOTE--The time period that Mario Soares had given himself and the Portuguese negotiators to conclude negotiations for membership in the EEC ends this weekend. The ponderous Brussels bureaucracy and the no less ponderous Spanish membership, in the meantime, have boycotted the commitments which the government and state leaders of the principal community countries had assumed toward the Portuguese prime minister. The anticipated schedule is now completely impractical; vital matters in important dossiers continue to await the community position and the already famous "constat d'accord" [certification of agreement] that Mario Soares wanted to sign as quickly as possible is gradually losing the possibility of containing anything substantial, becoming more and more a simple transition document in the midst of negotiations. There will be another negotiating session next week with no real progress being expected although on Monday the foreign ministers of the Ten are going to meet in Luxembourg to discuss the matter of that "constat d'accord," among other things. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Sep 84 p 1] 8711

GOVERNMENT'S WAGE PROPOSAL REJECTED--In the negotiations held with the representatives of the civil service workers unions, the government yesterday proposed salary increases of 16 percent, which was immediately rejected by those unions. The government proposal, presented verbally to the unions and union federations by the secretaries of state for the budget, Alipio Dias, and of public administration, San-Bento Menezes, provides for a 17 percent increase of salaries but raises by 0.5 percent the contributions to the Civil Servants Mutual Insurance Fund and to the General Retirement Fund, so that the real increase would be 16 percent. According to this proposal, the pensions would also be increased by 16 percent, while there would be 14 percent increases in the cost allowances in the interior of the country. The unions, alleging the need to maintain purchasing power, proposed increases of around 30 percent and considered that the offer made by the government significantly affects real wages next year. Stressing the fact that the government did not formalize the proposal it revealed to the union representatives, some of the latter mentioned the "levity" with which the executive is approaching the matter considering that the salaries of more than 500,000 workers are at stake. The unions also demanded that the career review process be undertaken before salary negotiations. The next negotiating meetings with the government were scheduled for 8 October. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Sep 84 p 1] 8711

CSO: 3542/12

## GONZALEZ APPEAL FOR EEC ENTRY TALK MOMENTUM

Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Oct 84 p 59

[Text] Madrid--Felipe Gonzalez has summoned the ambassadors of the EEC countries in Madrid to his Moncloa office today. According to an announcement from his spokesman, Gonzalez will give them personal letters addressed to their respective governments in which he proclaims Spain's support for European unity and calls on the EEC countries to show a clear political determination to conclude the negotiations.

The prime minister's initiative comes at a time when the negotiations for Spanish membership in the EEC are at a low point. The government announced 2 weeks ago, after the Council of Ministers meeting, that it would make a political move to get the talks going again. The letter, which will be forwarded to the various governments, is part of the overall initiative.

In November 1983 Felipe Gonzalez sent a similar letter to the governments of "The Ten." In it he asserted that "as prime minister I am worried that frustration will take hold of the Spanish public, which harbors serious doubts about whether the Community actually has the political will to complete the membership process."

## Difficult Times

The negotiations for Spain's membership in the EEC were supposed to have concluded on 30 September of this year, but the Community has not responded to Spain's negotiating delegation. In none of the negotiating sessions in September between foreign affairs ministers was Spain given the documents on the most difficult bargaining issues: fishing, farming, olive oil, wine, iron and steel or industry.

The prime minister's initiative, which will be complemented with a series of trips to EEC countries by various ministers to negotiate the pending issues by sector, comes just 9 days before the next ministerial negotiating session on 24 October.

Community circles have the impression that "the next session will do the trick," and accordingly the Irish minister for foreign affairs, Jim O'Keefe, yesterday began a swing through European capitals to spur the negotiations for expanding the Common Market. As a result of Felipe Gonzalez's visit to Ireland on 20 and 21 September, the Dublin government, which is acting president of the EEC, has taken it upon itself to spur the negotiations.

The summit meeting between France and Spain in Barcelona on 19 and 20 October is regarded as a major political initiative for spurring the talks.

Separately, the chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, Gaston Thorn, asserted yesterday in Barcelona that "there is no direct link between Spain's membership in the EEC and its presence in NATO." In his speech inaugurating a series of conferences on Spain and the EEC, organized by the Institute of Higher Business Studies, Thorn indicated that "as far as membership in the Community is concerned, belonging to NATO is entirely consistent and complementary."

8743

CSO: 3548/19

## NEW AGREEMENT TO ALTER AGRARIAN FINANCE SYSTEM

Madrid YA in Spanish 16 Oct 84 p 18

[Article by Melchor Enrique]

[Text] This week, probably on Thursday, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and private banks will sign the financial cooperation agreement that marks the final stage of the farm authorities' ambitious plan to replace some FORPPA and SENPA loans with subsidized private loans. The initial signers will be the seven major banks (Banesto, Central, Hispano, Bilbao, Popular, Vizcaya and Santander), in addition to the Banco Exterior de Espana, Zaragozano, Sabadell and another intermediate-level bank.

Madrid--The farm sector financial cooperation agreement, which other institutions can join later, calls for banks to contribute some 30 billion pesetas to the various credit lines of the agrarian administration (short-term loans for field work expenses, sector restructuring of the Jerez district [marco de Jerez] and long-term loans for farm modernization) under the same terms as the funds committed by the savings banks and the Banco de Credito Agricola-Cajas Rurales group on 31 July and 18 September respectively.

The total amount of "private" loans available to the farm sector will rise under the three agreements to some 90 billion pesetas, and the cost to the government of subsidizing interest rates (4 to 5 points on the average, with upper and lower limits of 7 and 2.5, depending on the type of loan) will be some 3 billion a year.

#### Private Accords

After signing this final comprehensive agreement, the ministry will work out a series of pacts with the various financial institutions to provide credit lines for specific activities. One of them will provide for loans for beet growers; another, loans to purchase fertilizers

and herbicides for grain crops, and the third will be earmarked for the purchase of select grain and oilseed seeds. The first two credit lines should total some 10 billion pesetas, and the third some 6 billion.

The agrarian administration is obviously pleased with this series of agreements, which is truly unprecedented not only in Agriculture but in any other ministry as well because of the amount of money and the great number of financial institutions involved. The promoters of the operation underscore among its advantages the freeing up of government funds, which can now be used for purposes other than loans to farmers, and greater access to the loans, inasmuch as there is a branch of one of the institutions that signed the pacts in practically every town in Spain.

#### Chain Reaction

According to the same sources, the new system will also provide a more accurate gauge of the budgetary costs of the ministry's financial transactions and, above all, it could be very instrumental in boosting credit investment in agriculture. Instead of a pretext for an initial contact between growers and lending institutions, the loans provided under the official agreements could pave the way for many other credits, given the low level of unpaid loans.

Two pieces of information reflect the importance of the new system. On the one hand, even if the initially forecast 115 billion pesetas are not available this year because the loans for the grain harvest are not on time, the 90 billion that will be available easily exceeds the regular credit ceiling of the farm sector's lending agency par excellence, the Banco de Credito Agricola (BCA), which is some 65 billion. On the other, the execution of two partial agreements (financing for the cotton and tomato crops) that are similar to the overall pact suggest that the latter will be successful. According to official sources, 2 billion pesetas had been expected to be available under the former agreement, and the offers of the various lending institutions totaled 3 billion. The surplus in the case of the tomato growers has been even larger, as 3 billion had been requested, and the total credit offering, in which almost all banks operating in growing areas took part, amounted to 5 billion. Moreover, FORPPA has so far received almost no complaints from growers about the two credit operations.

The series of agreements signed with the savings banks, the BCA-Cajas Rurales group and to be signed with private banks extend only to the 1984/85 season. Nevertheless, depending on their performance they could be renewed for subsequent seasons, pending renegotiation of the existing terms, which include an average weighted interest rate of 15-16 percent for the lending institutions.



## BANK CAPITAL EXPANSION TIED TO RESERVE REQUIREMENT BILL

Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Oct 84 p 57

[Article by Rosa Ovejero and Jose Maria Urquijo]

[Text] Madrid--Spanish banks will not be able to work out their capital expansion policy until the economy minister establishes the regulations for the reserve requirement bill that is now before the Cortes. The expansions will depend on the bill's definition of the reserve ratio (reserves as a percentage of investments), on the percentage that it sets and on the classification of risks.

The presidents of the major Spanish banks, who are in charge of the capital expansion policy of their credit institutions, are waiting to see Miguel Boyer's decision on the percentage of assets that the banks will have to cover with their own funds. If the percentage is high, they will be forced to boost their funds by expanding capital or through other means.

The reserve requirement bill makes two major changes in the current liquidity ratio system. In the first place, the requirement is a percentage of investments, not deposits. Secondly, these investments will be gauged by degree of risk and, therefore, will be covered by larger or smaller amounts of capital. Nevertheless, the bill merely calls for "maintaining sufficient funds as a proportion of assets, guarantees, investments and risks assumed" and leaves the setting of the percentage and the assessment of the risks up to the Economy Ministry.

The bill thus grants the ministry wideranging powers to expand on it. According to the sources we consulted, the banks have told Boyer that five percent would be an adequate reserve ratio and that they are covered to this extent. Nevertheless, according to the experts, their request is based on a risk assessment that has yet to be officially made and on a weighted percentage similar to what other countries have. If the percentage were set at seven, all of the major banks would have to expand their reserves in one way or another, bank sources feel. The banks and Boyer are currently negotiating on these issues.

In any event, in addition to traditional capital expansions, banks would expand their reserves by issuing subordinate debentures, a type of debt with a very long term and special conditions which like participation loans would be computed as reserves for all purposes. In other countries subordinate loans are likened to capital, but at less than 100 percent.

The hope is that the Cortes will pass the bill before the end of the year, because in addition to the reserve ratio it includes the standard investment ratio, which in turn governs the obligatory investment of the banks in government bonds. The government is very interested in having this investment arrangement worked out for 1985 so that it can use it to control the money supply. It could also boost the ratio from its current 12 percent of admitted liabilities to 15 percent.

Regardless of the bill that the Congress of Deputies eventually passes and what Miguel Boyer does with it later, the Vizcaya and Santander banks are going to approve a series of operations that might start up before the end of the year. Although according to all the rumors the Banco de Vizcaya is the only lending institution that plans an expansion of capital, authorized spokesmen have denied this to ABC, as long as capital expansion is understood in its traditional sense. What Vizcaya will approve soon is the issuance of new shares to take care of pending bond conversions. The bank itself describes this operation as a "technical adjustment," one that it already performed last June for the same reason.

As for the Banco de Santander, its president, Emilio Botin, announced during the regular stockholders meeting this year that he intended to increase the face value of the bank's shares this fiscal year; it is currently set at 400 pesetas. The increase to an eventual 500 pesetas will be in several stages.

When the economic authorities have worked out their policy on expansions, Spain's shareholders will, to an extent, relive the days when the banks based their dividends to shareholders on capital expansions.

When capital expansions became common, the management of lending institutions began to limit and even to cancel them (Vizcaya and Popular).

They thus acted in advance of the policy that the Bank of Spain later issued when it advised against released capital expansions and raised the limit set by the Larraz law from six to eight percent (of the sum of paid-up capital and reserves) for dividend distribution.

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CS0: 3548/19

## TEKEL HEAD OZDEN RESPONDS TO IMPROPRIETY CHARGES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Oct 84 pp 1,8

[Interview with State Monopolies Director General Yucel Ozden]

[Text] Turkish News Agency--Responding to allegations of an increasing number of improprieties within Tekel [State Monopolies Office], the organization's Director General Yucel Ozden stated, "I am not saying there have been no improprieties. I am working incessantly to uncover improprieties and irregularities."

Tekel Director General Ozden, pointing out that he gave a statement to the attorney general regarding misconduct, said, "Those who say they can import Marlboro cigarettes cheaply are those who attempt to bring dirty money into the country."

Ozden answered a THA [Turkish News Agency] correspondent's questions on the topics of denunciations of Tekel, the persons making these denunciations, and the charges of improprieties and irregularities.

[Question] Investigations of charges of improprieties and of Tekel administrators are opened from time to time. What is the story behind these incidents within Tekel?

[Answer] There are a number of problems within Tekel. I am not saying there are no improprieties. I am working night and day with investigators to uncover irregularities, but this does not mean that Tekel is involved in acts of treason. To assert this is not correct.

[Question] It is claimed that Tekel could have purchased Marlboro cigarettes, bought for duty-free shops at \$250.22 per crate, at a much lower price. A lawsuit was initiated stating that the state suffered a loss of about \$2 billion because of this, and a decision not to prosecute was handed down. Would you give your views on this?

[Answer] Initially, this topic attracted my attention. "I said, "I will sell the cigarettes I purchase anywhere. How is it possible for anyone to interfere

with this here in Turkey, in my country?" However, I summoned some persons to discuss this topic, which seemed to be handled in a reasonable fashion, and they told me, "We do not provide the cigarettes we sell you at a low price for your domestic market for the purpose of sale at tax-free stores. For this reason, we sold them at this price knowingly, and we will gradually raise the price. And, certainly, we do not offer them at a lower price to duty-free shops."

In 1984, we earned close to \$5 billion at duty-free shops. Are we so irrational that, if cigarettes were available for \$150, we would not purchase those, but would pay \$230? Is this possible? We are engaged in long-term business. The moment long-term ties are severed, one is forced to buy from black marketeers, from smugglers. If such a misfortune would occur, it is not known what would happen in the end.

[Question] There are Turkish firms that offer cigarettes at a low price. Haven't you responded to any of these at all?

[Answer] The sincerity of a state organization is vital. Some have come to me with papers. I said, "Come and let's talk." I could not find authenticity in anyone. In other words, it does not exist. In fact, there are several firms, possessors of dirty money in the world, that put on the Turkish market the cigarettes they have obtained in one manner or another in an effort to bring in their dirty money. Of course, we cannot engage in the business of middlemen, of smugglers. And it is not possible for us to take them seriously.

[Question] We have in our possession investigator's report No 1973/446 dated 27 March 1983 and another, No 51, dated 26 September 1983. According to these, there are several persons involved in improprieties in the customs office, and, despite the fact that their names were turned over to the public prosecutor, they are still working. What have you done about this?

[Answer] I cannot allow anyone to harm a state organization through illegalities or irregularities. Therefore, we in Tekel are confronted with this and a number of similar large-scale and small-scale incidents. I examined the reports you mention. We are awaiting the court's decision on those charges.

[Question] You also admit that improprieties occurred. Why haven't you announced this to the public without waiting for a final court decision to be handed down in each case?

[Answer] This is a state institution. If you announce an irregularity every day, what will happen? There are already interest groups that anticipate the weakening of Tekel. Why would I ensure that Tekel fall in the eyes of the public? Are there no problems within other organizations? Exactly 70,000 persons work for Tekel. There are a number of incidents of misconduct. I cannot say there aren't. However, we are dealing with them and engage in constant monitoring. Furthermore, what do the persons who make these and similar charges wish to do? They are the ones who make a conscious effort to impede state organizations. If these persons were ministers, they would be the ones who make allegations about prime ministers and the president.

## YILMAZ, NARIN SQUARE OFF ON NEW LABOR LAW

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 21 Oct 84 pp 1,8

[Text] Following delays which for workers have meant working without contracts for a rather lengthy period, the number of workplaces and workers sitting down to collective bargaining is now gradually increasing. A number of significant collective bargaining efforts are either resulting in contracts or being referred to mediation. Meanwhile, we are also witnessing the first strike actions. The criticisms which began when the laws framing the new labor regime were still in the preparatory stages have, since the laws went into effect and especially as their implementation becomes more widespread, become the topics of widespread complaints by unions and labor. In light of the principles of TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions], the YHK [Supreme Arbitration Council], and the Coordination Board, dissatisfaction in labor ranks is growing, both among those who sign collective contracts and among those going to mediation. Already, labor is saying that "With these laws, one cannot speak of the right to collective bargaining or the right to strike." As we approach the end of the first year since the implementation of the new labor regime framed by the new laws, what do Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] General Chairman Sevkett Yilmaz and TISK General Chairman Halit Narin, leaders of the labor and management fronts, respectively, think? What are their approaches to the problems of implementation of the new labor regime, and to the framework drawn by the laws? We queried them to find out, as follows:

Yilmaz: Collective Bargaining Being Placed under Mortgage

According to Turk-Is General Chairman Sevkett Yilmaz, implementation of Laws Numbers 2821 and 2822 on Collective Contracts, Strikes, and Lockouts has shown how valid are the doubts which have been expressed ever since publication of the draft constitution. According to Yilmaz, shortcomings in the legal formulations give the political administration the possibility of playing at will with workers' rights and freedoms, and some employers, in an effort to obtain short-term advantages, are endeavoring to benefit as much as possible from this state of affairs.

Turk-Is General Chairman Sevkett Yilmaz stresses that the obstacles before the collective bargaining system begin at the stage of determination of the

representative union. In answering our questions regarding problems encountered in the new labor regime, he began by expressing views on the stance and policies of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security which have not inspired confidence:

Yilmaz: "Proper functioning of the free collective bargaining system is dependent on the ability to answer correctly three basic questions. The first of these is the question as to which union will be the union to enter into the collective contract. This is related to the question of certification, and unfortunately it is not possible for this question to be answered in a proper manner within the Turkish legal system. Arrangements made sitting at a table have fallen flat; the system isn't working, and it inspires no trust.

"The second question is that as to what level the wages will be determined at. This can be at the individual workplace level or at that of groups of workplaces, or at the level of a certain industry, or at that of an employer, or at a nationwide level. The law has disregarded the industry and nationwide levels and stressed the workplace and employer levels. The policy is fraught with difficulties. Those who initiate discussions of just what the Turkish economy will and will not support should first have determined, from among the various alternatives, the one most appropriate to our conditions and our needs. In this area, there could be extensive cooperation among labor, management, and the political administration. There could have been efforts to find the most appropriate way, but this hasn't been done.

"The third question is that of how collective bargaining is to be carried out. In an environment wherein possibilities for using the strike, the confrontational means of solution, are so restricted, no one looks with confidence at more conciliatory solutions. The intended system is thus bankrupt from the outset.

"These three questions remain unanswered. It's not enough to say "We are in favor of the collective bargaining system." Favoring the collective bargaining system means taking the right to strike out of the situation of being controversial. No lasting peace can be built on a foundation of inequity."

Sevket Yilmaz says that, with the implementation of the new labor regime, the significance of the restrictions in the laws on certain basic rights has emerged more clearly. Stating that negative approaches are making the loopholes in the laws even more serious, he explains developments as follows:

Yilmaz: "Profiting to a considerable degree from the restrictions on the possibilities of strikes, there are efforts to obtain a mortgage on collective bargaining, both in the public sector by means of the Coordination Board and in the private sector through the employers' decisions of principle.

"In the final analysis this approach will increase unrest and prevent labor-management relations from being erected on a sound foundation. Such a result is in no one's interest.



"Turkey's success in both its development effort and in its democracy depends upon its ability to resolve the workers' problems in a form which is consistent with the requirements of social justice."

#### Contradicts Legal Rules

Stating that he is confronted with basic problems in the two basic laws which delineate labor unions' rights, and that he considers changes in the laws to be necessary, the Turk-Is General Chairman spoke as follows in summary:

"Yilmaz: "The basic shortcoming of Labor Unions law Number 2821 is its contradiction, in the area of workers' rights and freedoms, with the international legal rules implemented without exception in all the countries which accept Western democracy as their constitutional legal system. The provisions of Law Number 2821 which unduly restrict basic labor rights in comparison with international norms must be changed.

"Law Number 2822 on Collective Contracts, Strikes, and Lockouts, with its constraints on strikes and its provisions giving the administration the authority to postpone strikes, has eliminated from the outset any chance of establishing labor-management relations on a sound footing, both by its preservation of the Supreme Arbitration Council, which workers know very well from its four years of operation, and by those aspects which allow the political administration, through the Council, to interfere in the free collective bargaining process.

"The implementation has clearly shown that, in a system with such extensive prohibitions on strikes and in which disputes, with strikes postponed by the government, will in the end go to the Supreme Arbitration Council, the results of which can be guessed in advance in light of its composition, one cannot speak of a right to genuine collective bargaining. As for restrictions on the right to strike in those workplaces where the strike prohibition and strike postponement provisions are presumed not to apply, the first strike implementations have made the situation clear. One cannot speak of a true right to strike under these laws, as it cannot be claimed that unions, by exerting pressure on management through the power of the strike, will be able to assert their weight sufficiently at the bargaining table."

#### Narin: Nothing Wrong with System

Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions [TISK] Chairman Halit Narin considers arguments over the new labor regime to be fundamentally ill-timed and premature. According to Halit Narin, before the new laws can be debated and before it can be said that they have shortcomings and deficiencies, the first round of collective bargaining, at least, should be completed, and the second round entered: in other words, some years must pass. Only at that time will it be possible to determine whatever deficiencies there may be in those laws which have been altered in order to resolve the difficulties of the previous period, and only then can the correction of these shortcomings and deficiencies be demanded.



TISK General Chairman Halit Narin, continually stressing that he was not eager to speak out because it was still too early, omitted most of our questions concerning the problems of the new labor regime, but did provide the following:

Implementation of the new labor regime's laws numbered 2821 and 2822 has begun. First the legal provisions dealing with labor union organizing (orgutlenme) went into effect, and a number of problems were encountered. Later collective bargaining and even strikes began...

Narin: "First of all, the word 'organizing' (orgutlenme) is foreign to me. Professional organizations have been set up by law. Orgutlenme is used in other senses in Turkey. [often for illegal or subversive organizations] I don't like it; the word teskilatlanma is better. The law has already given a certain form to the existing union structure. It has done this by correcting both their deficiencies and their superfluous aspects. The collective bargaining system began only after this arrangement, and it has only been 3-4 months since it started. Perhaps this is a genuine arrangement; let's just apply it for a while and see."

Before passing on to collective bargaining, let me interject. From the employer's standpoint, giving a new form to the union structure, or organizing -- using the term you prefer -- may not have given rise to significant new problems. But haven't a number of important problems been experienced from the workers' standpoint?

Narin: "The first issue is fallacious, and so is this latter one."

Labor Law Not Labor Law

What is the error, what's the problem?

Narin: "In the labor law, and in the world of work, the employers' organization and the workers' organization are two complementary elements. In other words, if the worker has a problem, that has to be able to be considered a problem for the employer as well. To show the worker as opposed to the employer is to show the employer as opposed to the worker. Let's for once get away from this type of thinking. The labor law is not a workers' law, or an employers' law either, but a law which regulates the labor regime. The laws concerning unions do not differentiate between worker and employer unions. I am opposed in principle to their being postulated as separate. The second matter, that of certification, has been an issue creating problems in union procedures as long as anyone can remember. Now to expect that it will all at once be resolved by the Labor Ministry's taking it up again in a computerized manner is simply overoptimism. But one thing is certain: although there have been complaints, the system created by the new laws has produced results which have led to less of an uproar. Whether the deficiencies stem from the computer or from inaccuracies in the information provided it, this is something that can be remedied with time. In my view, it's still too early to identify the deficiencies."

## Need for Time

But the laws are being implemented, the collective bargaining system is functioning. The labor unions are of the view that this implementation demonstrates restriction in the laws of a number of rights...

Narin: "It's still premature to identify the deficiencies in these laws. It's only been 2-3 months since they began to be applied. The first-round contracts haven't yet been reached. Let's just let the first round of talks finish. If there are shortcomings, then the reasons for them should be evaluated...We need at least another 6-8 months of time. And afterwards the evaluation itself will take time. What are the complaints being heard today? There is talk that 'In order to gain more rights we gave up our old rights.' They had complaints about the laws deriving from the 1961 Constitution as well. They wanted more rights. Turk-Is and similar organizations always complain about lack of rights. Employers also claim that they have few rights, and that workers' rights are causing them problems. You'll always have this. The important thing is that the new laws are the result of an evaluation of the experience of 20 years. Whatever shortcomings there may have been, the law has corrected them. In my view there is no problem which has been observed at present in the system of collective labor contracts and free collective bargaining. The two sides are carrying out face-to-face discussions. They are expressing their free wills. All the modes to which we've always been accustomed have been for the negotiations to take place within a struggle of violent dimensions. I mean one can't act on the basis of an assumption that some voices have arisen saying that there are no large strikes now, like the ones before 12 September 1980 which so disturbed the public. In other words, if reaching a contract at a workplace without a strike is consistent with the needs of the national economy, and if both labor and management think along this same parallel and struggle by exercising both their rights and their duties in the best form possible, and if Turk-Is and TISK have been able to organize their sides in a national understanding and consciousness that will maintain a balance, then one can only rejoice at this."

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CSO: 3554/18

## INTEREST RATE ADJUSTMENT EXPECTED IN LIGHT OF INFLATION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 20 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Ankara - The tendency to make no changes in interest rates until December is becoming stronger, and both the Central Bank and the Undersecretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade are agreed to neither raise nor lower deposit interest rates, which were to be readjusted as of 1 November.

Stating that it was expected that the current rates would continue through November in light of the government policy of holding interest rates above the rate of inflation, an official of the Undersecretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade spoke as follows:

"When the rise in wholesale prices for July was at the rather low rate of .7 percent, the view favoring a corresponding reduction in interest rates gained influence, but the idea of reducing the rates was abandoned after the rise of 3.2 percent in wholesale prices for August. When the interest rates were adjusted on 11 August, the August price increases were taken into account."

## Price Increases to be Considered in Interest Rate Adjustments

Noting that interest rates had been held at the same level in the most recent adjustment on 28 September due to the price increases on State Monopoly products and liquid fuels, the official from the Undersecretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade said that "It is expected that the price increases for the months of September and October will be on the order of 2 percent. Accordingly, the trend in prices will be taken into account when the interest rates to go into effect on 1 November are set."

Meanwhile, the Undersecretariat's trend of issuing high-interest-bearing treasury bills is being pointed to as a significant factor pushing up real interest rates. The Undersecretariat's issuance of the high-interest securities is evaluated as a factor which militates against lowered interest rates.

Stating that a reduction in deposit interest rates during a period when high rates are paid on treasury bills would lead to unfair competition, an official of the Undersecretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade gave his views on the matter as follows:

"In addition to the rise in the price level, the increase in the issuance of treasury bills and state bonds over recent months is also a major factor working against a reduction in interest rates. The treasury is issuing securities based on the highest interest rates that the banks are paying on deposits. This policy is necessary in order for the purchase of these securities to be attractive. The issuance of bonds bearing high interest rates, which result from the tight money policy being followed, necessarily prevents a reduction in deposit interest rates. Since it is known that, as long as the sales of high-interest-bearing treasury bills continue, the banks will protest any reduction in deposit interest rates as amounting to unfair competition, efforts are being made to maintain a balance."

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CSO: 3554/18

## ILICAK PRESENTS 'WITNESS' FOR COHERENT ECONOMIC PLANNING

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 23 Oct 84, pp 1, 10

[Article by Nazli Ilıcak]

[Text] Yesterday, we published in this column the thoughts of one of our young bureaucrats. He said that Turkey is compelled to meet the demand for 500,000 new jobs each year and, for this reason, defended the need to make a transition to labor-intensive industries, which require a much smaller investment per individual. This bureaucrat, who noted that entrepreneurs are turning away from technology and automation because high interest rates have made credit very expensive, pointed to the need to give priority to the raising of livestock and poultry and the production of ceramics, clothing, cotton rugs, trinkets, and handicrafts. He said, "Since we have resources of \$3 billion and a demand for 500,000 new jobs each year, emphasis must be placed on investments that require an expenditure of as little as \$6,000 per individual."

We phoned a person who is knowledgeable and widely experienced in this field and asked:

"My friend, did you read yesterday's article?"

"I did."

"What do you think?"

"Before responding to an idea, before looking at what was said, we should, as Churchill stated, consider the source. Is he or is he not worthy to debate, to challenge?"

"He is a highly respected and influential bureaucrat. It is possible that he reflects the fundamental leanings and preferences of the government."

"The sun does not rise from a different spot each morning. This nation has a plan, a program, a budget. Article 166 of the constitution, which deals with planning, gives the state the functions of developing industry as well as agriculture rapidly and in a balanced and harmonious manner and of utilizing resources productively. It proposes that measures be taken to increase national wealth and production, to ensure price stability and balance in foreign

payments, and to develop investments and employment opportunities. To divide the \$3 billion available among 500,000 unemployed and say there is a need to give precedence to \$6,000 investments for each individual, to look upon a reality such as unemployment as Turkey's sole problem, is to deny the significance of the plan. The people have a right to a budget. Governments prepare planning strategies, plans, and programs, and they draw up budgets based on these. To say the sun should rise at this point one morning and that point the next runs counter not only to the concept of a plan and the constitution, which defends the concept of a plan, but also to the right of the people and, therefore, to the democratic form of government."

"You are saying then, aren't you, that a plan, at the outset, establishes how resources will best be utilized?"

"I am saying that a nation cannot be administered by momentary whims. How many problems does Turkey have? What is the extent of its resources? How will these resources be distributed to produce the best results? A matrix will emerge. This matrix is unraveled, and the best of the alternatives are chosen. This is what a plan is. The concept of a plan is based on solving a nation's critical problems quickly and in the best possible manner and to gain the power to solve problems in the future."

"What about the topic of employment?"

"Employment is only one of Turkey's concerns. The most important are investment, production, and growth. Job opportunities are one outcome of growth. In fact, this phenomenon was already included in the fifth 5-year plan. Because the rate of development predicted was achieved, it was reported that the current employment situation would be maintained. In the fifth 5-year plan, it was asserted that the size of the total labor force, 18 million in 1984, will increase to 19.5 million in 1989. Accordingly, it is said that the demand for new jobs will be 300,000 each year (not 500,000).

"In short, the government has planned to find jobs for 1.5 million persons within 5 years and has established a 5.5-percent development rate in order to reach this goal. This is to say that new jobs are a by-product of economic indicators of a plan. Again, in the same plan, it was foreseen to raise the proportion of industrial production in the gross national product, and, when the manufacturing industry was determined to be a supportive sector, the increase in productive employment was taken as essential. In other words, the creation of jobs through artificial means has not been considered."

"Will you elaborate a bit on productive employment?"

"If you eat all the wheat in your granary and do not leave any for seed, you will be unable to sow your field the following year. The following sentence was included in the plan, 'The increase in productive employment' will be defined 'as a function of investment volume, of investment productivity, of the production sector, and its technology.'

"The goal is to use resources productively to achieve the highest output and in a manner that will provide the nation the power to make future investments.

"The wheel of the state is a large wheel. You cannot change the way the wheel turns at whim. The wheel will either strike you and knock you down or will be costly to the nation."

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CSO: 3554/26



## BRIEFS

MAJORITY OPPOSES NUCLEAR POWER--Fifty-three percent of the Finns take a negative stand on nuclear power in electricity production, according to a recent opinion poll by Economy Research. Twenty-six percent adopt a positive view of nuclear power, according to the report made at the end of September. One-fifth of those who answered the inquiry were unable to take a stand on the matter, it was reported from Economy Research on Monday. According to the poll, nuclear power was most often supported by those in a leadership position; 43 percent of them announce they take a positive view of it. Thirty-seven percent of those who had at least passed the examination for entrance to a university and 35 percent of the men were affirmatively inclined. The most negative attitude toward nuclear power was adopted by those who live in northern Finland, of whom 65 percent opposed it, and by women and working people, according to the poll. Fifty-eight percent of the working people and 60 percent of the women who responded were opposed to it. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Oct 84 p 33] 12327

CSO: 3617/15

## EEC FINANCING OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26 Oct 84 p 7

/Text/ Minister of Energy and Natural Resources E. Veryvakis announced yesterday that the European Community will finance 19 Greek alternative forms of energy projects amounting to 450 million drachmas. These projects primarily concern the liquifaction and gasification of solid fuels, solar and wind-powered energy, small hydroelectric projects, economizing of energy and biomass.

The amount of this financing represents 40 percent of the budget for projects that are more specifically the following: three projects for electric power production by wind-powered energy; seven projects for solar-powered energy; one project dealing with liquifaction and gasification of solid fuels; three small hydroelectric projects; three projects concerned with the economization of energy and two in the field of biomass.

The above projects were selected from among 750 by means of strict technical and financial criteria.

The 19 projects to be financed by the EEC will be implemented by the following authorities:

Solar Energy

1. Two DEI /Public Power Corporation/ and University of Thraki projects for providing electric power to lighthouses through photovoltaic systems.
2. A project for utilizing passive solar energy systems for heating and cooling by a private company.
3. The financing of a project for two industrial units for development of passive solar energy systems.
4. The financing of a hotel using solar energy systems and heat pumps.
5. The financing of a project of the University of Patras for the use of solar energy in the development of fish hatcheries and greenhouses.

## Wind-Powered Energy

Financing has been approved for the following projects:

1. Construction of a 80 KW wind-powered generator by DEI-EAV /Greek Aircraft Industry/-AEI /Supreme Educational Establishments/.
2. Construction of a 3 KW wind-powered generator in Parnitha.
3. Construction of a 300 KW wind-powered generator by DEI.

## Gas Energy

A project for financing a nitrogenous fertilizer industry feasibility study for the setting up of a plant for producing lignite gas.

## Small Hydroelectric Plants

1. To be financed is the construction of two small DEI turbines in Stratos, Aitolokarnania and at the AIS /expansion unknown/ conduit of Kardia
2. A 75-KW turbine is to be financed and built in Sella, Evrytania (ETVA /Hellenic Industrial Development/ and the Association for the Development of Evrytania).

## Economizing of Energy

1. To be financed is the setting up and the equipping of a start-up and brake system for trolleys of the ILPAP /Electric-Powered Buses of the Athens-Piraeus Area/.
2. To be financed is still one more project for the production of natural gas in an ammonia plant of the Phosphoric Fertilizer Company.
3. A project for the production of high octane gasoline through new methods introduced by the Motor Oil Company.

## Biomass

1. To be financed is the Erkis Company for the production of ethanol through a new method for rapid alcohol fermentation.
2. Setting up of a unit for producing charcoal from basic residues (ETVA and the Agricultural School).

The EEC also approved the financing, with 400,000 European currency units, of the DEI project for developing the hydrocarbon deposit in the Katakolos region.

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CSO: 3521/45

## BRIEFS

**GAS PRICE RISE REDUCES CONSUMPTION**--The consumption of liquid fuels in Portugal, specifically gasoline, has been undergoing successive declines. According to the statistical services of the Directorate-General of Energy, during the first half of 1984, the consumption of regular and super gasoline underwent an overall decrease of 3 percent compared to the same period in 1983. In absolute terms and, according to data supplied by the same source, 310,645 tons of super gasoline were consumed throughout the national territory during the first 6 months of 1983, while 307,200 tons were consumed during the same period this year. With regard to the figures for regular gasoline, 71,824 tons of that fuel were consumed in the first half of 1983, while 63,886 tons were consumed during the same period in 1984. Those figures represent a variation of minus 1.1 percent for the consumption of super gasoline and minus 11.2 percent for regular gasoline. Those drops in the rates of gasoline consumption correspond approximately with the price increases that occurred during the same period. According to the Portuguese Petroleum Corporation (PETROGAL) public relations department, whenever there are price increases, there are reductions in the consumption of gasoline. In fact, in July 1983 a liter of super used to cost 84 escudos and a liter of regular, 81 escudos. This year, the prices of liquid fuels have already undergone two increases: in February 1984 super gasoline rose to 97 escudos and in July it went up to 99 escudos per liter. The route followed by the price of regular is the same: in February of this year it was 92 escudos and now it costs 96 escudos. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Sep 84 p 6] 8711

**NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN CRITICIZED**--The lack thus far of a public debate about the National Energy Plan (PEN) promised by the government and, at the same time, the evidence of "the interests of the private forum" in the implementation of that debate were indicated in a study prepared by specialized experts at the request of the Social Progress and Democracy Institute youth. The conclusions of the study made public this week indicate that the PEN shows a concession to the established lobbies, is based on a superseded model of development ("because it continues to favor the high energy-consuming economic activities such as steel, cement and petrochemicals") and does not question "the basic problem of the poor utilization of energy resources, limiting itself to concentrating 75 percent of the investments on increasing the supply of electricity." According to the study, the key variables are manipulated in the PEN "with a view to brazenly favoring the nuclear option." [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Sep 84 p 14] 8711

ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION UP--The production and consumption of electric energy in the Portuguese mainland during the month of September increased in overall terms compared to last year, with the Portuguese Electricity Company (EDP) resorting to importing electricity to meet the country's needs. Data supplied by EDP reveal, for example, that during the week of the 17th through the 23d of this month energy consumption was 354 million KWH, compared to 328.2 million KWH for the same period last year. As for production, it reached 338 million KWH compared to 308.5 million KWH in 1983. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Sep 84 p 14] 8711

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## ENVIRONMENT AFFAIRS MINISTER AHDE COMMENTS ON ACHIEVEMENTS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Oct 84 p 9

[Article: "Environmental Affairs Ministry Satisfied at Age One"]

[Text] The Environmental Affairs Ministry celebrated its first birthday on Tuesday.

This occurred in a situation in which, according to Environmental Affairs Minister Matti Ahde, there is a general lack of perspective among the parties in parliament, including environmentally oriented members, concerning environmental protection.

The minister said, however, that he was satisfied with his work and the work of his ministry during the past year.

Ahde became aware of this lack of perspective among the groups in parliament during the debate that followed the minister's report to parliament on environmental protection, which he delivered on 28 September.

"Although the groups criticized the report for lacking concrete proposals, their contributions to the debate were even more lacking in concrete proposals," Ahde said.

He stated, however, that the individual members of parliament who spoke during the debate had a genuine interest in the issue.

### Stepping On Powerful Toes

In his criticism of the Conservative Party, in particular, Ahde reiterated the principle of the Environmental Affairs Ministry, according to which those responsible for damaging the environment must also pay to protect the environment, whether it be industry, agriculture, municipalities, or individuals.

"We can try to develop incentives for groups and individuals to protect the environment, but we cannot send the bill to the taxpayers," he said.

According to Ahde, when the Environmental Affairs Ministry follows this principle, important toes are always stepped on.

#### Important Decision

According to Ahde, the Environmental Affairs Ministry has assisted in the passage of several important pieces of environmental legislation.

The minister has set standards for air quality. A new law limiting air pollution has taken effect. A total of 37 million marks has been allocated for acid rain research over a 5-year period. This project will employ 62 people. Another working group is studying how Finland can reduce sulfur emissions 30 percent by 1993, as promised.

Finland is also active in international organizations that are dealing with air pollution. In addition, during Ahde's visit to the Soviet Union in March, a bilateral agreement was signed for cooperation in various fields of environmental protection, particularly air pollution.

The Environmental Affairs Ministry now has three full-time negotiators for purchasing land to be used as nature reserves. Since the value of wood alone on a proposed nature reserve may exceed the entire budget for purchases, which was 19 million marks in 1983 and 28 million this year, the possibilities of purchasing land are limited.

So far, the liveliest debate over the new ministry's action has been on proposed new building legislation, which has been criticized sharply by agricultural organizations, in particular.

The most far-reaching legislation proposed to parliament by the Environmental Affairs Ministry to date is the residential rental legislation that is expected to result in increased production of rental units and a reduction in the loss of old apartment buildings.

Ahde said that his ministry, the insurance companies, and worker pension funds have a goal of constructing 4,000 new rental units by 1990 and thoroughly renovating old apartments.

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